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LOVE AND THE IMAGINATION
IN THE PHILOSOPHY AND POETRY
OF SAMUEL TAYLOR COLERIDGE

by



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A THESIS

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines Coleridge's interrelated conceptions of love and the imagination, as they are presented in his philosophy and poetry. The Introduction establishes Coleridge's continuing desire for unified vision, and suggests that he found both love and the imagination to be the power which, by reconciling internal and external opposites, enables man to achieve a vision of the unity of all things. The two opposing types of love, Eros and Agape, are also mentioned in the Introduction, in preparation for Chapter I, which discusses the philosophic history of the two "motifs." In Chapter I, the importance of Platonism in general to Coleridge is first of all established; then the pre-Platonic, Platonic, and neo- and Christian-Platonic ideas on love and creativity are briefly outlined. The purpose here is not only to trace the development of Eros and to show its gradual fusion with Agape, but also, and centrally, to point out ideas (and often even images) which are of importance to Coleridge himself.

In Chapter II, Coleridge's own theories of love and the imagination are examined. The discussion of the imagination concentrates on Coleridge's definitions of "fancy" and the "primary" and "secondary" imagination in the Biographia Literaria; however, other significant statements are also mentioned in order to clarify these definitions. This part of the chapter shows that it is the primary imagination which allows man to perceive the "unity in multēity," and that it is the secondary imagination which enables the poet to embody this elevated perception in poetic form. The second part of the chapter deals with human love, first

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of all distinguishing it from lust, or fanciful association, and then relating it to Coleridge's conceptions of the primary and secondary imagination. Finally, Coleridge's theories of divine love and love of the divine are discussed.

Chapters III and IV examine the most important poems in which Coleridge's theories of these two synthetic powers are embodied. Chapter III considers his major poems from this point of view, and shows how they deal with the process of achieving unified vision through imaginative love. Chapter IV deals with Coleridge's final inability to do so himself. He admits in "Dejection" that his imaginative powers are "suspended," and he indicates in the earlier version of the poem that unsatisfied love has caused the failure of his "genial spirits." Coleridge's personal need for love is examined in this last chapter, with reference to "Dejection" and the most significant "Asra poems."

The synthetic process of love and the imagination (and particularly their interrelationship) are of importance to most of the other Romantic poets. In order to indicate the possible scope of this topic, and to suggest the importance of it to the Romantic vision, Shelley's ideas on the two forces are briefly considered in the Conclusion.

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INTRODUCTION

Any critical work on Coleridge, whether its concern be with his poetry, aesthetics, or even biography, must begin with Coleridge's own central concern, his pervasive desire for unified vision. Coleridge himself admitted this desire to John Thelwall in 1797: "My mind feels as if it ached to behold & know something great--something one & indivisible" ¹ His longing for unity was, however, manifested even earlier than this, for in a letter written a few days later to Thomas Poole, Coleridge says that a "love of 'the Great' & 'the Whole'" ² had been his even as a child. And this love never left him: as a man, Coleridge dedicated himself to the search for an all-inclusive system which would support that love and that vision.

Of course this sense of the unity behind all things was not restricted to Coleridge; it was a feeling which was shared to some extent by all of the Romantic poets. All of them tended to be of an idealistic temperament; and all of them had to acknowledge (or deliberately ignore) the fact that this "felt" idealism was almost entirely unsupported by the scientific and philosophic theories which were currently held in England. These theories were derived from the earlier eighteenth century thinkers who had been almost exclusively concerned with the divisible rather than the "indivisible"; they had put forward purely materialistic explanations of external phenomena and often purely mechanistic theories of the perception of such phenomena. Even the faculty of Reason itself, certainly in the most extreme views of d'Alembert and Condillac, was

considered to be merely the result of passively compounded sensations received from an equally spiritless world. Reason was certainly not for them the "vision and the faculty divine"³ that it was for the Romantics or for the neo-Platonics of the centuries before them. Accordingly, the Romantics generally felt that the poetry of the eighteenth century suffered from the same lack of spirituality, and a consequent lack of what Coleridge was to call vital or "organic unity."⁴ Indeed, it could be little more than fanciful allegory, for the philosophy from which it sprang did not allow for the vital correspondences between man, nature, and the divine which are essential for true myth. As Frye and Whalley⁵ indicate, the Romantic poets were faced with the formidable task of recreating out of the fragmented vision of the eighteenth century a unified mythological structure upon which to base their poetry. Although Coleridge himself rarely discusses myth, in his 1818 lectures on poetry he does equate myth with symbolic narrative and contrasts it with allegory, its fundamental opposite.⁶ His comments on the symbol itself are, of course, more numerous; and they indicate a temperament far from mechanistic, for he maintains that a symbol is always characterized by "the translucence of the eternal through and in the temporal."⁷ Such a conception of poetry relies on a feeling of the unity and spirituality of all creation--a feeling which, as he indicates in a further comment on symbol, must be as deep and as psychologically valid as that provided by Hebrew "myth."⁸

But for Coleridge, such a feeling must also have philosophical validity.⁹ Although many of the Romantics chose to ignore the products of eighteenth century "understanding," Coleridge himself could not be

content to accept a duality between philosophic thought and poetic feeling; throughout his life he searched for the one unified system which would combine the "head" with the "heart," and "light" with "heat." Even his contemporaries realized that this uncompromising search for the grounds of unified vision was particularly characteristic of Coleridge. Keats, for example, acknowledged this essential disparity between Coleridge's temperament and his own:

Coleridge . . . would let go by a fine isolated verisimilitude caught from the Penetralium of mystery, from being incapable of remaining Content with half knowledge.¹⁰

And Coleridge himself recognized that while Wordsworth was content to deal only with particular "branches" of thought and their resulting poetic "fruitage" (that is, "fancy and imagination as they are manifested in poetry"), he was determined to explore the often-entangled philosophical "roots" supporting such systems.¹¹ His concern was to discover the "seminal principle" which would support and synthesize all theories:

The grand problem, the solution of which forms, according to Plato, the final object and distinctive character of philosophy, is this: for all that exists conditionally (i.e. the existence of which is inconceivable except under the condition of its dependency on some other as its antecedent) to find a ground that is unconditional and absolute, and thereby to reduce the aggregate of human knowledge to a system.¹²

And in the Biographia Literaria he also praises Leibnitz for recognizing

. . . the true criterion of a true philosophy; namely, that it would at once explain and collect the fragments of truth scattered through systems apparently the most incongruous. . . . The deeper . . . we penetrate into the ground of things, the more truth we discover in the doctrines of the greater number of philosophical sects.¹³

Indeed, Coleridge himself examined a great number and a bewildering

variety of philosophical sects in his search for an all-embracing view; Muirhead scarcely exaggerates when he suggests that there was "no recorded line of thought with which he was unacquainted and with which his soul had not some bond of sympathy."¹⁴

As will be shown, Coleridge's philosophical investigations gradually led him to the principle which he was satisfied was the absolute ground of all others: that principle was the "I AM," in which the two great opposites of all systems, the subject and the object or the "I am" and the "it is," are reconciled. And the power which enables man to apprehend and achieve that synthesis he found to be that of the imagination. But there is another power which Coleridge discovered to be not only equally synthetic but also intimately linked with the process of the imagination itself. That power is love. Although in many of his prose works Coleridge is concerned with the power of the imagination, in other less familiar works he is concerned with investigating the cosmic and psychic power of love, and occasionally with relating love to the imagination. However, this important aspect of his thought has been neglected almost completely in previous studies of his philosophy and poetry.¹⁵ Thus, it is the general purpose of this study to restore Coleridge's conception of love to its proper place in his aesthetics and philosophy.

Coleridge's knowledge of numerous "philosophical sects" is certainly reflected in his treatment of love, for the conception of love as a unifying force is, of course, of an older tradition than that of the imagination. Love is an essential figure in the creation myths of almost all cultures; Hesiod, for example, conceives of Eros as the first force to spring from the Void, and as the motivation for the consequent

procreation of the physical and divine cosmos.¹⁶ And the power of love was just as significant to the initiates of the pre-Platonic mystery cults, and to Plato himself, who is perhaps the greatest exponent of a philosophy based on love.¹⁷ The later neo-Platonic philosophers and the Christian-Platonic mystics also often dealt with various aspects of Eros and Agape, and occasionally linked love with artistic creativity. This connection between love and poetic inspiration is certainly not unusual in poetry itself; poets from Homer on have invoked the Muse as a source of imaginative inspiration and also as an intermediary between the poet and the divine. But in an age where the process of the imagination was almost as important as its result, what had degenerated in the eighteenth century into a superficial convention was restored to its philosophic heights and given a new psychological depth.

Coleridge was one of the poets who were rediscovering the philosophical profundity of the Platonic tradition, and when he came to formulate his own philosophy of the imagination there were in it echoes of the older tradition of love (although his philosophical terminology was from more contemporary sources). Thus, in this study, the central articles in the Platonic tradition of love (and its frequent connection of love with artistic fecundity) will first of all be established, in order that Coleridge's own theories may be seen in their proper perspective; then Coleridge's own theories of love and the imagination will be examined in detail. As his own major poems attest, for Coleridge these two synthetic processes are not merely analogous, but are inextricably linked in the act of creation. "Kubla Khan," "The Rime of the Ancient Mariner," and "Christabel" are the results of a personal annus mirabilis during which he was inspired by both imaginative power and love, and themselves embody

in mythical form this necessary connection between the two synthetic powers. So central was this connection that when Coleridge was himself without love, imaginative synthesis seemed impossible for him to achieve. "Dejection: An Ode" explores his loss of "Joy" and therefore creativity; the later poems often attest to that loss. These poems will be examined as documents of Coleridge's own personal need for love and also (since they are failures only in comparison with the major poems) as minor works of art.

It should be emphasized that this study is not meant to be an exhaustive account of the history of the philosophy of love, nor for that matter of the genesis of Coleridge's theory of the imagination. Many full-length books have been written on both questions, and unfortunately the conclusions are almost as numerous as the books themselves. This is particularly true of those works dealing with Eros and Agape; the three most influential books on love--Nygren's Agape and Eros, de Rougemont's Passion and Society, and D'Arcy's The Mind and Heart of Love¹⁸--all come to different conclusions as to the meaning of the two fundamental types of love. Nygren's book is perhaps the most comprehensive study of the separate philosophic origins and the gradual historical intermingling of Eros and Agape. As opposed to Agape, which Nygren associates with the scriptures of Saint Paul, pagan Eros is associated with Platonic Logos and is a creative power which allows man to recover the divine in himself and to strive to become eternally one with the Godhead. However, according to Paul (or Nygren's conception of him), man, because of original sin, cannot engender love but can only passively receive God's love and grace; there is nothing divine or creative in man. Nygren provides the following rather useful comparison of "the two fundamental motifs and

their contrary tendencies":

Eros is acquisitive desire and longing.

Eros is an upward movement.

Eros is man's way to God.

Eros is man's effort: it assumes that man's salvation is his own work.

Eros is egocentric love, a form of self-assertion of the highest, noblest, sublimest kind.

Eros seeks to gain its life, a life divine, immortalised.

Eros is the will to get and possess which depends on want and need.

Eros is primarily man's love; God is the object of Eros. Even when it is attributed to God, Eros is patterned on human love.

Eros is determined by the quality, the beauty and worth, of its object; it is not spontaneous, but "evoked", "motivated".

Eros recognises value in its object --and loves it.

Agape is sacrificial giving.

Agape comes down.

Agape is God's way to man.

Agape is God's grace: salvation is the work of Divine love.

Agape is unselfish love, it "seeketh not its own", it gives itself away.

Agape lives the life of God, therefore dares to "lose it".

Agape is freedom in giving, which depends on wealth and plenty.

Agape is primarily God's love; God is Agape. Even when it is attributed to man, Agape is patterned on Divine love.

Agape is sovereign in relation to its object, and is directed to both "the evil and the good"; it is spontaneous, "overflowing", "unmotivated".

Agape loves--and creates value in its object.¹⁹

Although he maintains that he does not use "egocentrism" in a derogatory sense, Bishop Nygren is definitely interested in purifying Agape of its association with Eros.²⁰ He reserves his highest praise for Luther who, by rejecting the possibility of man's merit, does much to restore Agape to its Pauline purity. The concern of Denis de Rougemont, however, is with the opposite problem of Eros. Although Nygren and de Rougemont generally agree that Eros is possessive and Agape passively receptive, they disagree completely as to the type of possession involved in Eros. While Nygren equates Eros with Platonic self-assertion and Apollonian possession of intellectual light, de Rougemont equates it with Dionysian possession and the dark and destructively

passionate surrender of the self to unknown sources of energy. He is concerned with identifying what he calls "Romantic Eros" with the "love of death" which he shows to be derived from a twelfth century Catharic heresy embodied in the archetypal myth of Tristan and Iseult.²¹ Indeed, as Mario Praz indicates, the "metaphysic of death" is a strong Romantic undercurrent which emerges fully in the works of Poe, then Baudelaire, and finally the "decadents" such as Wilde and Swinburne. However, unlike the later Romantics, Coleridge never abandons himself to any one extreme --Dionysiac or Apollonian. In fact, as has been established, he actively engages in an attempt to reconcile such extremes. Thus, although de Rougemont may be correct in his assessment of the preoccupation of the later Romantics with Dionysiac excesses of love, his thesis seems to be too restricted to deal adequately with Coleridge's more balanced theories.

Martin D'Arcy, like Coleridge himself, is concerned instead with the dialectical process of reconciling opposites. He is critical of the exclusiveness of Nygren's conception of Eros as ego and de Rougemont's equation of it with dark passion (and of their separation of Eros from Agape).²² Although he admits that man's history is a series of oscillations between the opposite forces of active and passive love, he maintains that true happiness can be achieved only by the interpenetration of such opposites. D'Arcy discusses many opposing tendencies in man--acquisitive and benevolent, intellectual and passionate, conscious and unconscious, male and female--but he subsumes all of those tendencies under the general Jungian terms, animus and anima.²³ To neglect or to inflate either the animus (ego) or the anima (unconscious) is to court disaster. D'Arcy also extends his conception of the necessity for the balance and interpenetration of forces in the human personality into the realms of its

relationship with the divine. Following Aquinas, D'Arcy sees that man, because he is fallen, requires divine aid, but also, because he is merely wounded by the Fall, that he is still capable of extending love. According to D'Arcy, love of the divine is achieved through the conjunction of divine grace and free will.

The conflicting opinions of Nygren and de Rougemont, and particularly D'Arcy's quite successful attempt at synthesizing their attitudes, should be kept in mind. These distinctions will provide a useful guide to the following chapter in which the traditional conceptions of love and Coleridge's familiarity with them are discussed in greater depth.

CHAPTER I

COLERIDGE'S "DARLING STUDIES" AND THEIR CONNECTION

WITH THE PLATONIC TRADITION OF LOVE

Before the significant moments in the tradition of love can be recalled, Coleridge's own knowledge of that tradition must be established. Muirhead's observations on Coleridge's eclecticism are corroborated by Coleridge himself: in another letter to Thelwall in November 1796, he indicates that he is deeply immersed in the obscure and "mysterious" metaphysics of "philosophy-dreamers from Tauth [sic] . . . to Taylor."¹ His reading thus extends from the most obscure origins of Platonic philosophy to its most recent interpretation.² Indeed, Coleridge's interests were similar to those of Thomas Taylor, who was partly responsible for the revival of interest in Platonism at Cambridge. In the same letter to Thelwall, Coleridge makes his now-famous request for Ficino's one-volume translation of "Iamblichus, Proclus, Porphyrius etc."³ This little volume by Taylor's great predecessor also includes works by Synesius Platonicus, Psellus, Speusippus, Pythagoras, Xenocrates, and Ficino himself. But again, Coleridge's acquaintance with such "philosophy-dreamers" was much earlier than this letter indicates; Charles Lamb speaks of the "young Mirandula" of Christ's Hospital, like the Ancient Mariner, holding his audience spellbound with "the mysteries of Jamblichus, or Plotinus (for even in those years [he] wax[ed] not pale at such philosophic draughts)"⁴ In the Biographia Literaria Coleridge, perhaps a trifle self-consciously, confirms Lamb's reminiscences

of the "inspired charity-boy," and adds even further to the list of his "early studies."⁵ Thus, from the evidence that Coleridge himself provides, a reasonably full list of his early reading would have to include at least the following: Plato, Plotinus, Proclus, Sidonius Apollonarius, Psellus, Iamblichus, Plutarch, Porphyry, Boehme, Bruno, and the Cambridge Platonists, as well as Ficino and Taylor themselves.⁶ All of these idealists and mystics "contributed to keep alive the heart in the head."⁷

This last remark from the Biographia refers to the period during which Coleridge was under the influence of Hartley's Associationism (and Priestley's Unitarianism). His desire to find "some Sun to unite heat and ~~warm~~ Light"⁸ and to avoid either extreme⁹ led him to an equally extensive study of more modern philosophic systems. Mystic heat could not neglect intellectual light, nor light the heat:

She [Philosophy] must . . . explain to us, and bring into distinct and harmonious conceptions all those feelings, convictions, & instincts vital or spiritual, which all men possess as men, which we cannot lose altogether without losing our human nature, or pretend to despise without introducing a discord & contradiction between the principles of Thought & those of Feeling, which ought to be in closest harmony.¹⁰

At first Hartley seemed to be such a Sun, for, as J.A. Appleyard suggests,

The thrust of associationist psychology . . . was in the direction of unity. . . . Its success lay in the fact that it seemed to preserve the particularity of individual perceptions and yet to assert the integrating process of the mind as it develops gradually more complex ideas out of simple ones.¹¹

But Coleridge soon discovered that this unity was based upon mere mechanical combination and that this system accorded the mind a merely passive role in perception.¹² Associationism also did not harmonize Thought and Feeling, for it almost completely neglected the role of

emotion in the formation of ideas.¹³ Hartley was merely another extreme, this time a cold ignis fatuus which might have led Coleridge completely astray if he had not previously felt the warmth of the early idealists.


By 1796 the false light of Necessitarianism and Mechanism was definitely fading.¹⁴ During the years between 1796 and his tour of Germany (1798-1799), Coleridge was engaged in a search for a system which would allow the mind to be active and creative, as his own intense poetic activity of the same period assured him it was. The books of German philosophy which he brought back with him were a definite guide toward such a system; as he indicates himself, Kant, and then Schelling, were influential in his formulation of an epistemology and an aesthetic in which the mind was active in perception and creation. But Coleridge is not only protecting his reputation as a thinker when he maintains that the ideas which he met in German philosophy were already at least partially formulated (and certainly intuited) in his own mind, for Platonic and mystic thought, especially that of Plotinus, could have directed him towards such a dynamic view. The influence of Plotinus (or the Cambridge Plotinists, as Coleridge liked to call them) on this phase of his thought should not be overlooked. Both I.A. Richards and J.V. Baker, for example, acknowledge that Coleridge owes a great debt to Plotinus, who fathered the theory of "divine interchange or creative communion between the perceiving subject--the conscious I--and the perceived object, nature, in which divinity is immanent and transcendent."¹⁵ This "creative communion" is at the heart of Coleridge's philosophy, although, as Claud Howard admits, because of the influence of German thought, "Coleridge's mysticism was differentiated from the Platonists by being more critical."¹⁶

The Coleridge of the "middle period" of Plotinian vitalistic idealism is the Coleridge who is best known today. But soon after (if not during) the writing of the Biographia Literaria Coleridge becomes "more critical" of both Plotinus and Schelling. He begins to find both philosophers too pantheistic, too willing to equate the world with God. (As he says himself, the world may equal God, but God certainly does not equal the world.) During the last phase of his life, Coleridge is concerned more and more with the transcendent God and with the more orthodox conception of the Trinity. But here again, surprising as it may seem, the Platonic tradition is still important. Referring to the year he wrote The Watchman (1796), he says that he was "at that time and long after, though a Trinitarian (i.e. ad normam Platonis) in philosophy, yet a zealous Unitarian in Religion" ¹⁷ Coleridge soon became a Trinitarian in religion as well, and remained so until his death. Thus, it may be said that during all phases of his thought, the tradition of Platonism was a significant influence. Indeed, he has been quite justly called "the hierophant of Romantic Platonism." ¹⁸

Now that the importance of Platonism to Coleridge has been established, the significance of love to that tradition can be investigated. Although Eros is given its most complete and philosophic expression in the dialogues of Plato, particularly the Phaedrus and the Symposium, Plato's ideas on love and divine inspiration are derived partially from the ancient mystery cults which so fascinated Coleridge and his contemporaries. As Hungerford points out, ¹⁹ in the latter half of the eighteenth century there was a revival of interest in myth and ritual, and an attempt to synthesize all myth into one. Mythographers such as

Bryant, Stukeley, Maurice, Davies and Faber postulated a common origin for Celtic, Hebrew, Egyptian and Greek myth; that the ultimate source was often Albion's own shores increased the English poets' interest in such Helio-arkite theories. This interest is manifested most obviously in Blake (and later in Tennyson and Yeats), but Coleridge was definitely familiar with and would be naturally attracted to such synthetic theories. Coleridge's intense interest in myth was not only historical, but also, as always, psychological. He felt ancient myths and rituals were attempts to penetrate the unknown regions of the unconscious mind and to "lay bare" its mysteries.²⁰

The connection between Platonism and the earlier mystery cults can be traced back to Thoth (of the letter to Thelwall) who was historically identified with Hermes Trismegistus, the then-postulated source of all Greek philosophy. According to this early identification,²¹ Hermes Trismegistus was not only the Egyptian God of wisdom and letters but also the author of the Hermetica. As the creator of the world and the word, Thoth was always associated with the tail-eating serpent, an ancient symbol of eternity and the ordered energy of the world. (Coleridge also liked to use this symbol for the combination of form and creative energy in poetry itself.²²) Thoth is also associated with the uraeon, a more complex version of the circular snake emblem:²³





According to Bryant and Stukeley, this emblem was a rather esoteric symbol of the Trinity; the sun representing the First Mind; the snake, the creation or divine energy itself; and the wings, the power of love to unite the serpent with the sun. The uraeon is also rather intricately connected with the myths of Isis, Osiris, and Typhon--all three often considered the children of Thoth. According to the best-known version of this myth, Typhon the serpent is jealous of the impending marriage of Isis and Osiris; he destroys Osiris by tearing his body into pieces and scattering them to the winds. Isis, the power of love, gathers the pieces together, makes an uneasy peace between the brothers, and, by reuniting with Osiris, restores him to divine wholeness. Remembering Coleridge's own views on the meaning of myth, it would perhaps be best to see this myth in terms of the human mind. Typhon and Osiris are certainly dual aspects of the same mind: the lower and the higher, the unconscious and the conscious. The power of love (Isis) reconciles these opposites; the creative energy of the snake is "tamed" and through the now-possible reunion of male and female principles, the lost androgynous nature of the divine is restored. To use Coleridge's own, now-familiar terminology, light and heat are reconciled through the untiring efforts of Love, and man can thus be reunited with the divine. This central idea will be encountered with great frequency in Coleridge's philosophy and poetry. Coleridge also would have been familiar with another version of the myth²⁴ which is discussed by Plutarch. This version gives additional proof of the identity of Osiris and Typhon proposed above:

Among the Egyptians . . . men say that Osiris is the Nile consorting with the Earth, which is Isis, and that the sea is Typhon into which the Nile discharges its waters and is lost to view and dissipated, save for

that part which the earth takes up and absorbs and thereby becomes fertilized.²⁵

This myth will also be met with again, specifically in "Kubla Khan."

In the same work, Plutarch equates Osiris with the Greek god Dionysus; both Coleridge and Thomas Taylor accept Plutarch's suggestion that the mysteries of Isis and Osiris were the direct source of the mysteries of Dionysus and then of Orpheus.²⁶ In his "Dissertation on the Eleusinian and Bacchic Mysteries,"²⁷ Taylor discusses the rites of man's reintegration with the heavenly Bacchus, usually re-enacted by the sexual union of the Bacchantes with a beautiful youth representing the god's spirit and called by his name.²⁸ The Orphic rites were merely refined Dionysiac rites where restraint and purification were substituted for Bacchic excess and intoxication as a means of reuniting with the Divine, or, more specifically, recovering the divine in oneself. The Orphic initiate sought to recover the state of Dionysus Zagreus before he was devoured by the Titans. Zeus destroyed the Titans with his fire of wrath for their transgressions, and man was formed from their ashes. Thus, in man the spiritual and eternal was combined with the corporeal and transient. The Orphic initiate sought to annihilate this dual nature of spirit and flesh and to become truly divine. Although the Orphic rites still retain traces of the Dionysiac surrender to unknown forces which de Rougemont equates with Eros, there are definite historical and ideological affinities between these mysteries and the more philosophical doctrines of Plato and Pythagoras which Nygren associates with Eros.²⁹ Taylor recognized this connection when he put forward Orpheus as "the prophet who taught the sacred rites from which the divine

muse of Homer and the philosophy of Pythagoras and Plato flowed."³⁰

The Platonic dialogues in which this somewhat obscure connection with the mysteries is most apparent are those in which poetic inspiration and creative Eros are discussed. Perhaps the most direct (certainly the best known) connection is in the Ion, where Socrates presents the poet as a Bacchic maiden inspired by the love of the Godhead: the lyric poets

are seized with the Bacchic transport and are possessed--as the bacchantes, when possessed, draw milk and honey from the rivers, but not when in their senses. So the spirit of the lyric poet works. . . . For the poets tell us, don't they, that the Melodies they bring us are gathered from rills that run with honey out of glens and gardens of the Muses, and they bring them as the bees do honey, flying with the bees? And what they say is true, for a poet is a light and winged thing, and holy, and never able to compose until he has become inspired, and is beside himself, and reason is no longer in him.³¹

Although this quotation seems to affirm de Rougemont's conception of Eros as the surrender of the self to reasonless passion, as well as to accord the poet the rather negative role of the passive receptacle of creative force, it must be remembered that the whole dialogue is a somewhat ironic deprecation of the pompous claims of Ion. In the Phaedo, Socrates asserts his own position: corporeal man still contains within him a portion of that universal soul with which he was once one; the poet and, to a greater extent, the philosopher³² have actualized that soul by striving to know or recollect the eternal. Here, Platonic Logos and Mythos³³ are combined: man does have a share in the realm of Truth, Beauty, and Goodness, but he must first perceive that realm and his share in it. And in order to achieve that share he must be a philosopher and not merely a man who observes religious rituals. Thus, in this dialogue the poet-philosopher is still an intermediary but he is such because of his own aspirations, his own Eros for the ideal.

The connection between Eros and creativity is explored in greater depth in the Phaedrus, the dialogue concerned with the "philosophic lover." Socrates attempts to refute Lysias' paradoxical argument that the non-lover should be accepted as a lover; he begins by defining what is meant by the mania which characterizes the true lover. Mania should not be thought of as "madness," but as the possession of divine wisdom.³⁴ One of Socrates' examples is poetic mania; he maintains that the poet must be in contact with the divine and cannot be merely skillful.³⁵ The poet must also, then, be the philosophic lover. It is through the force of Eros that the philosopher or poet recollects the divine world of eternal Ideas: Eros directs the soul out of the world of shadows into the light of the world of Forms; love of physical, earthly beauty leads to an imaginative grasp of the laws of Eternal Beauty. Thus Eros is, or should be,³⁶ the impulse to seek that which is higher. Indeed, the man who possesses such an impulse is the closest of all men to the divine, for once the soul (like the serpent) has lost its wings and fallen to earth its first incarnation is "into the human babe that shall grow into a seeker after wisdom or beauty, a follower of the Muses and a lover."³⁷ Socrates then describes the reverse process, the re-ascent, in two verses from Homer:

Eros, cleaver of air, in mortal's speech is he named,
But, since he must grow wings, Pteros the celestials call him.³⁸

Accordingly, the Phaedo and the Phaedrus clarify the image of the "winged . . . holy" poet in the Ion by describing the "making of wings" (Pteros).

In the Symposium both the winged creature and the making of wings are even more fully described. This dialogue is a series of speeches on

love, all of which have had an important influence on subsequent philosophies of love, and with the Romantics on philosophies of poetic creation.³⁹ The first speech at the banquet is that of Phaedrus, who repeats Hesiod's story of the birth of Love and Earth from primal Chaos.⁴⁰ To Phaedrus, love is "the creative principle . . . [and] the ancient source of all our highest good." He quotes Parmenides: "And love she framed the first of all the gods."⁴¹ Pausanias elaborates: there are in fact two goddesses of love, Uranus and Pandemus. Pandemian love is earthly and sensual, a descent to man's animal nature; but Uranian love is heavenly, a recognition of the necessary connection between physical beauty and spiritual Beauty or Intellect.⁴² Eryximachus continues Pausanias' line of thought and extends it from the personal to the universal level. Using Heraclitus' musical analogy, he describes Eros as the reconciliation of opposites which produces harmony. He extends the analogy to poetry: verse inspired by Urania truly reconciles opposites, whereas verse sprung from Polyhymnia does not create true harmony.⁴³ (In Coleridge's terms, one type of poetry springs from imaginative synthesis and one merely from fancy.)

Then the somewhat inebriated Aristophanes tells his version of the "Fall" of man. He says that the human race was initially divided into three: males descended from the sun, females descended from the earth, and an androgynous creature descended from the moon and inheriting its circular shape.⁴⁴ Because of their aspiring pride, Zeus cut these creatures in half to lessen their strength. But now Aristophanes reveals his true comic purpose: since that time, each part has run around searching desperately for its lost half. Aristophanes' speech is obviously a humorous justification of unrestrained indulgence in sexual love, but

Eryximachus (and Coleridge after him) realizes that the myth also has a more philosophic potential.

Agathon begins his speech by describing the youth, beauty, and valour of the God of Love. He emphasizes the fact that the nature of Eros is essentially poetic:

Love is himself so divine a poet that he can kindle in the souls of others the poetic fire, for no matter what dull clay we seemed to be before, we are every one of us a poet when we are in love. . . . And who will deny that the creative power by which all living things are begotten and brought forth is the very genius of love? . . . It was longing and desire that led Apollo to found the arts of archery, healing, and divination--so he, too, was a scholar in the school of Love. It was thus that the fine arts were founded by the Muses.⁴⁵

Socrates quarrels with Agathon's rather rhetorical description of Eros; as in the Ion, Plato's knowledge of the mysteries is obvious, for here Socrates says that his instructress in matters of Love has been the Orphic priestess Diotima. She has told him that Love is one of the spirits or intermediaries between man and the gods, and "since they are between the two estates they weld both sides together and merge them into one great whole. . . . There are many spirits, and many kinds of spirits, too, and Love is one of them."⁴⁶ (That this last statement is significant to Coleridge's theory of the imagination is quite obvious; that it is also significant to his poetry, specifically "The Rime of the Ancient Mariner," is revealed by the conventional translation which Shelley retains: "These daemons are, indeed, many and various and one of them is Love."⁴⁷) Thus, Love has a dual nature: he retains qualities of the godlike, but he also shares man's desire to ascend to the divine. As Diotima expresses it, Love has a dual nature because he is the child of Poverty and Plenty; thus, he is not beautiful, but "forever scheming

to obtain things which are good and beautiful; . . . he is also . . . a philosopher, a powerful enchanter, a wizard, and a subtle sophist."⁴⁸

Martin D'Arcy indicates that this description of the birth of Love is the "germ" of his theory of "the two-fold character of love" and of the necessity of reconciling internal opposites.⁴⁹ Indeed, in the Symposium itself the description of the daemon of Love is brought down to the psychological level, as it is in the Cratylus, where Socrates discusses daemons in general. In the Cratylus Socrates first of all equates daemons with the race of golden men whom Hesiod speaks of as the first inhabitants of the earth. But then he says that to be golden is to be "good and wise," and that even men of the race of iron who achieve wisdom can be thought of as "daemons."⁵⁰ This, of course, relates the concept of the daemon to the discussion of the philosophic lover in other dialogues.⁵¹ Indeed, in the Symposium the daemon of Love is also the force within man which can lead him to the divine; Love in man himself is the desire for the Beautiful, therefore the Good, and therefore the immortal. More specifically, Diotima says that it is the desire for immortality either through physical or spiritual generation--the productions of the body or the more elevated productions of the mind. She thus makes a direct link between love and imagination:

Those whose bodies alone are pregnant with this principle of immortality are attracted by women, seeking through the production of children what they imagine to be happiness and immortality and an enduring remembrance; but they whose souls are far more pregnant than their bodies, conceive and produce that which is more suitable to the soul. What is suitable to the soul? Intelligence, and every other power and excellence of the mind, of which all poets, and all other artists who are creative and inventive, are the authors.⁵²

Diotima concludes by saying that Uranian love conducts the soul from

transitory objects which are beautiful, to one Form of Beauty, and then to another, until one finally arrives at the doctrine of supreme Beauty and Goodness. This is, of course, the famous Platonic "ladder of love" which was also, although less specifically, present in the Phaedrus.

But both the ascent of the ladder presented in the Symposium and even more particularly the upward flight of the soul in the Phaedrus tend to deny the ultimate validity of the sensible world. This brings us to the old problem of the exact relationship of the particular to the Form in Plato's philosophy. Dialogues such as the Phaedrus and the Timaeus seem to support the Aristotelian (and the conventional) interpretation of the Forms as existing "apart from" the particulars.

Although Plato was a poet (as Coleridge himself maintains⁵³), he often uses poetic form as a means of invalidating the world of the senses. In the allegory of the cave, for instance, he presents this world as a mere shadow of the world of eternal Forms. Such a conception of this world would be in opposition to Coleridge's vitalistic and symbolical tendencies. Yet Coleridge always maintained that he was of the school of Plato, certainly in opposition to the "empirical" school of Aristotle. His own views on Plato are particularly interesting, for he maintains (although perhaps not with this specific problem in mind) that the true theory of Plato can not be found in the dialogues at all, but

in the few fragments that are preserved in his immediate successors, such as [Speusippus]; and likewise more in the neo-Platonists . . . [especially in] Plotinus . . . and in the writings of Proclus.⁵⁴

This hypothesis is most certainly reflected in his summary of the essence of Plato's philosophy:

he taught the idea, namely the possibility, and the duty of all who would arrive at the greatest perfection of the human mind, of striving to contemplate things not in the phenomenon, not in their accidents or their superficialities, but in their essential powers, first as they exist in relation to other powers co-existing with them, but lastly and chiefly as they exist in the Supreme Mind, independent of all material division, distinct and yet indivisible. This is expressly asserted by [Plato], and it is the very essential of Platonism when he says that that which exists in the perfection of distinctness and yet without separation, either from another or from the supreme cause, is an Idea.⁵⁵

It is Ernest Hartley Coleridge who has inserted the name "Plato" into the manuscript of this lecture, but Miss Coburn's suggestion that it should read "Plotinus" is in keeping with both Coleridge's own theory stated above and with the import of the statement itself.⁵⁶

As previously mentioned, the philosophy of Plotinus attempts to resolve the tendency to dualism in Plato by combining immanence with transcendence, Aristotelian Becoming with Platonic Being. Plotinus' philosophy certainly allows for the world of nature to be symbolic, as it was for Coleridge, especially during his middle period. In the Fifth Tractate of the Enneads, for example, Plotinus says that "Nature itself, clearly, springs from the divine realm, from Good and Beauty."⁵⁷ Although the later Coleridge finds Plotinus to be pantheistic, W.R. Inge quite rightly differentiates between the doctrines of pantheism (in which God is wholly immanent) and those of panentheism (in which God is both immanent and transcendent).⁵⁸ Plotinus is definitely a panentheist, for his system is based on the principle of emanation, in which the emanating entity remains outside of (and undiminished by) its product and yet is also within that product. This stress on the dynamic is extended to man's own mind, which is actively creative in perception. In Plotinus' theory there is a creative communion between the mind and nature; to use Wordsworth's terms, man and nature are wedded in an "ennobling interchange."

Baker expands the analogy: for Plotinus, "there is a marriage or fecundation of subject and object at the moment of vision."⁵⁹ Plotinus also talks about the mind of the poet specifically; here, the importance of the mind itself to that marriage becomes clearer. The poet must get behind the appearances of nature to its divine essence and then shape his own material according to his perception of that essence:

The arts do not merely copy the visible world but ascend to the principles on which nature is built up; and, further, many of their creations are original. For they certainly make good the defects of things, as having the source of beauty in themselves.⁶⁰

As Nygren suggests, the central tenet of Plotinus' philosophy can be adequately summarized by Heraclitus' phrase, "the downward and the upward way."⁶¹ But he also stresses that this downward movement can still not be equated with Agape: when Plotinus talks of a "downward way," he refers to a cosmic process rather than a process of salvation. And when Plotinus deals with salvation itself, he stresses the transcendent Divine. Although he recognizes the beauty and the divinity of creation, he still realizes that the soul cannot become "spellbound by visible loveliness," but must trace it to its source. Once again we are back at the Platonic "ladder of love": although creation is "divine by participation," the soul must ascend to unite with the emanating One itself. The artist and, to a lesser extent, the lover are especially susceptible to the spell of "visible loveliness"; only the philosopher (or the wise lover or poet) extends his Eros upwards to "the One Principle underlying all."⁶² As we shall see, both aspects of Plotinus--the stress on nature as an emanation of the divine, and the somewhat contradictory⁶³ stress on the need for the soul to re-ascend to the divine--are important to

Coleridge in various phases of his own philosophical development.

Other neo-Platonic philosophers contribute to a lesser extent to the ideas and images of Coleridge. Psellus, for example, elaborates a system of daemonology in which there are two main types of daemons or intermediaries--the cacodaemons, who are characterized by the destructive lust which we have earlier associated with the wingless serpent, and the agathodaemons, who are associated with the love and productive spirituality of angelic forms. (This dual nature of the daemon Eros was implied in the Symposium, but in Psellus these aspects are separated, and the psychological implications of Socratic daemonology are reduced.) Proclus, Porphyry and Iamblichus also extend Platonic ideas and associate them more directly with the mystery cults of Egypt and Greece. Although, as we have seen, Coleridge was interested in all these "philosophy-dreamers," an elaboration of their specific theories is not within the scope or purpose of this study. However, the theories of Proclus must at least be mentioned, for Proclus is quite significant to the history of love. Nygren suggests that it is Proclus who introduces the idea of Agape into Platonic philosophy; with Proclus,

the higher has begun to interest itself in the lower and to approach it with a view to helping and saving it. . . . Thus Proclus says something almost incredible in a Platonist: "Eros descends from above, from the intelligible sphere down to the cosmic, and turns all things toward the Divine Beauty."⁶⁴

Love becomes not only the upward tendency of the soul to the divine, but also that force which governs both the descent and the ascent. It is truly a universal bond of cohesion; as Nygren says,

Eros is a divine power of sympathy which permeates reality in all its parts and unites them in all directions and at all levels: it binds

together the higher with the lower, the lower with the higher, the equal with the equal.⁶⁵

Later neo-Platonists continued the expansion of Platonic doctrines. Ficino is certainly the most significant name in the Renaissance consolidation and popularization of Platonic doctrines; in Ficino the tradition of Platonic Eros reaches a new height. As Nygren indicates, Ficino put forth Eros as the great "uniting force, uniting intellect and act."⁶⁶ Ficino was indebted not only to the neo-Platonics but also to the earlier courtly love tradition as manifested in the "Platonic" works of Dante and Petrarch. In Dante, the figure of the woman as a divine intermediary achieves a lasting profundity. With Pico della Mirandola, neo-Platonism was infused with Cabbalistic notions of the association of the sexual with the divine.⁶⁷ J.B. Beer gives an account of the relevant doctrines in the Cabbala, and indicates the importance of Cabbalistic thought and imagery to Coleridge:

. . . the divine creative activity, like that of human beings in procreation, is thought of as a joyful dialectic between male and female elements. Their coming together, known as the marriage of the King [usually Solomon] and the Matrona, irradiates a divine light, called the 'Shechinah.' Wherever the divine creative forces are at work, there also is the Shechinah.

The cabbalistic doctrine . . . carries certain implications concerning the Fall of Man. At the Fall, man was deprived of the Shechinah which had hitherto surrounded him, and the creative principles fell apart into male and female. . . . [The Shechinah] can only be regained at rare moments of exaltation--one of them being when complete love and harmony exist between a man and a woman.⁶⁸

As Beer notes, Coleridge refers to the Scriptures as a "Shechinah or Epiphany," to Love as the light which "glorifies the darkness into a Shechinah of its own Beauty," and to the Imagination as "a Shechinah of the heart." In another context Beer quite rightly notes that "light

became for Coleridge a central symbol, second only to love in its power to bind together disparate strands of his thinking."⁶⁹

Cabbalistic, as well as Plotinian, ideas were also important to Jacob Boehme, the Christian-Platonic mystic who exerted the most influence on Coleridge. (As Nygren indicates, the source of Christian-Platonism was pseudo-Dionysius who transplanted Proclus' scheme of purification, illumination, and union into Christian soil: "An unbroken line runs from the ancient Mysteries through Plato, Plotinus, Proclus, Pseudo-Dionysius and Mediaeval mysticism down to our own time."⁷⁰) Boehme based his philosophy on Plotinian emanation which, as we have seen, allowed God to be both immanent and transcendent; but Boehme infuses Plotinus' idea with Cabbalistic energy. For him the whole universe is a "potent ejaculation of God's creative force, for it is improbable that any other thinker has a more vitalistic conception of creation than his."⁷¹ In a significant notebook entry which reveals the eclectic and synthetic quality of Coleridge's mind, as well as gathers together some of the diverse strands of his thought which we have been tracing, Coleridge mentions Boehme's Sophia or Celestial Bride:

Man in the savage state as a water drinker or rather Man before the Fall possessed of the Heavenly Bacchus (as Jac. Boehmen's Sophia or celestial Bride) his fall--forsaken by the *Διονυσος* [Dionysus]--the savage state--and dreadful consequences of the interspersed vacancies left in his mind by the absence of Dionysus. . . .⁷²

Coleridge was also probably aware of the similarities between Sophia and the Cabbalistic Matrona.⁷³ Boehme uses a Cabbalistic image of energized light when he uses the word "flash" to describe the moment of unification with the celestial Bride. Beer also notes the fact that Coleridge uses the term "flash" to describe the processes of love; but he fails to note

The first part of the document discusses the importance of maintaining accurate records of all transactions and the role of the accounting department in ensuring the integrity of the financial statements. It also highlights the need for transparency and accountability in the reporting process.

The second part of the document provides a detailed overview of the company's financial performance over the past year, including a breakdown of revenue, expenses, and profit. It also includes a comparison of the company's performance against industry benchmarks and a discussion of the factors that have contributed to the results.

The third part of the document outlines the company's financial strategy for the upcoming year, including plans for increasing revenue, reducing costs, and improving overall financial health. It also includes a discussion of the risks associated with the strategy and the steps that will be taken to mitigate those risks.

The fourth part of the document provides a summary of the key findings of the financial review and a conclusion on the company's overall financial performance. It also includes a list of recommendations for improving the company's financial management and a discussion of the next steps that will be taken.

Appendix A

This appendix contains a detailed list of the company's assets and liabilities, as well as a breakdown of the company's equity. It also includes a discussion of the company's capital structure and a comparison of the company's financial position against industry benchmarks.

The first section of the appendix provides a detailed list of the company's assets, including property, equipment, and intangible assets. It also includes a discussion of the company's depreciation and amortization policies and a comparison of the company's asset base against industry benchmarks.

The second section of the appendix provides a detailed list of the company's liabilities, including debt, accounts payable, and other obligations. It also includes a discussion of the company's debt covenants and a comparison of the company's liability base against industry benchmarks.

The third section of the appendix provides a detailed breakdown of the company's equity, including common stock, preferred stock, and retained earnings. It also includes a discussion of the company's dividend policy and a comparison of the company's equity base against industry benchmarks.

that Coleridge also uses the same word to describe the processes of creation during which "Free Life" is fused with "Form."⁷⁴ This interpenetration of Free Life and Form is connected with Coleridge's conception of the symbol; once again, he acknowledges an affinity with the mystics, who, as he says, "define beauty as the subjection of matter to spirit so as to be transformed into a symbol, in and through which the spirit reveals itself."⁷⁵

Boehme is also important to Coleridge for his emphasis on polarity as the very principle of life; for Boehme, there can be neither life nor manifestation without contrasts.⁷⁶ This idea runs throughout Boehme's works; here, our example will be one which is concerned with love:

The One, the "Yes," is pure power, and the life and the truth of God, or God Himself; but God would be unknowable to Himself, and there would be in Him no joy or perception, if it were not for the presence of the "No." The latter is the antithesis or opposite to the positive or the truth; it causes the latter to become revealed, and this is only possible by its being the opposite wherein eternal love may become active and perceptible.⁷⁷

Coleridge also acknowledges a debt to Bruno for his equal emphasis on "polar logic and dynamic philosophy."⁷⁸ He explains Bruno's "polar logic" as follows:

. . . in order to manifest itself every power must appear in two opposites, but these two opposites having a ground in identity were constantly striving to reunite, but not being permitted to pass back to their original state, which would amount to annihilation, they pressed forward and the two formed a third something.⁷⁹

This idea of the reconciliation of opposites is central to Coleridge's own thought, and he echoes both Boehme and Bruno in his own definition of life:

Every power in nature and spirit must evolve an opposite, as the sole means and condition of its manifestation: and all opposition is a tendency to reunion. . . . The identity of thesis and antithesis is the substance of all being.⁸⁰

Boehme's and Bruno's theories also have a direct and important influence on Coleridge's theory of the imagination, and, as Coleridge himself indicates, on Schelling's.

Both Schelling and Kant have their own theories of love which are directly in the tradition which we are tracing. As Nygren indicates, "There is a continuous line of Eros-tradition running from Neoplatonism and Alexandrian theology . . . to German Idealism and post-Kantian speculative systems."⁸¹ However, the influence of Kant and Schelling on Coleridge's theory of the imagination is obviously more direct than their theories of love. Thus, their aesthetic theories will be noted briefly in the next chapter where Coleridge's own theory of the imagination is examined.⁸²

CHAPTER II

COLERIDGE'S THEORIES ON THE IMAGINATION AND LOVE

Although fragmentary from an historical point of view, the foregoing discussion of love has fulfilled its purpose by establishing that love has often been seen as the synthetic force which brings about the union of opposites. In systems of pure idealism, love is the force moving the soul upward to wisdom or union with the divine; in systems of vitalistic idealism, it is the active power emanating from and uniting both "poles," creation and creator. In both systems, then, the subject, man, is united with the object, God (or nature in the second system), through the force of love. Thus, the differences between subject and object are overcome and synthesis is achieved. As the previous chapter has also shown, Coleridge's pervasive concern was with examining this process of reconciliation and with establishing the unifying principle which makes it possible.

The Biographia Literaria is the culmination of Coleridge's repeated meditations of the problem of the relation of subject to object or of "thoughts to things."¹ As Appleyard points out, this central document of Coleridge's criticism is the result of his firm "persuasion that certain kinds of knowing demand an explanation that admits of subjective participation in the knowledge act."² And, as has been mentioned previously, this conviction is itself the result of Coleridge's examination and ultimate rejection of associational epistemology (which he discusses, together with the counterbalancing vitalistic tendencies of idealism, in the greater part of Book 1 of the Biographia). It is also the result of

Coleridge's examination of Wordsworth's poetry which so profoundly manifests this vital and necessary connection between man and nature, thoughts and things: "[Wordsworth is] the first & greatest philosophical Poet--the only man who has effected a compleat and constant synthesis of Thought & Feeling and combined them with poetic Forms" ³

Wordsworth's powers and poetry are examined by Coleridge in the most significant section of Book II of the Biographia, as a kind of demonstration of his own philosophical and aesthetic theories which are given in the small but central section between the refutation of associationism and this practical criticism of Wordsworth's poetry.

It is in this middle section (Chapters XII and XIII) that we see Coleridge "restlessly scheming . . . to apprehend the absolute," ⁴ or, in his own words, "labor[ing] at a solid foundation, on which permanently to ground my opinions, in the component faculties of the human mind itself, and their comparative dignity and importance." ⁵ The weakness of this half-completed foundation has been noticed with regret by many commentators. In fact, Chapter XIII consists only of the famous summary of the hundred-page essay on the "primary" and "secondary" imagination and fancy which Coleridge was persuaded in a letter from a "friend" (another visitor from Porlock?) not to include--as well as the letter itself. Jackson suggests that the fragmentary nature of this central section is the result of Coleridge being rushed into publication both by "financial necessity and reforming zeal." ⁶ Although the Biographia may be somewhat premature because of external pressures, it also reflects the intrinsic quality of Coleridge's own mind: even though he was gifted with an intuitive insight into the unity of all things, he also was able to see the "numberless qualifications" ⁷ which must be recognized

and subsumed in that unity. As his daughter Sara perceptively comments,

even had he possessed the ordinary amount of skill in the arranging and methodizing of thought with a view to publication and in reference to the capacity of a volume [the Biographia], this would have been inadequate to the needs of one whose genius was ever impelling him to trace things down to their deepest source, and to follow them out to their remotest ramifications.⁸

In these central chapters it seems as if Coleridge has imaginatively intuited the theory of the imagination itself, but is still struggling with all of the "ramifications" of a philosophical justification of it.

Chapter XII is his attempt to provide that justification and to present an alternative epistemology which would support his aesthetic theories. Coleridge begins with what is perhaps the most fundamental question of philosophy: the relationship between the subject (the perceiver) and the object (the perceived) in the act of knowledge. But the method which he employs in order to demonstrate that relationship is particularly Coleridgean. He begins with an intuition of the inherent unity of perceiver and perceived: "during the act of knowledge itself, the objective and subjective are . . . instantly united. . . ; both are coinstantaneous and one."⁹ But at the same time, he realizes that for the purposes of philosophical analysis this "intimate coalition" must be broken down and opposites considered separately in order that the grounds for their union can be established. He begins with the philosophy which considers the objective first ("natural philosophy"), and shows how such a philosophy moves from the observation of concrete phenomena, to the abstract laws based upon those phenomena, and then, ideally, to "the perfect spiritualization of all the laws of nature into laws of intuition and intellect."¹⁰ Thus, "natural philosophy" begins with one pole and

ends at the other--subjectivity.¹¹ But this particular philosophical method is based on an initial premise which can only be a prejudice: "inasmuch as it refers to something essentially different from ourselves . . . [this method] leaves it inconceivable how it [the object] could possibly become part of our immediate consciousness" ¹²

Coleridge thus turns to the philosophy which begins with the perceiver rather than the perceived ("transcendental philosophy"). The initial premise of this method--the "I am"--cannot be considered a prejudice; it is groundless because it is itself the ground of all else. Transcendental philosophy resolves the dichotomy of object and subject because it supposes in its initial premise, and subsequently attempts to demonstrate, "that the former [nature] is unconsciously involved in the latter [the mind]; that it is not only coherent but identical, one and the same thing with our immediate self-consciousness."¹³ Thus, this philosophy is both ideal and real (as was Plotinus'): it presupposes a common spiritual essence in man and nature. Coleridge's affinity with this second method is obvious, for he has arrived at his own initial premise--without, it must be added, demonstrating anything. Coleridge is aware of this fact himself, for at this point he refers us to the third treatise of his (unwritten) Logosophia in which he will fulfil the "office and object" of transcendental philosophy by "giv[ing] . . . the demonstrations and constructions of the Dynamic Philosophy scientifically arranged."¹⁴

But if he does not demonstrate this vital idealism in the Biographia, he at least clarifies what he means by the seminal principle of the "I am" in the ten Theses which follow this initial attempt and cover the same ground from a slightly different angle. As all his editors

have noted, here Coleridge depends a great deal on Schelling; but he also makes a few quite significant qualifications of his own. In the first five Theses he reiterates the necessity of discovering the one truth which is "self grounded and unconditional"--that which is neither subject nor object but "the identity of both." In Thesis VI he explains that this principle is the

SUM or I AM; . . . spirit, self, and self-consciousness. In this, and in this alone, object and subject, being and knowing are identical, each involving and supposing the other. In other words, it is a subject which becomes a subject by the act of construing itself objectively to itself; but which never is an object except for itself, and only so far as by the very same act it becomes a subject. It may be described therefore as a perpetual self-duplication of one and the same power into object and subject, which presuppose each other, and can exist only as antitheses.¹⁵

Up to this point in the Theses he has followed Schelling quite closely, but in the "Scholium" to Thesis VI and in Thesis IX he indicates that although this "I am" is the principle of knowing, the principle of being is the eternal "I am" or God. Although maintaining that his purpose here is necessarily restricted to the "absolute principium cognoscendi" (transcendental philosophy rather than transcendent), at the same time he indicates that in the "great eternal I AM" the "ground of existence, and the ground of the knowledge of existence, are absolutely identical"¹⁶ As he repeats in Thesis IX, "We begin with the I KNOW MYSELF, in order to end with the absolute I AM. We proceed from the SELF, in order to lose and find all self in GOD."¹⁷ This desire not only to include the immanent God but also to indicate definitely his transcendence can also be seen in Coleridge's definition of the primary imagination, which depends upon this act of "self-consciousness" discussed in Chapter XII:

The primary IMAGINATION I hold to be the living Power and prime Agent of all human Perception, and as a repetition in the finite mind of the eternal act of creation in the infinite I AM.¹⁸

There have been many conflicting interpretations of Coleridge's definition of the primary imagination. Here, and to a lesser extent in his definition of "self-consciousness," Coleridge seems to imply that this apprehension or, as he calls it, "intuition" of the spirituality and unity of all things ("the one life within us and abroad") is common to all human beings in the very act of perception. This is the interpretation which I.A. Richards puts forward: he says that Coleridge's primary imagination is the "normal perception that produces the usual world of the senses,

That inanimate cold world allowed
To the poor loveless ever-anxious crowd

the world of motor-buses, beef-steaks and acquaintances. . . . "¹⁹ But Lovejoy provides a warning against just such an interpretation of transcendental philosophy in general, as well as an explanation of why such an interpretation can occur:

The identification of knowledge with a sort of immediate experience has often led these epistemologists to adopt a fashion of speech which sounds like that of scientific empiricism. Since the "intuition" was conceived, not as the recognition of the truth of a general proposition, but, after the analogy of a sense-perception, as the direct apprehension of a concrete datum, the philosophy based upon this intuition professed to be a simple report of empirical facts²⁰

And Bate provides a reason why in this specific instance such an interpretation as Richards' is impossible: if the primary imagination is a kind of "loveless" perception (the word "loveless" should itself make his suggestion suspect), it seems inconceivable that the secondary or

aesthetic imagination could be an "echo" of it, as it is in Coleridge's own definition:

The secondary Imagination I consider as an echo of the former, co-existing with the conscious will, yet still as identical with the primary in the kind of its agency, and differing only in degree, and in the mode of its operation. It dissolves, diffuses, dissipates, in order to recreate; or where this process is rendered impossible, yet still at all events it struggles to idealize and to unify. It is essentially vital, even as all objects (as objects) are essentially fixed and dead.²¹

The fact that Richards himself admits that the "mind is not always, alas, a self-realizing activity" and that it may be a "lazy looker-on"²² (as it is in associational psychology) also casts more doubt on his own interpretation of the primary imagination, as does Coleridge's own definition of fancy:

FANCY, on the contrary, has no other counters to play with, but fixities and definites. The Fancy is indeed no other than a mode of Memory emancipated from the order of time and space; while it is blended with, and modified by that empirical phenomenon of the will, which we express by the word CHOICE. But equally with the ordinary memory the Fancy must receive all its materials ready made from the law of association.²³

Here, fancy seems to be the mechanical combination of previous perceptions which were not initially the result of the apprehension of the underlying unity and spirituality of all things. Indeed, as Coleridge himself attests, it is possible to see the world as "inanimate" and "cold," "an immense heap of little things."²⁴

But of course Richards (who is ordinarily a perceptive critic of Coleridge) cannot be wholly blamed for putting forward a doubtful interpretation of the primary imagination; Coleridge himself, as the large lacuna between Chapters XII and XIII indicates, was still struggling to subsume all the "numberless qualifications" into a coherent

whole, and finally abandoned the attempt altogether. (As Richards himself suggests, Coleridge's attempts at logical philosophical analysis can be considered no more than attempts.) If Coleridge had been able to write those one hundred pages, Richards' conception of the primary imagination as the perception of the "ever-anxious crowd" and Bate's conception of it as the joyful and spiritual intuition of the unity of all things would not exist side by side. In the introduction to his edition of the Biographia, Shawcross makes several suggestions as to the reasons for Coleridge's inability to complete and satisfactorily integrate his theories. First of all, in these chapters Coleridge is trying to integrate his own theories of the imagination which were at first only aesthetic with the more pervasive theories of the imagination which he had subsequently met in German philosophy. Coleridge knew that in the Critique of Pure Reason Kant had put forward the imagination (in its lowest, "reproductive," function) as the faculty which allows the mind to receive the impressions of the external world and to recall previous representations of it. In general terms, it mediates between the world of the senses and the "understanding." But in Kant's philosophy the imagination could also function as

productive, in which it acts spontaneously and determines phenomena instead of being determined by them, but yet in accordance with a law of the understanding; and as aesthetic, when it attains its highest degree of freedom in respect of the object, which it regards as material for a possible, not an actual and impending act of cognition.²⁵

Although it has been generally agreed that in terms of Coleridge's own theories Kant's "reproductive imagination" is not imagination at all, but fancy, the differences between Coleridge's primary and secondary imagination and Kant's "productive" and "aesthetic" imagination have

caused some confusion. But there is certainly a difference; and this difference is the result of their varying interpretations of Reason. According to Kant, although our actions are governed by the ideas of the Reason, it is impossible ever to know these eternal ideas or noumena. But Coleridge returns to an earlier tradition and maintains that the "faculty" of Reason is not merely regulative as it is in Kant, but constitutive as it is in Plato. (Therefore it is possible to know the realm of ultimate realities.) Indeed, in his famous division between the Aristotelians and the Platonists, Coleridge considers Kant to be an Aristotelian. Thus, as Shawcross also indicates, Coleridge went beyond Kant to postulate the inherent interdependence of the subject and object, and, as we have seen, to show that their essential unity and spirituality could be imaginatively perceived by man. In this, Coleridge follows Schelling (or at least agrees with him, for as was shown in Chapter I, Plotinus and Boehme are behind both men); as a result, Schelling's definitions of "productive intuition" and the "poetic faculty" are closer to Coleridge's primary and secondary imagination than were Kant's "productive" and "aesthetic" imagination:

Philosophy starts with an infinite division of two opposed activities; but the same division is at the root of every aesthetic production, and is completely resolved by every individual representation of art. What is then that marvellous faculty by which, according to the assertion of the philosopher, an infinite contradiction is resolved in the productive intuition? . . . That productive faculty is the same which enables art to compass the impossible, to resolve an infinite contradiction in a finite product. It is the poetic faculty, which in its first power is the original intuition, and contrariwise, it is only the productive intuition reasserting itself in the highest power, that we call the poetic faculty. It is one and the same power which is active in both, the sole power whereby we are able to think and comprehend what is contradictory--namely, the imagination.²⁶

But, again, there is a difference between Schelling and Coleridge: in his own definition of the primary imagination (and in the ten Theses which precede it) Coleridge includes another imagination--God's. As Shawcross suggests, "Coleridge is all the time striving to identify Schelling's intellectual intuition of subject and object in their absolute identity with the religious intuition, the direct consciousness of God."²⁷ As was shown in the previous examination of the Theses of Chapter XII, Coleridge is already struggling with what he later identified as Schelling's "pantheism"; he seems to feel that the source of being was not clearly or sufficiently indicated by Schelling. His struggle to do this himself is obvious in his own definition of the primary imagination and, indeed, causes that definition to be somewhat contradictory. In his definition Coleridge seems to imply that the process of the primary imagination is an unconscious one (as it is in Schelling's theory). But by adding the qualification that it is also a "repetition in the finite mind of the eternal act of creation," Coleridge also seems to imply that God's own act of creation was equally unconscious. Coleridge was himself aware of this implication, and later tried to modify his statement by crossing out this phrase; but he was still dissatisfied, for, as his earlier comments on the primary imagination indicate, this qualification was what he meant by the primary imagination. This additional problem brings us to yet another interpretation of Coleridge's definition of the primary imagination. In Method and Imagination in Coleridge's Criticism, Jackson supports Bate's interpretation against that of Richards, but he maintains, as Bate does not, that this higher sort of knowing is a wholly unconscious activity. For

Jackson, only the secondary imagination can be considered a conscious activity.

As we have seen, the problem of what Coleridge meant by the primary and secondary imagination is an extremely complicated one. But even though the missing steps in the argument make it almost impossible to present a definitive solution to the problem, Coleridge does provide some indication in the opening paragraphs of Chapter XII as to the path he would have followed in connecting the chapters and unifying his philosophy and aesthetics. These passages will now be examined in order to provide additional proof that in his definition Coleridge was not speaking of the perception of the "normal world of the senses" and, secondly, to show that these passages do not seem to support the thesis that this higher kind of "knowing" is wholly unconscious.

First of all, in the kind of Platonic allegory with which he begins Chapter XII, Coleridge indicates that there are ascending levels of knowledge which men are capable of achieving:

The first range of hills, that encircles the scanty vale of human life, is the horizon for the majority of its inhabitants. . . . By the many, even this range, the natural limit and bulwark of the vale, is but imperfectly known. Its higher ascents are too often hidden by mists and clouds from uncultivated swamps, which few have courage or curiosity to penetrate. . . . But in all ages there have been a few, who measuring and sounding the rivers of the vale at the feet of their furthest inaccessible falls have learned, that the sources must be far higher and far inward; a few, who even in the level streams have detected elements, which neither the vale itself or the surrounding mountains contained or could supply.²⁸

Here it is obvious that some men never become aware of that which is "far higher and far inward," that divine presence and indwelling power existing in all creation. In the section following this allegory, Coleridge confirms that it is the knowledge of this unifying presence

with which he is concerned:

On the IMMEDIATE, which dwells in every man, and on the original intuition, or absolute affirmation of it, (which is likewise in every man, but does not in every man rise into consciousness) all the certainty of our knowledge depends²⁹

Thus, there is in man both an immediate "presence" and the potential to apprehend it, but that potential must be actualized by man himself.³⁰

Indeed, Coleridge reiterates the fact that the philosophic system which he is about to put forth is concerned with that actualization: he is concerned with the immediate and "heaven-descended KNOW THYSELF"³¹ and not with empirical perception as such. Thus, transcendental philosophy,

the first principle of which it is to render the mind intuitive of the spiritual in man . . . must needs have a greater obscurity for those, ³² who have never disciplined and strengthened this ulterior consciousness.

It is unintelligible to those who come to it "unaccompanied with any realizing intuition which exists by and in the act that affirms its existence," to those who have not the "philosophic imagination."³³

Throughout Chapter XII of the Biographia, Coleridge emphasizes the fact that self-consciousness (or the "I am" in which subject and object are one) is fundamentally an act of the free will. As he says in the opening paragraphs of the chapter,

where the spirit of man is not filled with the consciousness of freedom . . . all spiritual intercourse is interrupted, not only with others, but even with himself. No wonder then, that he remains incomprehensible to himself, as well as to others.³⁴

This essential fact is repeated in more philosophic terms in Theses VII and X. Thus, it seems certain that the process of knowing discussed in Chapter XII is "knowing" in this higher sense,³⁵ which although possible

to all men is not actualized by all. And the people who are part of Richards' "loveless ever-anxious crowd" are not those who have activated the power of the primary imagination, but those for whom "all spiritual intercourse . . . [has been] interrupted."

Instead, the "primary" imagination should be seen as the act which both illuminates the "immediate" or divine reason within us and therefore reconciles all opposites by apprehending their essential unity. Bate suggests that the "Perception" which Coleridge speaks of in his definition should be seen in this context:

["Perception"] is not consistently used by Coleridge; in its loose context, and in its capitalized form, it may be applied to the direct awareness of reason. In this case, the "primary" imagination may simply refer to that aspect of the creative capacity which draws down the rational insight of the universal into an individualized form of response, thus repeating "the eternal act of creation" whereby value becomes fulfilled in concrete particularity.³⁶

In Blakean terms, perception is creation. And although this elevated kind of perceiving or creating is possible for all men, it is not actively accomplished by all men. As Coleridge says himself, "All men live in the power of Ideas which work in them, though few live in their light."³⁷ Our discussion of pre-Platonic myth and the Platonic dialogues has prepared us for an understanding of this statement; the unconscious energy dwelling in man (and nature) must in man be illuminated by his own conscious intellect. The Dionysian elements in man must be combined with the Apollonian. If man does not combine unconscious and conscious, feeling and thought, these sources which are "far higher and far inward" will seem but the "dark haunts of terrifying agents." Thus, it seems probable that for Coleridge the work of the "primary imagination" is not a wholly unconscious process, but an act which also mediates between these

opposites (as well as between nature and man). Indeed, his definition of the sense of beauty supports this suggestion and indicates what he means in Chapter XII by "intuitive" or "immediate" knowledge:

The sense of Beauty is implicit knowledge--a silent communion of the Spirit with the Spirit in Nature, not without consciousness, though with the consciousness not successively unfolded.³⁸

The "secondary" imagination is an echo of this elevated perception of the wholeness and harmony of creation; the poet, once he has intuitively grasped the essential unity of thesis (thought) and antithesis (things), consciously manifests this unity by creating his own vital synthesis of the two. He shows how the universal works in and through the particulars. But if the poet has not initially apprehended this vital unity, his own creation will be the lifeless product of a mechanical combination of image and idea; he will merely "stamp" a preconceived and abstract idea on to a "fixed" and "dead" object. It is only the "ideal" poet who

brings the whole soul of man into activity, . . . and diffuses a tone and spirit of unity, that blends, and (as it were) fuses, each into each, by that synthetic and magical power . . . [the] imagination. This power, first put in action by the will and understanding, and retained under their irremissive, though gentle and unnoticed, controul . . . reveals itself in the balance or reconciliation of opposite or discordant qualities: of sameness, with difference; of the general, with the concrete; the idea, with the image; the individual, with the representative; the sense of novelty and freshness, with old and familiar objects; a more than usual state of emotion, with more than usual order³⁹

Thus in the context which Coleridge himself provides, this interpretation of the functions of the primary and secondary imagination is definitely supported. And in the many statements on the imagination which he makes both before and after the Biographia, he provides further

support for this interpretation. Indeed, these earlier and later statements help greatly in the clarification of Coleridge's meaning, partly because they are not complicated--one might almost say encumbered⁴⁰--by the simultaneous attempt to develop a transcendental theory of knowledge, and an aesthetic theory of the imagination. Although as early as 1796, in The Watchman, Coleridge had laid the ground for his distinction between the primary and secondary imagination ("Man . . . is urged to develop the powers of the Creator, and by new combinations of those powers to imitate his creativeness."⁴¹), he rarely develops this distinction in any other of his works except the Biographia. Certainly in his earlier statements he makes little attempt to differentiate between the two types of imagination.

The earliest and perhaps the most important distinction (in terms of his aesthetics) which Coleridge makes is between "imagination" and "fancy." As he says in the opening chapters of the Biographia, this fundamental distinction is the result of his meditation on the works of contemporary poets, specifically Bowles and Wordsworth.⁴² He came to realize that a higher and more profound power was at work in the creations of some poets which made their poems not only different in "degree" but also in "kind" from those of other poets.⁴³ In a letter of 1802 to William Sotheby he presents what can be seen a summary of his earlier investigations into that essential difference:

Nature has her proper interest; & he will know what it is, who believes & feels, that every Thing has a Life of it's [sic] own, & that we are all one Life. A Poet's Heart & Intellect should be combined, intimately combined & unified, with the great appearances in Nature--& not merely held in solution & loose mixture with them, in the shape of formal Similies.

In this same letter he explains fancy and imagination in much the same terms as in the Biographia: "Fancy" is merely the "aggregating Faculty of the Mind," but "imagination" is the "modifying, and co-adunating Faculty."⁴⁴ And in another letter of 1804 he elevates the imagination above fancy even further by distinguishing the former as "a dim Analogue of Creation, not all that we can believe, but all that we can conceive of creation."⁴⁵

Coleridge's conception of the imagination as the reconciler of opposites is fundamental to his aesthetics and is often reiterated in subsequent statements. Intimately connected with this basic theory is Coleridge's conception of organic unity. As he says in "On the Principles of Genial Criticism" (1814), true art must manifest the "unity in multëity"; it must show the form working in and through the particular, as it does in nature. Poetry must effect the perfect reconciliation "between these two conflicting principles of the FREE LIFE, and of the confining FORM."⁴⁶ And, as he says in "On Poesy or Art" (1818),

Remember that there is a difference between form as proceeding, and shape as superinduced;--the latter is either the death or the imprisonment of the thing;--the former is its self-witnessing and self-effected sphere of agency. Art would or should be the abridgement of nature.⁴⁷

In the same essay he explains exactly what he means both by "abridgement" and "nature"; art is a conscious elaboration and concentration of the spiritual essence or "indwelling power" in nature; it focuses "the rays of intellect which are scattered throughout the images of nature."⁴⁸

The artist or poet must "imitate that which is within the thing . . .--the Natur-geist, or spirit of nature";⁴⁹ he must master "the essence, the natura naturans, which presupposes a bond between nature in the higher

sense and the soul of man."⁵⁰

Thus, true art (and in a more diffused sense, nature, the art of God) is symbolic; it partakes of the reality it illuminates. As

Coleridge says in the Statesman's Manual, it is only the imagination,

that reconciling and mediatory power, which incorporating the reason in images of the sense, and organizing (as it were) the flux of the senses by the permanence and self-circling energies of the reason, gives birth to a system of symbols, harmonious in themselves and consubstantial with the truths of which they are the conductors. . . . Now an allegory is but a translation of abstract notions into a picture-language, which is itself nothing but an abstraction from objects of the senses.⁵¹

Coleridge's often-repeated differentiation between art which is symbolic and art which is merely allegorical should be seen in the light of his distinctions between imagination and fancy, and organic and mechanical form. (Eryximachus' more general distinction between the verses inspired by Urania and those dedicated to Polyhymnia should also be recalled in this context.) All of these interconnected sets of opposites help to clarify Coleridge's summary of the fundamentals of his aesthetics given in Chapter XIII of the Biographia.⁵²

In addition to augmenting his distinction between imagination and fancy, after the Biographia Coleridge also examines more intensively the "faculties" of reason and understanding upon which the former distinction relies. In a note in Tennemann's Geschichte der Philosophie, for example, he draws the following chart of the "order of the Mental Powers":

lowest	highest
Sense	Reason
Fancy	Imagination
Understanding	Understanding
<hr/>	<hr/>
Understanding	Understanding
Imagination	Fancy
Reason	Sense ⁵³

(This chart also provides additional support for the theory of the primary imagination presented above.) After about 1820 Coleridge is concerned almost wholly with the "higher power" of reason and its relationship with religion, and with reconciling dynamic philosophy with the personal Christian God.⁵⁴ He attempts to solve the problem which he had rather unsuccessfully avoided in the Biographia, where he had seemed to imply that God's creation was a "blind unconscious Activity."⁵⁵ While in the Biographia he was content to indicate only that the source of being was God,⁵⁶ in his later works he is almost exclusively concerned with that source--the transcendent rather than the immanent God. (He began to realize that the exclusive contemplation of God's immanence could lead to mere pantheism.) As Bate suggests, in the idea of the Trinity Coleridge found if not the answer at least the clue to the possibility of reconciling the "one life" of dynamic philosophy with the Christian conception of God, the Fall and the subsequent need for grace.⁵⁷ But before Coleridge's conception of the Trinity can be examined, his general ideas on love must be established, for his ideas on the Trinity are intimately connected with his larger conception of the synthetic power of love.

Love plays a significant role in Coleridge's religious thought (both when he is an Unitarian and a Trinitarian); but it is also integral to his philosophy and aesthetics.⁵⁸ In fact, he has quite justly been called a "philosopher of love"⁵⁹ as well as a philosopher of the imagination. He himself considered love to be "one of the five or six magna mysteria of human nature. . . . There are two mighty mysteries--action and passion (or passive action) and love is [a] synthesis of these, in

which each is the other"60 This statement reveals two fundamental facts of Coleridge's philosophy of love: first of all, love is neither purely passive (Agape) nor only active (Eros) but a union of both, as it is in D'Arcy's theory; secondly, it is a force which fuses or synthesizes opposites, as does the imagination in Coleridge's own theories.

Indeed, when Coleridge attempts to interpret the "mystery" of love, he uses essentially the same vocabulary and the same dialectical method as he employs for defining the imagination. First of all, he establishes its opposite: love is not merely a fanciful association or an "Habit of attachment."⁶¹ In a letter to Crabb Robinson he maintains that love should definitely be "distinguished both from Lust and from that habitual attachment which may include many Objects, diversifying itself by degrees only"62 For Coleridge, lust is the opposite of love just as fancy is the opposite of imagination; lust is concerned only with the external form of its object and "relies only on sense perception." Its object remains an object, and the relationship remains one of "I-it" rather than Aristotle's "I-Thou."

Although Coleridge admits that it is the great need for love that causes men to "make themselves believe they love at the first liking of a likely form, loving from the horror vacui," he maintains that such men do not "feel indeed the corresponding presence of that within and without, which makes the heart find a reason in passion";⁶³ thus they remain in a state of spiritual isolation. However, Coleridge is not a pure spiritualist: by opposing lust to love, he does not imply that there is no place for the senses in love. There is a place for the body in love, just as in poetry there is a place for fancy and the senses. In

fact, sexual union can be a symbol of the higher union of spirit:

Does Lust call forth or occasion Love?--Just as much as the reek of the marsh calls up the Sun. [Instead, the] sun calls up the vapor--attenuates, lifts it--it becomes a cloud--and now it is the Veil of the Divinity--the Divinity transpiercing it at once hides & declares his presence--We see, we are conscious of, Light alone; but it is Light embodied in the earthly nature In her homely way the Body tries to interpret & symbolize that divinest movement of the FINITE Spirit--the yearning to complete itself by Union?⁶⁴

Thus, sexual attachment is acknowledged and accepted, but only when it is not purely sensual but essentially symbolic of a higher kind of love.

(St. Augustine makes the same distinction in terms of cupiditas and caritas.) Love, like oxygen, "has an almost universal affinity, and a long & finely graduate Scale of elective Attractions,"⁶⁵ but sensual attraction should be the lowest on that scale. Like Plato and Plotinus, Coleridge envisions a "ladder of love" reaching ultimately to the transcendent divine:

One infallible criterion in forming an opinion of a man is the reverence in which he holds women. Plato has said, that in this way we rise from sensuality to affection, from affection to love, and from love to the pure intellectual delight by which we become worthy to conceive that infinite in ourselves, without which it is impossible for man to believe in a God.⁶⁶

Coleridge provides several examples from Shakespeare's plays which help to clarify his distinction between Uranian or "heavenly" love and Pandemian or "earthly" lust. For instance, he juxtaposes the spiritual and intuitive love of Romeo and Juliet and the lust of Cleopatra, whose "passion . . . springs out of the habitual craving of a licentious nature, and . . . is reinforced by voluntary stimulus and sought-for associations."⁶⁷ This same distinction between "true love" and lustful association is also

employed in his analysis of Shakespeare's *Troilus and Cressida*.⁶⁸

Indeed, throughout his dramatic criticism, Coleridge often uses both the dichotomy between love and lust as well as that between fancy and imagination to delineate the differences between dramatic characters.

Two of Coleridge's lectures on Shakespeare, the seventh and eighth lectures of the 1811 series, are invaluable to an understanding of his conception of love. Although they were ostensibly on Romeo and Juliet, Crabb Robinson says that Coleridge actually "declaimed with great eloquence on Love."⁶⁹ It is in these lectures that Coleridge offers his definition of love in opposition to those who would debase love into an animal passion:

Consider myself and my fellow-men as a sort of link between heaven and earth, being composed of body and soul, with power to reason and to will . . . ; considering man, I say, in this two-fold character, yet united in one person, I conceive that there can be no correct definition of love which does not correspond with our being and with that subordination of one part to another which constitutes our perfection. I would say therefore that--"Love is a desire of the whole being to be united to some thing, or some being, felt necessary to its completeness, by the most perfect means that nature permits, and reason dictates."⁷⁰

As Raysor indicates, this definition is derived directly from Plato's Symposium; but it should also be noted that it is based on the same reconciliation of opposites (both internal and external) which governs Coleridge's definition of the primary imagination. Like the imagination, love is often seen by Coleridge as the force which fuses all aspects of man's mind and allows him to become "whole." As he says in his marginal notes to Sir Thomas Browne's Religio Medici, love works "to establish a concord and unity betwixt all parts of our nature, to give a Feeling & a Passion to our purer Intellect, and to intellectualize our feelings &

passions."⁷¹ And in a footnote to Aids to Reflection, Coleridge explains this wholeness by referring, as did Aristophanes in the Symposium, to the "old tradition of the homo androgynus": in order to achieve the integrity of unfallen man, desire, or the female aspect of our nature, must be united with the masculine power of reason.⁷²

But, as in Coleridge's conception of the primary imagination, wholeness implies not a separation, but indeed leads to a union of the self with the external, and a vision of the wholeness of all creation.⁷³ The deepest and the fullest reality is achieved through love which "transforms the soul into a conformity with the object loved."⁷⁴ Thus, through the force of love, as opposed to lust, the object (whether it be considered another person or nature itself) does not remain as an object but becomes one with the subject. This "co-adunation" is most obviously and traditionally conceived of as between human beings, but for Coleridge (and Wordsworth) it is extended to nature itself; through love, man is able to penetrate to the vital inscape of nature. As Coleridge says in his "lecture on Love,"

what is the first effect of love, but to associate the feeling with every object in nature? . . . It gives to every object in nature a power of the heart, without which indeed it would be spiritless.⁷⁵

And in a letter of 1798, Coleridge suggests that a love or "visionary fondness" for nature leads to a love of humanity. This sentiment seems particularly Wordsworthian, and indeed when Coleridge utters it, he quotes his friend and fellow poet:

Not useless do I deem
These shadowy Sympathies with things that hold
An inarticulate Language: for the Man
Once taught to love such objects, as excite

No morbid passions, no disquietude,
 No vengence & no hatred, needs must feel
 The Joy of that pure principle of Love
 So deeply, that, unsatisfied with aught
 Less pure & exquisite, he cannot chuse
 But seek for objects of a kindred Love
 In fellow-natures, & a kindred Joy.⁷⁶

But this is Coleridge in an optimistic mood of 1798; later, in "Dejection: An Ode" and in several notebook entries relating to it, he stresses the active role for the mind in its relationship with nature. And by 1815, in the Biographia, Coleridge criticizes Wordsworth for not equally stressing that

Education, or original sensibility, or both, must pre-exist, if the changes, forms and incidents of nature are to prove a sufficient stimulant. And where these are not sufficient, the mind contracts and hardens . . . the man becomes selfish, sensual, gross, and hard-hearted.⁷⁷

But in "Dejection" it is not a lack of education or organic sensibility but a lack of a satisfying personal love relationship that hinders Coleridge's communion with nature. Indeed, even in his earlier "Conversation Poems," the focal point for his poetry had been his love for an individual; and from that center his mind would move out to embrace all nature.⁷⁸ It seems as if Coleridge, never the great "solitary" that Wordsworth was, has reversed the order and therefore the importance of the two loves indicated in Wordsworth's poem. Certainly in his prose works and his personal notebooks Coleridge's emphasis is on the relationship between man and woman. These comments are not only more numerous but also more continuous than the ones on the love of nature; as many critics have noted, after 1804 Coleridge rarely looks to nature for restoration, but he continues to hope that from personal love (particularly from his relationship with "Asra" or Sara Hutchinson) he will

achieve the essential wholeness which he lacks. Many of Coleridge's statements on love are the result of his personal experiences; some remain personal, but others attempt to deal with the force of love in general. In comparing lust to love we have noted that many of these more philosophical statements on personal love are concerned with the same reconciliation of opposites which governs his definition of the primary imagination: as Coleridge says in Table Talk, "in love there is a sort of antipathy, or opposing passion. Each strives to be the other and both together make up one whole."⁷⁹ And in a significant entry collected in the Anima Poetae, Coleridge includes both the idea that personal love must be a mutual and "ennobling interchange" and that this love is the basis for a "visionary fondness" for nature:

Suppose a wide and delightful landscape, and what the eye is to the light, and the light to the eye, that interchangeably is the lover to the beloved. "O best beloved! who loves me the best!" In strictest propriety of application might he thus address her, if only she with equal truth could echo the same sense in the same feeling. "Light of mine eye! by which alone I not only see all I see, but which makes up more than half the loveliness of the objects seen, yet, still, like the rising sun in the morning, like the moon at night, remainest thyself and for thyself, the dearest, fairest form of all the thousand forms that derive from thee all their visibility, and borrow from thy presence their chiefest beauty!"⁸⁰

It is also interesting to note that in this observation Coleridge uses the now-familiar terminology of perception to explain the reciprocity of love.

Coleridge's "whole man theory," as Yarlott calls it,⁸¹ applies directly to the creation of poetry, for the ideal poet is he who "brings the whole soul of man into activity."⁸² As Coleridge says in a conversation with John Frere,

Poetry is the highest effort of the mind; all the powers are in a state of equilibrium and equally energetic, the knowledge of individual existence is forgotten, the man is out of himself and exists in all things⁸³

Foremost among the powers of the mind which must be fused by the poet are those fundamental and opposing powers of (masculine) thought and (feminine) feeling: "To carry on the feelings of childhood . . . is the character and privilege of genius, and one of the marks which distinguishes genius from talents."⁸⁴ Many critics have noted the centrality of feeling to Coleridge's aesthetic theories,⁸⁵ and some of them have equated love with feeling. Although love is definitely the power which allows us to "feel" rather than merely "see" ("Dejection: An Ode") the world, in Coleridge's aesthetic theories love cannot be equated with feeling. It must be remembered that for Coleridge love or "Joy" is one of the fundamental syntheses of "action and passion"; it is the fusion of the intellect or "will" with the heart or "practical reason."⁸⁶ As he says in the following notebook entry,

Love's essence being a divine synthesis of highest ~~order~~ reason--and ~~passion~~ vehementest Impulse, it must needs the soul in its two faculties, or perhaps of the two souls, vital power of Heat, & Light of Intellect--attract and combine with poesy, whose essence is passionate order.⁸⁷

This passage not only indicates that love and the imagination are both synthetic forces, but also suggests that they are themselves interconnected. The necessity for the co-adunation of love and the imagination is most obviously manifested in Coleridge's own poetry, but it is also present in his theories. As was previously established, the need for both love and imagination is certainly indicated in Coleridge's theory that a man must be "whole" in order to create. And in one rather

interesting instance Coleridge applies this theory in order to criticize Wordsworth's character and thus his poetry. For all his earlier praise of Wordsworth, in 1811 Coleridge proclaims him unable to "understand Love":

Wordsworth is by nature incapable of being in Love, tho' no man more tenderly attached--hence he ridicules the existence of any other passion, than a compound of Lust with Esteem & Friendship, confined to one Object, first by accidents of Association, and permanently, by the force of Habit & a sense of Duty.⁸⁸

Although this seems to be a somewhat unfair criticism of Wordsworth, it could perhaps be related to Coleridge's adverse criticism in the Biographia of the occasional "matter-of-factness" and the "insertion of accidental circumstances" in Wordsworth's poetry.⁸⁹ At any rate, Coleridge maintains that although not all lovers are poets, "no man can be a great Poet, that Apotheosis of a Philosopher, the transfigured Philosopher with seraph wings on his shoulders, who has not a pure Heart."⁹⁰ And in one of his most suggestive definitions of the poet he definitely associates love with poetic creation: poets are "Gods of Love who tame the Chaos."⁹¹

Coleridge also makes an attempt to apply his theories of love to other aspects of his aesthetics, specifically to his theories on beauty and taste. Once again, Bate provides the best introduction to Coleridge's theory of beauty:

If reality consists in the "evolution and assimilation" of the particular in the universal, beauty . . . may be described as the means by which this reality can be comprehended by the "total" mind.⁹²

"On the Principles of Genial Criticism" is Coleridge's own attempt to define beauty, which he sees as the "mediator between Truth and Feeling, the Head and the Heart."⁹³ Beauty, or beautiful art, reconciles "Free

Life" with "Form" and harmonizes chaos. Coleridge's method of dealing with the question of beauty is familiar: first of all, he distinguishes it from what is merely "agreeable."⁹⁴ (Here, "agreeable" takes the place of fancy or lust.) Instead, beauty is "immediate" or disinterested; it does not rely upon the accretions of pleasurable associations. But in this essay Coleridge also distinguishes beauty from the "good" which is the transcendent end ("above it") rather than the means to that end. Thus, beauty does lead up to the good; as Coleridge himself suggests, "the Greeks called a beautiful object . . . [a] calling on the soul."⁹⁵ But here Coleridge seems to be at least partially contradicting himself: although beauty is "pleasing for its own sake,"⁹⁶ it is also "interested" in the sense that it is the means to the good. In the following passage from an incompleted essay on beauty Coleridge seems to be attempting to qualify, or at least to clarify, his thoughts on beauty in "Genial Criticism":

Love--We shall master the Idea of Love, when having assumed that Love = Beauty + Interest, we find the solution of the following Problem. --

First, Immediateness being an essential and indispensable character of Beauty, and Immediateness and Esse inter being not opposites but contraries, how can they be united otherwise than by the destruction or suspension of the one or the other?

He must therefore discover, a Beauty that is not incompatible with an Interest. And at the same time an Interest not incompatible with Beauty.

Now these would be comprized in the problem generalized.

To find an Interest, i.e. a medium that is nevertheless immediate--This [?] must be therefore--1. Whil[e] not partial, an interest of the whole Being[?]. 2. As such it must involve the potential as well as the actual. 3. The potential must even predominate (For so only can the Will appear as in its own form.--etc., etc., etc., But the result will be to reveal the close analogy of Love and Beauty)]⁹⁷

The problem which Coleridge is attempting to resolve is that beauty is both real or "immediate" (that is, not depending on preconceived associations and not restricted to sensual pleasures) and symbolical or "potential." Although the resolution of this problem is certainly not clear, its postulated result is clearly indicated: love and beauty are definitely analogous. Coleridge also attempts to relate love to taste, which is the "sense of beauty,"⁹⁸ and yet another "intermediate faculty which connects the active with the passive powers of our nature."⁹⁹ But all we have left of this attempt is a newspaper account of the conclusion of his eighth lecture in the 1811 series: "The lecturer went on to notice the analogy between the operations of the mind with regard to taste and love, as with the former an ideal had been created which the reason was anxious to realise."¹⁰⁰ Although these comments are too fragmentary to lead to any definite conclusions, they do indicate that Coleridge was attempting to extend his theories of love into the realm of aesthetics.

Coleridge's conception of the symbol is also important to his theories on love, for like many poets before him he considers his beloved to be a symbol which both contains and leads up to the divine. He expresses this idea in several places throughout his prose works.¹⁰¹ Two of the most significant statements on the symbolic quality of the beloved are as follows; both of them concern "Asra," Coleridge's Beatrice.

The best, the truly lovely, in each & all is God. Therefore the truly Beloved is the symbol of God to whomever it is truly beloved by!--but it may become perfect & maintained lovely by the function of the two / The Lover worships in his Beloved that final consummation of itself which is produced in his own soul by the action of the Soul of the Beloved upon it, and that final perfection of the Soul of the Beloved, which is in part the consequence of the reaction of his (so ameliorated & regenerated) Soul upon the Soul of his Beloved / till each contemplates the Soul of the other as involving his own, both in its givings and its

receivings, ~~in a mood that~~ and thus still keeping alive its outness, its self-oblivion united with Self-warmth, & still approximates to God! Where shall I find an image for this sublime Symbol which ever involving the presence of Deity, yet ~~tending~~ towards it ever!¹⁰²

Again, there is a stress on a dynamic "ennobling interchange," as there is in the following entry:

Real + Symbolical.--Motion + Rest at the Goal. Love--and the grandeur of loving the Supreme in her--the real & symbolical united / --and the more because I love her as being capable of being glorified by me & as the means & instrument of my own glorification / In loving her thus I love two Souls as one . . . [and] as the ever improving Symbol of Deity to us, still growing with the growth of ~~my~~ our intellectual Faculties:-- and so uniting the moving impulse & the stationary desire. O that I may have heart & soul to develope this Truth so important and so deeply felt.¹⁰³

If the beloved was a symbol of God, so marriage was for Coleridge the symbol of union with God; and he stresses that for St. Paul it was not merely allegorical but equally symbolic.¹⁰⁴ Marriage for Coleridge is a sacred union participating in the larger union with God:

marriage contracted between Christians is a true and perfect symbol or mystery: that is, the actualizing faith being supposed to exist in the receivers, it is an outward sign co-essential with that which it signifies, or a living part of that, the whole of which it represents.¹⁰⁵

Thus, marriage is also a "mutal transfusion," as is union with God: in both relationships, love is both extended and received.

But in his later years Coleridge was concerned not so much with the translucent symbol as with the source of its light:

The wonderful works of God in the sensible world are a perpetual discourse, reminding me of his existence, and shadowing out to me his perfections. But all language presupposes in the intelligent hearer or reader those primary notions, which it symbolizes; as well as the power of making those combinations of those primary notions, which it represents and excites us to combine,--even so I believe, that the notion of God is essential to the human mind . . .¹⁰⁶

He began to be more concerned with the direct contemplation of "Him, from whose absolute Unity all Union derives its possibility, existence, and meaning,"¹⁰⁷ and increasingly suspicious of lesser loves, whether they be for nature or for another human being. As he says in 1830,

Our best loves and solitudes may be in excess, and assuredly are so when they are exclusively confined to one Object The only exception is the Love of God--because the Love of God alone is inclusive of all good and Lovely, and excludes nothing but the Lust of Evil, the Solitude after emptiness.¹⁰⁸

But Coleridge himself cannot be accused of such an excess, for his love of earthly things had not been "idolatry,"¹⁰⁹ but had included God. There are also many early examples of Coleridge's direct love of God and his identification of God himself with Love. ("Religious Musings" will be our example.) But once Coleridge had accepted the religious implications of Trinitarianism (1804 or 1805), these early statements on God as Love give way to a more thorough examination of the particular role of love in the Godhead. As Coleridge tells us in the Biographia, his ideas on the Trinity were first of all Platonic and philosophical, and then Christian and religious. He considered Plato's ideas on the Trinity to be part of the "unwritten dogmata" preserved by his follower, Speusippus. Coleridge explains the Platonic doctrine of the Trinity and its relationship with Christian doctrine in the Philosophical Lectures:

I refer to the passage in which we are told that the intelligential powers, by the Pythagoreans and Anexagoras called the Nous, (the Logos or the Word of Philo and St. John) is indeed indivisibly united with, but yet not the same as the absolute principle of causation. THE PATERNAL One, the super-essential Will; nor yet, though indivisibly One with, is it the same as the energy of Love, the sanctifying spirit so sublimely described in the Apocrypha under the name of the Wisdom of Solomon, remembering that Σοφία, Wisdom, is the term which the Fathers of the Church made peculiar to the Holy Ghost.¹¹⁰

is, relatively objective to the subjective, relatively subjective to the objective.

This "co-eternal" is Love or "Community"; relative to the Father, it is the "Holy Spirit"; and relative to the Son, it is the "Sancta Sophia."¹¹⁷

Thus, love is conceived of as the copula which reunites Father and creation, the finite and the Infinite. Coleridge often stresses the importance of this third and unifying hypostasis of the Trinity; for example, in a marginal note to one of Donne's sermons he says that

the best moral Definition is--God is LOVE-- and this is (to us, the highest prerogative of the moral that all it's dictates immediately reveal the truths of intelligence, whereas the strictly Intellectual only by more distant & cold deductions carries us towards the moral. For what is Love? Union with the desire of union. God therefore is the Cohesion & the oneness of all Things)¹¹⁸

Coleridge's conception of the Trinity is directly related to his ideas on the will and reason in man, and the problem of original sin and evil. First of all he maintains that although God is love, man must by a total act of his being also extend his love towards God. Once again there is an emphasis on receiving as well as giving; only when man both receives God's love and then extends it upward can the circle be completed:

Even so doth religion finitely express the unity of the infinite Spirit by being a total act of the soul. . . . The love of God, and therefore God himself who is love, religion strives to express by love, and measures its growth by the increase and activity of its love. . . . From God's love through his Son, crucified for us from the beginning of the world, religion begins: and in love towards God and the creatures of God it hath its end and completion.¹¹⁹

In several of his later works, Coleridge explains this total act of the soul which he calls love or, more often, "faith": it is the result of the

synthesis of Reason and the individual will. For Coleridge, Reason is the manifestation of God's love in man; it is the "spark of Divinity"¹²⁰ or "the super-individual of each man."¹²¹ And will is the opposite and "personalizing principle of free agency."¹²² The first force is, as he says, "minus" will and the second "plus" will. Thus, man, who alone has free will and choice, must consciously achieve what nature unconsciously is:¹²³ he must synthesize Reason and his individual will. Only when they are fused, and the individuating principle is thus controlled, can man attain to his proper character as the "likeness or image of the prothesis."¹²⁴ Only when the will is "in its state of immanence or indwelling in reason . . . [will it] appear indifferently as wisdom or as love."¹²⁵ Thus, man will meet love with love. But the will may also be fused with the lower and purely "earthly" forces in the human personality; when it is fused with appetite, the result ~~is~~ sensuality;¹²⁶ and when it is synthesized with the finite understanding, the result is a "carnal mind" or a wisdom of this world.¹²⁷ As Coleridge explains it in the Statesman's Manual, "in its utmost abstraction from reason and consequent state of reprobation, the will becomes Satanic pride and rebellious self-idolatry"¹²⁸ Thus there is an essential difference between self-love or idolatry and love of the self. The first kind of love is interested, sensual, and self-contained; the second is disinterested, spiritual, and (by recognizing that reason is super-individual) embraces all other souls.¹²⁹ Coleridge says that this is "the great privilege of pure religion. By diverting self-love to our self under those relations, . . . it annihilates self, as a notion of diversity. Extremes meet."¹³⁰

This idea of the ability of the will to fuse with any other power than Divine Reason is at the heart of Coleridge's conception of original

sin. In his theology, original sin is not an innate or inherited condition: "a sin is an evil which has its ground or origin in the agent, and not in the compulsion of circumstances." He explains:

In this sense of the word, original, . . . it is evident that the phrase, Original Sin, is a pleonasm, the epithet not adding to the thought, but only enforcing it. For if it be sin, it must be original; and a state or act, that has not its origin in the will, may be a calamity, deformity, disease, or mischief; but a sin it can not be.¹³¹

Thus, for Coleridge a sin is "the falling back into the Dark Will"¹³²--the will in conjunction with appetite or understanding rather than Reason. Coleridge gives what is perhaps his most comprehensive explanation of sin and evil in the following notebook entry:

For pure Evil what is it but Will that would manifest itself as Will, not in Being . . . not in Intelligence (therefore formless)--not in union of Communion, the contrary therefore of Life, even eternal Death. . . . It is the creaturely will which instead of quenching itself in the Light and the Form, to be Warmth (of Life) and the Procession (Love); and so resolve itself into the Will of the One, it would quench the Light of the Form, and shrink inward, if so it might itself remain the One, by recoiling from the One--and find a center by centrifuge--and thus in the Self-Love it becomes Hate and the lust full of Hate--and in the striving to be one (instead of striving after and toward the One) it becomes the infinite Many.¹³³

Sin is thus the contraction of self rather than the expansion of consciousness outward to include all souls and upward to meet the source of the Reason in all souls.

In most of his prose statements Coleridge discusses only the end result of the reconciling of conscious intellect with the unconscious sources of divine power--wisdom or "Self-Knowledge." Rarely does he discuss the process by which unconscious energies become enlightened by love and imagination; rarely does he indicate the initial fear involved

in going out of oneself to explore what seem to be "the dark haunts of terrific agents"¹³⁴ until love and wisdom supersede fear. However, like Wordsworth,¹³⁵ Coleridge does recognize that fear and awe of the sublimity of God are necessary aspects of the regeneration of the soul from self-complacence and self-idolatry:

The Terrors of the Almighty are the whirlwind, the earthquake, and the Fire that precede the still small voice of his Love. The pestilence of our lusts must be scattered, the strong-layed Foundations of our Pride blown up, & the stubble & chaff of our Vanities burnt, ere we can give ear to the inspeaking Voice of Mercy. . . .¹³⁶

Here Coleridge is close to Boehme, who also suggests that the energy and "wrath" of God are recognized by man before His light and love. Although fear for Coleridge is also a cohesive force,¹³⁷ he maintains that "unless that Fear, which is the Beginning of Wisdom, shall proceed to LOVE, there can be no Union with God: for God is Love."¹³⁸ But such prose statements are few; it is primarily in his own poetry that Coleridge attempts to explain the transition from fear to love, as well as to manifest the internal reconciliation of light and energy, or thought and feeling (and thus man and all else), through the forces of love and the imagination.

CHAPTER III

THE MAJOR POEMS

Although Coleridge considered love a magnum mysterium, we have seen that he had done much to unveil that mystery and to incorporate his knowledge of it into his psychology, his aesthetics and his theology. And in one of his more inspired moods he had contemplated manifesting his knowledge of the significance of love in a series of poems which would encompass

Love in all the moods of the mind--Philosophic, fantastic, in moods of high enthusiasm, of simple Feeling, of mysticism, of Religion-- / comprize in it all the practice, & all the philosophy of Love.¹

Of the many ambitious and elaborate schemes which Coleridge contemplated, this is one of the few which he actually fulfilled. Most of his poems do deal with at least one of the aspects or "moods" of love which he contemplated; the most significant of these also connect love with the workings of the imagination. And all of these poems, in their various presentations of love, manifest the same general movement from passive to dynamic and then beyond as did the prose statements.

"Religious Musings" (1794) and "The Destiny of Nations" (1796) are Coleridge's earliest and rather overly ambitious attempts to deal with love in a philosophic sense; in both poems he tries to incorporate his political philosophy with his theology by demonstrating the inevitable historical and individual reintegration of creation and creator. This reintegration is made possible through the God who is Love:

There is one Mind, one omnipresent Mind,
 Omnific. His most holy name is Love.
 Truth of subliming import! with the which
 Who feeds and saturates his constant soul,
 He from his small particular orbit flies
 With blest outstarting! From himself he flies,
 Stands in the sun, and with no partial gaze
 Views all creation; and he loves it all,
 And blesses it, and calls it very good!
 This is indeed to dwell with the Most High!²

Although this passage is certainly mystic in import, in a footnote to a similar passage Coleridge says that such a sentiment has been "freed from the charge of Mysticism" and rationally "demonstrated" by David Hartley in his Observations on Man.³ It was during this period that Coleridge was almost overwhelmingly influenced by the genius of "that great Christian," Hartley, who had "first . . . marked the ideal tribes / Up the fine fibres through the sentient brain,"⁴ and had shown how by the passive and "magic power of association . . . gross self-interest rises gradually into pure Benevolence, and Appetence of Pleasure into Love of Virtue."⁵ Dorothy Waples outlines the links in the Hartleian chain of association to which Coleridge refers in the preceding quotation: this inevitable process begins with "imagination," which results in ambition and self-interested pleasure, which in turn pass to enlightened self-interest or "sympathy," which finally culminates in "theopathy," or the love of God.⁶ Both "The Destiny of Nations" and "Religious Musings" outline, although much less specifically, this same progression of the mind from sense perception to final "theopathy," where

by exclusive consciousness of God
 All self-annihilated it shall make
 God its Identity: God all in all!
 We and our Father one!⁷

The result of this reconciliation of God and man is the equal (and finally

universal) benevolence of man for man. This "great process of Benevolence" is thus both a psychological and an historical fact; Coleridge, like Shelley after him, envisions the necessary historical process from the evil enslavement of the many to the Wealth and Power and "self interest" of the few, to the final restoration of the principles of Love and Happiness in a Godwinian future paradise. Thus, at this stage of his thought his rather facile answer to the problem of evil is that it necessarily leads to a greater good.

Fear and dark superstition are also necessary steps in the reintegration of God and man; as Coleridge says in "The Destiny of Nations," fear expands the mind and "trains [it] up to God":

For Fancy is the power
That first unsensualizes the dark mind,
Giving it new delights; and bids it swell
With wild activity; and peopling air,
By obscure fears of Beings invisible,
Emancipates it from the grosser thrall
Of the present impulse, teaching Self-control,
Till Superstition with unconscious hand
Seat Reason on her throne.⁸

Yet another footnote to "Religious Musings" directs us to a passage in Hartley which attempts to explain this intimate relationship between fear and final love. Hartley presents an ingenious algebraic analysis of the relationship between "W", or the love of the World, and "F" and "L," or the fear and the love of God: W equals F^2 divided by L , so that if W remains a constant, F^2 equals L . Thus, increased fear will always lead to the final love of God.⁹ In "The Destiny of Nations" Coleridge rather unsuccessfully tries to dramatize Hartley's abstract equations and theories in the character of Saint Joan. He tries to show how, through her own experiences and the concomitant advice of her "tutelary Spirit,"

Joan moves from fear of the mysterious and seemingly destructive powers of God to a love of Him; thus, she is able to turn back to the evils of this world and hasten their inevitable end.

This tutelary power who aids Joan's spiritual growth is perhaps a more interesting figure than Joan herself. He seems at once to be a neo-Platonic daemon or a "Being[] of [a] higher class than Man,"¹⁰ and a more Hartleian "monad" or atom of energy which here engages in "weaving human fates" and "evolv[ing] the process of eternal good."¹¹ But it is not only this tutelary spirit who suffers from a kind of dual nature; as many critics have noted, both poems are a rather loose mixture of the ideas of Hartley, Priestley and Newton with those of Berkeley and the neo-Platonists. Indeed, in some passages it is difficult to decide whether Coleridge is echoing Priestley's quasi-scientific and religious attitude toward the atoms of energy in nature or Plotinus' conception of the immanent spirit in nature. How, for example, is the following passage to be interpreted?

'Glory to Thee, Father of Earth and Heaven!
All-conscious Presence of the Universe!
Nature's vast ever-acting Energy!
In will, in deed, Impulse of All to All!'¹²

Coleridge provides the following manuscript note to this passage: "Tho' these Lines may bear a sane sense, yet they are easily and more naturally interpreted with a very false or dangerous one."¹³ But since the note is undated, it is still difficult to ascertain which interpretation Coleridge would consider to be "sane." There are, however, several other passages in both poems which contain more definite non-Hartleian ideas and anticipate the idealism and transcendentalism of Coleridge's

later thought.¹⁴ As Appleyard notes,

though Hartley's system begins in a benevolent disposition on the part of God and culminates in the perfect happiness of divine contemplation, the process is mechanical and only apparently voluntary, and emotion, since it is merely a less organized kind of idea, plays little part On the other hand, the unity of being in Coleridge's poem . . . is realized by man by means of a personal vision contingent upon his own contemplation of the loveliness of God and its reflection in things. In the same way, the love that Coleridge is speaking of is a dynamic and voluntary exchange between man and God, or at least an active sympathy with mind and order in existence; Hartley's intellectualized and largely unselfconscious response . . . is something quite different.¹⁵

One of the significant differences between Hartley's theories and Coleridge's poems is the highly emotional tone which pervades these poems, as well as the corresponding emphasis placed on the emotional quality of the union of man with God which the poems themselves present. Equally non-Hartleian is Coleridge's conception of the ability of man to imaginatively and joyfully perceive and partake of the unity of all things; here, as in Coleridge's later theories, there is also the same contrast between the contracted consciousness of the man who makes "his own low self the whole" and the expanded consciousness of the man who

by sacred sympathy might make
The whole one Self! Self, that no alien knows!
Self, far diffused as Fancy's wings can travel!¹⁶

Another and related idea anticipated in these poems is Coleridge's dynamic conception of nature as the symbol of God:

For all that meets the bodily sense I deem
Symbolical, one mighty alphabet
For infant minds¹⁷

In such passages as this, the earlier influence of Plotinus (or Boehme)

can be seen, although, as several critics have pointed out, the source could also have been Berkeley, who also conceived of the world as "a language spoken by God to be understood by men."¹⁸ Whatever the source, Coleridge's idea that "the Great / Invisible [is] by symbols only seen"¹⁹ plays a significant part in the aesthetic theories which he developed after "Religious Musings" and "The Destiny of Nations."

Although both of these poems are invaluable aids to an understanding of Coleridge's early and later ideas, they certainly cannot be considered great works of art, not only because of their turgid and elaborate diction,²⁰ but also because of the uncontrolled profusion of the ideas themselves. As Coleridge himself admits in a letter to Southey, his early poetry is still too "crowded and sweats beneath a heavy burthen of Ideas and Images."²¹ Coleridge is definitely correct in criticizing the proliferation of images as well as ideas in such poems, but at the same time it should be said that a few of these images taken in isolation are quite striking. Some (like the ideas) are also significant to his later poems; two of such images are concerned with manifesting the influence of God's love on creation and are repeated in a more perfected form in the later poems. The first image presents God as the sun which causes the contracted and frozen soul to expand and overflow with love:



Soaring aloft I breathe the empyreal air
Of Love, omnific, omnipresent Love,
Whose day-spring rises glorious in my soul
As the great Sun, when he his influence
Sheds on the frost-bound waters--The glad stream
Flows to the ray and warbles as it flows.²²

The second presents God as the winged spirit of Love who "tames" the chaos:

. . . Love rose glittering, and his gorgeous wings
 Over the abyss fluttered with such glad noise,
 As what time after long and pestful calms,
 With slimy shapes and miscreated life
 Poisoning the vast Pacific, the fresh breeze
 Wakens the merchant-sail uprising.²³

Although both of these image-clusters are repeated most obviously in "The Rime of the Ancient Mariner," they are also present in a modified form in "Kubla Khan." In the latter poem, the power to reconcile the opposites of heat and ice and to tame the chaos is given not to God but to the "ideal" poet--himself a kind of creator who "gives birth" to his own "system of symbols . . . consubstantial with the truths of which they are the conductors."²⁴ Indeed, both "Kubla Khan" and "The Rime of the Ancient Mariner" are the supreme examples of Coleridge's own ability to meet the criteria of his definition of "ideal" poetry; here, form and feeling, idea and image, internal and external worlds are one. Brett is certainly correct in suggesting that although Coleridge did not publish his aesthetic theories until much later, he had "arrived at the main principles of his criticism when he was writing his best poetry."²⁵ But in "Kubla Khan" the affinities with Coleridge's critical theories are even greater, for this poem is itself on the creation of poetry. When Coleridge later suggests that the imagination reveals itself "in the balance or reconciliation of opposite or discordant qualities: of sameness, with difference; of the general, with the concrete; . . . the sense of novelty and freshness, with old and familiar objects; a more than usual state of emotion, with more than usual order; judgement ever awake and steady self-possession, with enthusiasm and feeling profound or vehement,"²⁶ he is talking of the inherent idea of "Kubla Khan." And when he defines poetry as "the perfect reconciliation, affected

between these two conflicting principles of the FREE LIFE, and of the confining FORM . . . fused and . . . almost volatilized by the interpenetration and electrical flashes of the former,"²⁷ he is using the sexual imagery of "Kubla Khan." In this poem the creative acts of love and the imagination are inextricably linked.

The poem, like its landscape,²⁸ is divided into three interrelated parts: the first, the dome () as the form of poetry and thought of the poet; the second, the chasm () or free life and feeling, united with the dome into a perfect circle by the sacred river of imagination; the third, the poet's own yearning to create and to be enclosed in that perfect circle. In the first part (lines one to eleven), the sunny dome of Kubla Khan is defined by its own structures as well as by its contrast with the sacred river. The dome could be seen as an image corresponding to Coleridge's own definition of ancient or classical art; it is "the finite, and, therefore, grace, elegance, proportion, fancy, dignity, majesty,--whatever is capable of being definitely conveyed by defined forms or thoughts."²⁹ Accordingly, the dome is "stately" and "decreed"; its grounds are measured ("twice five miles") and protected by "walls and towers"; and its gardens are cultivated and artificially peaceful. But this enclosure is not all "formed"; within it there are also untouched forests and a freely-flowing river. This sacred river, Alpheus, is the source and origin (Alpha) of creativity and life from which the "rills" of the garden are watered; it "meanders" across the landscape and then returns underground to its "measureless" caves and finally to the "sunless sea." This essential contrast between the river and the dome, "free life" and "form," is enhanced by the rhythm of the lines themselves.

There is also another image of "free life" which is contained within the circumscribed area of Kubla's realm; in the second part of the poem (lines twelve to thirty-six), in direct contrast to the ordered pleasure dome is the "deep romantic chasm," the place from which the sacred river is forced above ground. Both the chasm and the river can be seen as images of "modern" or romantic art which for Coleridge is dedicated to "the infinite and [the] indefinite as the vehicle of the infinite . . . the passions, the obscure hopes and fears . . .--sublimity."³⁰ At the same time, both the chasm and the river with its deep caves are, as is usual in Romantic poetry, symbols of the unconscious mind of the poet. In this poem Coleridge manifests both the organic reconciliation of form and free life and the internal reconciliation of the conscious and unconscious mind. It is, of course, the unconscious which is the source of artistic creativity and genius; as Coleridge says in "On Poesy and Art," "There is in genius itself an unconscious activity; nay, that is the genius in the man of genius."³¹ But this unconscious activity must be ordered and utilized as it is by Kubla, for alone it is both sacred and fearfully enchanted. It is

A savage place! as holy and enchanted
As e'er beneath a waning moon was haunted
By woman wailing for her demon-lover!³²

In the Crewe manuscript, the dichotomies of this passage are increased, for "demon" is spelled "daemon," and daemons can be either productive or destructive forces. Both Goethe and Coleridge associate daemons with the unconscious powers; Goethe calls the unconscious the "daemon" of the "well."³³ But both poets maintain that the vital energy of the unconscious

must be controlled by the conscious mind; as Coleridge says, it is only the "ideal" poet such as Shakespeare who can direct "self-consciously a power and an implicit wisdom deeper than consciousness."³⁴

In the poem this central moment of imaginative reconciliation occurs when the sacred river is forced violently upwards from the depths of the chasm into a fountain.³⁵ The sexual connotations of this creative act are unmistakable, for it is related to the sexual union of the woman and her demon-lover. And the virile intensity of the act of creation is also reflected in the rhythm of these central lines:

And from this chasm, with ceaseless turmoil seething,
As if this earth in thick fast pants were breathing,
A mighty fountain momentarily was forced:
Amid whose swift half-intermitted burst
Huge fragments vaulted like rebounding hail,
Or chaffy grain beneath the thresher's flail:
And 'mid these dancing rocks at once and ever
It flung up momentarily the sacred river.³⁶

Immediately afterward there is calm as the sacred river moves across Kubla's kingdom, fertilizing his forests and gardens; but on the other side of the kingdom is chaos and the prophesy of war. "The poet," says Coleridge, "is a God of Love who tames the chaos." But this poetic reconciliation of opposites, "rest at the goal," is only momentary. "Mingled measure" will inevitably become the clash of the war³⁷ between dialectical opposites (for this is the process of growth itself). But here the God of Love reconciles thesis and antithesis to create the perfect whole--"a sunny pleasure dome with caves of ice." This is the ultimate reconciliation of "heat in ice"³⁸ for which the poet in the third part of the poem longs. The last section of the poem ends with the expression of the poet's own intense longing to recall the inspiration of love from his

Muse, and with music³⁹ to create his own divinely-inspired "magic circle"⁴⁰ of pleasure and perfection.

Rather than supplement this admittedly simple explanation of an amazingly complex and "fused" poem with a lengthy examination of possible sources and allusions for Coleridge's landscape,⁴¹ it will be more significant here to pursue the connection between love and imagination by an examination of the relationships between the wailing woman and her demon-lover and the poet and his Muse. Both sets of figures are, of course, associated with the central process of the reconciliation of opposites (male and female to form an "androgynous mind," and form and free life to create a perfect poem). However, as many critics have suggested, both are also associated with the rituals of the mystery cults, and are therefore also linked with the simultaneous reconciliation of the human and the divine. In the relationship between the woman and her "demon-lover," the woman seems to be connected with the ordered realm of Kubla Khan, not only because she is the next person to appear in the poem, but also because as order she would naturally seek her opposite of excessive emotion: "Extremes meet." As Beer and others have noted, wailing women are associated with the rituals of Osiris in which they wait to be united with the divine god, often, as suggested earlier, through a sexual ceremony performed by a priestly substitute. Thus, as Beer suggests, the "woman wailing" can also be thought of as Isis searching for Osiris in order to restore the lost Shechinah. The landscape certainly supports this interpretation, for critics have often placed the sacred river in Egypt rather than Greece and equated it with the Nile (the source of which was discovered by Bruce in Abyssinia).⁴² And, as has been established in Chapter One, Plutarch equated Osiris with the Nile,

Isis with the productive earth which it fertilizes,⁴³ and Typhon with the destructive sea into which it ultimately flows. Here certainly is an Egyptian equivalent of Kubla's landscape (and the forces which it symbolizes). And there are even traces in the poem of the snake myths which are connected with these mysteries: not only were many of Coleridge's sources fascinated by snake-lore, but also at least one source connected the river with the snake and described it as a "serpentine rivulet meandering over the meadow."⁴⁴ In the poem itself there are traces of the tamed serpent both in the motion of the river and in the "sinuous rills" which it waters. Indeed, as Howey tells us in The Encircled Serpent, emperor, snake, river, and moon--all of the elements of Kubla's landscape--are often interconnected in Egyptian mythology. Isis is also often considered to be the moon: when the moon is waning, Osiris is dismembered and when she is full, Osiris or the Nile is restored.⁴⁵ This version of the myth can definitely be connected with the process of poetic creation, for the "waning moon" is a familiar Coleridgean symbol for the loss of imagination.⁴⁶

But wailing women are also directly associated with the cult of Dionysus, the Greek equivalent of Osiris; they call to him and persuade him to come out of the deep so that they may become one with him again. Thus the demon-lover could also be Dionysus, whom Coleridge himself equates with the energies of the unconscious mind: Bacchus or Dionysus was

worshipped in the mysteries as representative of the organic energies of the Universe, that work by passion and joy without apparent distinct consciousness, and rather as the cause or condition of skill and contrivance, than the result; and thus [he was] distinguished from Apollo and Minerva, under which they personified the causative and pre-ordaining intellect manifested through nature. . . . Bacchus was honored as the

presiding genius of the heroic temperament . . . , this being considered not as an acquisition of art or discipline, but something innate and divine . . . --and hence, too, the connection with the same deity of all the vehement and awful passions. . . .⁴⁷

And in his 1813 lectures Coleridge makes the same distinction, applying it more directly to the human mind: "[Dionysus] was the symbol of that power which acts without our consciousness from the vital energies of nature, as Apollo was the symbol of our intellectual consciousness."⁴⁸

It is tempting to extend this analogy and to connect Kubla and his sunny dome with Apollo, or the conscious mind which forms the obscure intuitions rising from the depths of the unconscious.⁴⁹ In any case, the woman is definitely the intermediary force who, by her love, mediates between unconscious and conscious elements of the mind, and makes poetic creation possible.

Whereas the "woman wailing" and her "demon-lover" together symbolize the reintegration of the psyche, the Abyssinian maid is herself a symbol of the achieved harmony of poetic creation.⁵⁰ Her divine state was once the poet's, and he longs to achieve that state once again. As Mercer suggests,⁵¹ the Abyssinian maid functions in the same capacity as Boehme's Sophia, who is at once a symbol of the androgynous nature of the divine and a feminine inspiration to man to unify with her and become divine himself. However, this elusive figure is specifically associated with the creation of poetry, and therefore can also be connected with Plato's or Milton's Urania. But if she is a Muse, she is also an Abyssinian Muse. Beer makes the following suggestion which accounts for this fact and also indicates the androgynous connotations of this figure:

there was a whole race of cave-dwellers who were associated with the guardianship of hidden knowledge--namely, the troglodytes of Abyssinia.

They were reputed to have been androgynous, to have invented the first three letters of the alphabet . . . [and] one of the oldest instruments known to man, namely the sambuca. And the English word used to translate this in Coleridge's day was always "dulcimer."⁵²

Although Beer oversimplifies matters by connecting both the "damsel with a dulcimer" and the wailing woman with Isis,⁵³ he is certainly correct in equating the figure of the poet in the last lines of the poem with the restored Osiris. This poet could also be thought of as the "Heavenly Bacchus," for the implications of the two figures are the same. And as the following notebook entry indicates, this image of the poet is not the opposite but the equivalent of the Abyssinian maid (her opposite being the poet who longs for this state): "Man before the Fall [was] possessed of the Heavenly Bacchus (as Jac. Boehmen's Sophia or celestial Bride)"⁵⁴ Like the demon-lover, this poet is a figure of "holy dread," but since he is surrounded by the protective form of the circle⁵⁵ and has "drunk the milk of Paradise," the unconscious energy of the snake is controlled. As Coleridge says himself, the suitable "emblem [of] a writer of Genius" is the snake, and the proper symbol of the ordered energy of poetry is "the snake with it's [sic] Tail in it's mouth."⁵⁶

For Robert Penn Warren, "The Rime of the Ancient Mariner" is just as much a poem of the creative process as is "Kubla Khan." It is true that the Ancient Mariner does become a kind of poet, compelled to convey his fearful knowledge of the universe and man's own mind to those who "must hear" him. It is also true that many of the elements of this mythic tale, notably the moon, wind and water, have been previous Coleridgean symbols for the creative imagination.⁵⁷ For example, in "The Eolian Harp," the wind is an objective correlative for the imagination,

breathing life or energy into the harp and the soul; and in the later "Dejection: An Ode," the wind is once again associated with the imagination. And it is equally true that in this poem the becalming of the ship corresponds in some mysterious way to the Mariner's loss of active inspiration and his isolation from imaginative wholeness. However, this view would partially negate the cosmic proportions of the poem. In "The Eolian Harp," the breeze also symbolizes the intimate connection between all things, the "one life within us and abroad, / which meets all motion and becomes its soul"; the breeze is presented as "At once the soul of each and God of all." In fact, the conclusion which results from the poet's apprehension of this connection between all things--"it should have been impossible / Not to love all things in a world so fill'd"--directly corresponds to the "moral" of "The Ancient Mariner":

He prayeth best, who loveth best
All things both great and small;
For the dear God who loveth us,
He made and loveth all.⁵⁸

"The Ancient Mariner" deals with love in this its most philosophic and cosmic sense. But the central statement of "The Eolian Harp" also points to another aspect of "The Ancient Mariner," for it indicates only that it "should have been impossible" not to reverence all creation. "The Ancient Mariner" also deals with this possible separation of mankind from the force that binds the universe, the love of God, and the means by which man can be restored to the spiritual harmony of creation. Thus, when Warren speaks of Coleridge's "sacramental vision," he is speaking of the central meaning of this poem. If "Kubla Khan" is of the processes of the imagination, "The Ancient Mariner" is of the processes of love by

which the imaginative faculty is enlivened. As in Shelley's central poem, Prometheus Unbound, the imagination is redeemed by sympathy and love, "or a going out of our own nature, and an identification of ourselves with [all else]." ⁵⁹

In "The Rime of the Ancient Mariner" the motifs of Eros and Agape are interconnected in much the same way as they are in the philosophy of Proclus; God is both immanent and transcendent as in Plotinian vitalistic idealism, but the transcendent God also cares for His creation as He does in Proclus' theories and in orthodox Christian belief. However, in the pure Agape scheme, all man must do is passively accept God's gift of love and grace. As Knight suggests, ⁶⁰ the world of "The Ancient Mariner" is a world in which the soul is "watched over" by the deity; but it is also a world in which the soul is necessarily active. As we have seen in regard to Coleridge's later theories, man must return the love of God by an act of his own will. And he is equally free to turn away from the light and power of love both within him and without. "The Rime of the Ancient Mariner" is an exploration of this act of rejection, and, as such, just as much an exploration of the nature of evil as was the projected poem, "The Wanderings of Cain." But at the same time it is also an examination of the nature of salvation and the role which the soul of man plays in this regeneration.

The shooting of the albatross is, of course, the act by which the Ancient Mariner turns away from the unifying force of Agape. As many critics have observed, this seems to be a completely unmotivated action; however, such "motiveless malignancy" is itself indicative of the inexplicable nature of evil. Coleridge seems to be saying that there can

never be a rational motive (in the higher sense) for turning away from the all-inclusive light of God.⁶¹ To do so is a perverse, dark negation of the very principles of existence. (Indeed, the Mariner does cease to exist and is suspended in a kind of Life-in-Death.) The meaning of the albatross has been discussed almost as much as the apparent lack of meaning in its killing. Suggestions have ranged from Coleridge's mother on down--or, to put it more qualitatively, on up. It is certain that the albatross is some sort of manifestation or incarnation of the loving principle of God; and it is possible that it is an intermediary or daemon, as was the God of Love in the Symposium or the "tutelary Spirit" in the "Destiny of Nations." This possibility is reinforced by the close connection between the albatross and the polar daemon who "loved the bird that loved the man / Who shot him with his bow." Without following up his own suggestion, Lowes tells us that "the daemons of the water sometimes take the form of birds."⁶² And, as we have already established, Psellian daemons can either be beneficial or destructive forces; here, once the guiding agathodaemon is killed, the revengeful cacodaemon takes over the "guiding" of the ship. To take this line of enquiry one step further and to see both daemons as potentially one, the "plumed serpent" (a symbol almost as common as the uraeon) loses its wings and becomes the serpent of the deep.⁶³ Thus, Typhonic energy is no longer controlled by light and form, and the polar daemon becomes an avenging law unto himself. (In terms of the Mariner's own mind, the unconscious forces of the psyche are no longer controlled by the conscious mind; chaos remains untamed.) Nor does this more esoteric interpretation contradict the usual conception of the albatross as a symbol of Christ (as the references to the cross-bow, for instance, would indicate), for the agathodaemon has itself

been traditionally associated with the Logos.⁶⁴ And whether the albatross be considered a daemon or a Christ-figure, the same pattern can be traced: the Ancient Mariner has violated the universal laws of love and xenios and has broken the bond which connects light and energy. As a result, he is left with only the burning heat of the sun.⁶⁵

However, it is not as if the links between God and creation are completely broken; it is just that the Ancient Mariner is no longer able to reaffirm that bond in his own mind or to imaginatively apprehend the fact that the world is symbolically conceived.⁶⁶ (It is especially important here to be aware of the various levels--psychological and metaphysical--which are contained within the poem.) Beer explains this difficult but central point by referring to Boehme, whose importance to Coleridge is revealed in his notebook entries of the same date as this poem:⁶⁷

Boehme's insistence on the benevolence of God led him to the doctrine that if God at times seemed angry, this was no more than an appearance, engendered by the diseased imagination of fallen man. Cut off from the light of God, he could experience only the heat of his presence⁶⁸

A similar idea is expressed in the Corpus Hermeticum: "But to the Mindless ones, the wicked and depraved, the envious and covetous, and those who murder do and love impiety, I am far off, yielding my place to the Avenging Daimon."⁶⁹ Thus, the world is not inherently a burning hell or a chaos of chance association, as the Mariner's exposure to the fire of "wrath" and his vision of the dice game between Death and Life-in-Death⁷⁰ would indicate. It is only because the Mariner has negated the guiding light of the imagination (externalized in the act of the killing of the albatross) that the world appears to him as indifferent and even malevolent

--as he was himself when he killed the albatross. He is "alone on a wide, wide sea" and in a state of fear and "inward desolation"⁷¹ precisely because he has negated his own imagination and neglected God's love. He has made himself the center of the universe.

It is with the loss of this egocentrism⁷² and the transition from fear to love that redemption begins; aesthetic sympathy is first extended to the "beautiful men" who have died, and then further and climactically to the creatures of the deep for which he had previously felt only repulsion. The fact that these creatures are water-snakes is certainly significant to the symbolic patterns of the poem; by blessing the snakes the Mariner once again extends a bond of love to connect energy with light and creates wings for the serpent. Robert Penn Warren outlines the successive stages of this central moment: first of all, the Mariner recognizes that these creatures (like the moon) are "happy" because they are part of the vital pattern of creation; secondly, he recognizes their beauty as their colours flash under the light of the moon; then he instinctively feels love for them; and, finally, he spontaneously blesses them.⁷³ However, this central moment is more complex than Warren (or Coleridge's own gloss) indicates; a closer look at the imagery reveals that it is not only under the light of the moon that the Mariner blesses the snakes. Instead, the same sort of reconciliation of the opposites of heat and light or "heat in ice" which was at the heart of "Kubla Khan" is at work here. Throughout his journey, the Mariner has experienced the alternate effects of the sun and the moon; now they are both reflected in the water surrounding the ship. Within the shadow of the ship, the influence of the red and burning sun can still be seen; but without is the light of the moon:

Her beams bemocked the sultry main,
 Like April hoar-frost spread;
 But where the ship's huge shadow lay,
 The charmed water burnt alway
 A still and awful red.⁷⁴

And the Mariner perceives the beauty of the snakes as they move both
 without and within the shadow of the ship:

Beyond the shadow of the ship,
 I watched the water-snakes:
 They moved in tracks of shining white,
 And when they reared, the elfish light
 Fell off in hoary flakes.

Within the shadow of the ship
 I watched their rich attire:
 Blue, glossy green, and velvet black,
 They coiled and swam; and every track
 Was a flash of golden fire.⁷⁵

Here we have the opposites of "hoary flakes" and "golden fire," "shining white" and dark colours--in general terms, of moon and sun, light and heat--reconciled in the Mariner's mind as he blesses the snakes.⁷⁶

In "going out of [him] self" to bless the water-snakes the Ancient Mariner manifests the principles of Agape which, as Nygren suggests, when attributed to man are "patterned on divine love." But Eros elements are also present, in the sense that Eros is active and "assumes that man's salvation is his own work."⁷⁷ Once the Ancient Mariner has substituted active spiritual love and imagination for passive corporeal understanding, the quality of the world about him changes. Once his heart is filled with love, the world is filled with saving grace in the form of the wind and the rain. The sentence of "Life-in-Death" is suspended by her opposite, "Mary Queen," and the guiding force of the cacodaemon is replaced by its opposite, the angels. Once more the life

of the air is filled with joy and the sun is a source of harmony: the souls of the crew like "sweet sounds . . . from their bodies passed" and

Around, around, flew each sweet sound,
Then darted to the Sun;
Slowly the sounds came back again,
Now mixed, now one by one.

Sometimes a-dropping from the sky
I heard the sky-lark sing;
Sometimes all little birds that are,
How they seemed to fill the sea and air
With their sweet jargoning!⁷⁸

As Coleridge says, "you must be as the lark, and rise and enjoy the light as well as the warmth, and therein your own being will be made fit for its appointed happiness"⁷⁹ Indeed, the bond between warmth, or energy, and light has been re-established in the form and influence of the seraphs, who are not only symbols of pure love but also Christian equivalents of the plumed and fiery serpent.⁸⁰ It is these seraphs who restore the "sadder and wiser" Mariner to the land which he had left in carefree innocence.

The Mariner's restoration should not be seen as only joyful or his redemption as wholly final; the poem has shown that the joy of the "one life" is not necessarily man's (as it was in "Religious Musings"), for man has the power to cut himself off from such joy and to contract his consciousness so that all else seems separate and spiritless. The poem has also shown that it is through fear that wisdom begins; the Mariner has been initiated into a higher level of knowledge, a kind of higher innocence which is reached only by passing through experience. This sublime knowledge must be constantly reaffirmed and the bonds of love must be continually recreated by man, for such is the process of

expansion and growth.⁸¹ This is particularly necessary for the Mariner, for he has assumed the role of the poet; the ship which has sunk into the depths of his unconscious mind must make the same fearful journey each time that he re-enacts the process of sin and salvation, not only for himself but also for the benefit of his hearers. He has assumed the role of the guide for the rites de passage of others.

Indeed, throughout the poem there is the same feeling for the "mysterious" and powerful forces of existence as there is in the rites of the ancient mysteries, or, more significantly here, in the actions of the medieval ballad. The poem defies complete and final analysis, and even the Mariner's own attempt at abstraction fails to convey the fearful nature of passage to wisdom or the sublimity of that final wisdom. The poem is not allegory, but myth (or "symbolic narrative") and it lives through its symbols.⁸² It is also mythical in its universality; although the framework for the journey is an individual wedding that the wedding guest is to witness, instead he witnesses the universal wedding of man and God through nature.⁸³ This individual wedding contrasts with and heightens the circular structure of the poem and the journey. The Ancient Mariner returns the wedding-guest to the same harbour, and yet in a sense he knows it for the first time. But for the Mariner himself the journey is cyclic--an "eternal return" to the drama of sin and redemption, for his is the fate of the poet. And it is the archetypal depth of his message of sin and salvation and the elemental power of his depiction of it that makes each reader the wedding-guest, unable to stay within the safe harbour of conscious thought and exposed to the elemental forces of his own psyche.

In "Religious Musings" and "The Destiny of Nations" Coleridge had revealed the significance of love to his philosophy, and in "Kubla Khan" and "The Rime of the Ancient Mariner" he had indicated its importance to his aesthetics by manifesting the intimate connection between love and the imagination. But, as we have seen, Coleridge was interested in exploring in his poetry all of the many aspects and "moods" of love. "Christabel" can be seen as an attempt to extend this exploration of the powerful force of love, particularly into the previously untouched area of personal relationships. Indeed, in this one poem Coleridge includes almost all types of loves and love-relationships--the love between parent and child, man and wife, man and man (Sir Leoline and Roland de Vaux), and lover and beloved (not only Christabel and her knight, but also certainly by implication Sir Leoline and Geraldine). But not all of the loves explored in "Christabel" are earthly: there is also the love of the heavenly powers for Christabel, particularly that of her guardian spirit, her mother. And the relationship which is central to the action of the tale, that between Christabel and Geraldine, is also "unearthly"--for most critics "unearthly" in a demonic sense. Most of the critics of "Christabel" have assumed that there is a direct contrast between the benevolent influence of the higher powers represented by Christabel's mother and the malevolent influence of the "lower" powers represented by Geraldine; as a result, they have interpreted the relationship between Christabel and Geraldine as the sexual seduction and/or complete destruction of pure innocence by dark and demonic evil. On the surface, this view seems to be perfectly justifiable, but it is also possible to hold a completely different view of this unfinished poem and to see the influence of Geraldine as neither wholly sexual and evil, nor wholly

disconnected from the influence of those of the "upper sky." And when the poem is placed in the larger context of Coleridge's other poems and his philosophy, this view seems not only possible but also extremely probable.

First of all, it must be admitted that there are definite sexual overtones to the relationship between Christabel and Geraldine, especially in the chamber scene, which achieved almost immediate infamy. However, as we have seen, for Coleridge sexual union could be either purely lustful and therefore evil, or symbolical of a higher, spiritual union. We have also established that sexual union is a common mystical metaphor for the union of the soul with God; perhaps the best examples are the works of Saint Bernard and Saint Teresa. Indeed, Coleridge himself mentions Crashaw's poems on Saint Teresa as a definite influence on his own poem on Christabel:

[Crashaw's verses on Teresa] were ever present to my mind whilst writing the second part of Christabel; if, indeed, by some subtle process of the mind they did not suggest the first thought of the whole poem.⁸⁴

Thus, if the "first thought" of the poem was spiritual, we should be at least cautioned against putting forward a purely sexual interpretation of "Christabel."

Related to this problem of the sexual overtones in the central scene of the poem is the problem of Geraldine's apparently evil nature; she has, again quite justly, been identified as a lamia or vampire who seduces man only to suck out his blood and his soul. Coleridge would have been fascinated by such superstitions, and in The Road to Tryermaine Nethercot thoroughly documents his knowledge of them. As Nethercot informs us, a lamia or lilith⁸⁵ is an evil spirit in the form of a snake

who has the power to assume the form of a beautiful woman in order to "work her harms"; Geraldine's strange beauty, and her occasionally-manifested ophidian characteristics definitely place her within this phylum of the daemonic kingdom. However, it must be remembered that in mythology and daemonology snakes can be either good or bad influences; according to Howey and his sources, their influence is more often good than bad:

Does not the touch of the sacred serpent imply that the erring soul may some day build a purer thought-form, and one that is in harmony with the Divine, and will rejoice and gain new vigour from the vision of Its Presence?⁸⁶

Nethercot also indicates a similar duality within the lamia tradition itself, for lamiae are occasionally thought to be fallen spirits expiating their own guilt, and often working for the ultimate good of their "victims."⁸⁷ This is the very role which Coleridge accorded daemons and seemingly evil powers in "The Destiny of Nations,"⁸⁸ and the very process from fear of seeming evil to the love of sublime good which he traced in "The Ancient Mariner." Coleridge himself connects "The Ancient Mariner" with "Christabel" and maintains that here he would have "more nearly realized [his] ideal, than [he] had done in [his] first attempt."⁸⁹ Suffering is also an important phase in the mystical journey to final union with God, particularly for "martyr-ecstatics"⁹⁰ such as Teresa. As Miss Underhill indicates, before final mystical illumination and union can be achieved, a purgative suffering (or a "dark night of the soul" during which the presence of God seems to have been entirely withdrawn) must be endured. Once again, we can turn to Boehme, the mystic with whom Coleridge had the greatest affinities, for an explanation of this

process in the dialectical terms of the necessity for opposites and for their ultimate reconciliation. According to Boehme, God is voluntarily and continually self-revealing, but each revelation to the individual soul "has as its condition the appearance of its opposite: light can only be recognized at the price of knowing darkness, life needs death, love needs wrath."⁹¹ As he says in De Electione, light can be received only after terror

which is not revealed in the light, . . . yet is a cause of the kindling of light. . . . In the love the terror is a beginning of the lightening or brightness, whereby the one Love becomes perceptible, majestic, and shining, and is the beginning of the kingdom of joy, in manner as light becomes shining in fire.⁹²

For Boehme, the serpent is the usual form in which God appears to man when "fire and light . . . [are still] separate" in his mind, and when burning energy is not yet accompanied by illumination and therefore appears as evil.⁹³ Correspondingly, in this poem Geraldine is the embodiment of the principle of the snake, and as such should not be thought of as an evil force separate from the powers of those of the "upper sky."⁹⁴ Her influence on Christabel should not be thought of as destructive, but necessary to the same fearful process of initiation to higher levels of knowing and being which Coleridge presented in "The Ancient Mariner."

But there is one essential difference between the character and the consequent actions of Christabel and the Ancient Mariner: Christabel commits no wanton act of cruelty and "inhospitality," but is herself the embodiment of innocence. Perhaps Coleridge felt that in "Christabel" he would have "more nearly realized" his "ideal" because he would have shown that the "wrath" of God was not a punishment as much as it was a necessary

stage in the process of "expanded consciousness" and spiritual growth. "Christabel" is concerned with the pains of such growth. Indeed, throughout the poem we are aware that Christabel is on the threshold between childhood and maturity; Coleridge seems to be saying that she, like Blake's Thel, must cross that threshold and pass through experience in order to achieve a higher and more meaningful innocence which is that of both the tiger and the lamb. Coleridge's treatment of this theme of growth also seems to be more subtle and psychological⁹⁵ than it was in "The Ancient Mariner." Here, the focus is more on the reactions and emotions of the "initiate," and, had the poem been completed, presumably more on the internal process of reconciling unconscious energy with conscious light, feeling with thought. Such a theme is certainly as "subtle and difficult"⁹⁶ as Coleridge proclaimed his theme was. It certainly may be suggested that his struggle to complete the poem was occasioned not only by the aesthetic difficulty of sustaining the subtle quality of the verse but also, and more importantly, by the philosophical difficulty of resolving the theme itself. But before this contention can be supported, this suggested theme must itself be given further support by a closer study of the poem.

At the heart of "Christabel" is the same reconciliation of opposites which governed the action and the meaning of "Kubla Khan" and "The Ancient Mariner." And the synthesis here contains the same sexual connotations as it did in "Kubla Khan." But this is not the only similarity between the two poems; the opposites put forward in the first scene of "Christabel" are quite similar to the symbolic elements of the landscape in "Kubla Khan." First of all, there is the same "decreed" enclosure

(here a castle), but this time it is an enclosure which contains no chasm and no sacred river of life. Instead, the castle is intimately associated with death and dying power. It is guarded by a "toothless" mastiff and ruled by a knight who is "weak in health" and who has hung his armour in a forgotten corner of his castle. At the very heart of this castle is death, for in the hearth the brands of the fire are slowly dying; and at the very heart of the knight is death, for he lives not only in his past memories but in his memories of past deaths. And every morning his castle bell

Knells us back to a world of death.
 These words Sir Leoline first said,
 When he rose and found his lady dead:
 These words Sir Leoline will say
 Many a morn to his dying day!⁹⁷

The world of Sir Leoline is pure form without unifying energy, and a negation of the principles of growth. Indeed, "the Spring comes slowly up this way." But Christabel, whose birth was the cause of her mother's death, is his constant reminder of the eternal cycles of generation and growth; and it is she who introduces the principle of life and change into his castle.

It is Christabel who ventures out of the confines of the castle into the dark midnight forest, if not (like the "woman wailing") to meet her lover, at least to pray for him. Christabel's thoughts of her lover are mysteriously connected with the fearful ambiguities of the dark forest and with the correspondingly ambiguous regions of her own mind which the forest symbolizes (as it often does for the Romantics⁹⁸). In order to reach her lover,⁹⁹ Christabel must "venture . . . into the twilight realms of consciousness,"¹⁰⁰ which at first inevitably seem to be

"the dark haunts of terrific agents." As Bloom suggests, to the "frightened consciousness," the unconscious world appears only as evil.¹⁰¹

Indeed, the forest does appear to be haunted only by evil, but from a higher perspective than Christabel's, or even the narrator's, all of the signs of evil appearing in the half lights and shadows also contain the possibility of good. In this part of the poem Coleridge manifests a quite masterly subtleness and suggestiveness; through rhythm, tone and imagery he manages to both "reveal" and "conceal" the ambiguous possibilities of "bliss or bale" in the elements of the landscape (while still restricting his vision to that of a narrator who is as innocent and fearful as Christabel herself). The moon which helps to create this chiaroscuro effect has itself an ambiguous quality: for Coleridge the full moon is a symbol of imaginative potency, but the veiled or waning moon indicates that this power is submerged or even dying. Here Coleridge's description of the moon alternates quite effectively between the two possibilities:

The thin gray cloud is spread on high,
It covers but not hides the sky.
The moon is behind, and at the full;
And yet she looks both small and dull.¹⁰²

The moon seems at the same time to be potentially evil and potentially good, although the next lines seem to balance the forces in favour of the good by proclaiming the advent of creativity: "'Tis a month before the month of May, / And the spring comes slowly up this way." Beer corroborates this interpretation of the symbol of the moon by referring to Coleridge's imagery in general: "The image of sun and moon veiled by cloud is one which Coleridge uses with great frequency to express his view that apparent evils are really good seen in distortion."¹⁰³ The

owls also advance the idea of veiled good, for they are not only portents of evil associated with lamiae and lilith superstitions¹⁰⁴ but also traditional symbols of wisdom. The same may be said of the mistletoe and oak (both Druidical symbols) under which Christabel first encounters Geraldine--and of Geraldine herself, with her strangely glittering beauty:

There she sees a damsel bright,
Drest in a silken robe of white,
That shadowy in the moonlight shone:
The neck that made the white robe wan,
Her stately neck, and arms were bare;
Her blue-veined feet unsandal'd were,
And wildly glittered here and there
The gems entangled in her hair.¹⁰⁵

Here, subtly combined with "exceeding beauty" are hints of "shadowy" evil; even "white" has darker overtones, for in Geraldine's strange story of her capture and ride across "the shade of night," the "steeds" and the "palfry" were also "white." Even though there is something "frightful" and demonic about the presence of this beautiful woman, Christabel still stretches out her hand to Geraldine and then carries her "demon-lover" across the threshold into the castle.

In terms of the "internal landscape," Christabel has recognized her own unconscious feelings and energies and has allowed them to pass into her conscious mind. Both Jung and D'Arcy maintain that it is necessary to recognize the force which they call the Lilith or the Lamia within us; the anima not only "preserves an equilibrium" in the mind but also helps it to "get into touch with the feelings and natures of other beings." As Jung maintains, the ego alone "grasps surfaces and superficialities only."¹⁰⁶ "Christabel" does seem to lend itself to a Jungian reading more readily than most poems; many of its critics (Fogle, for

instance) have adopted this approach and have identified Geraldine as Christabel's feminine anima. Although there is a definite doppelgänger motif in the poem, culminating in a partial interchange of character, this theme must be seen as only a necessary aspect of the larger theme of the expansion of the soul outwards ultimately to embrace the principle of God.

When Christabel has admitted Geraldine to her own room in the castle the ambiguities of good and evil become even more prevalent. Although Geraldine shrinks from the light of the lamp (significantly shaped like an angel¹⁰⁷), she does seem to have some connection with those of the "upper sky." First of all, there is the "struggle" between Geraldine and Christabel's mother; for a moment both spirits seem to inhabit the same body:

O mother dear! that thou wert here!
 I would, said Geraldine, she were!
 But soon with altered voice, said she--
 'Off wandering mother! Peak and pine!
 I have power to bid thee flee.'

 'Off, woman, off! this hour is mine--
 Though thou her guardian spirit be,
 Off, woman, off! 'tis given to me.'¹⁰⁸

It seems unusual that evil could have power over the angelic; and, indeed, when Geraldine explains to Christabel what has been "given" to her to do, it seems instead that Geraldine herself is directed from above:

'All they who live in the upper sky,
 Do love you, holy Christabel!
 And you love them, and for their sake
 And for the good which me befel,
 Even I in my degree will try,
 Fair maiden, to requite you well.'¹⁰⁹

These lines have often been interpreted as superbly ironic and in the spirit of seduction, as it were; but the effects of that seduction are not as easily accounted for. For, once she has Christabel in her arms, Geraldine falls into a gentle sleep, much like a "mother with her child." And Christabel, smiling like a child "at a sudden light,"¹¹⁰ has a kind of "waking vision"--not of evil but of impending good:

No doubt, she hath a vision sweet.
 What if her guardian spirit 'twere,
 What if she knew her mother near?
 But this she knows, in joys and woe,
 That saints will aid if men will call:
 For the blue sky bends over all!¹¹¹

Although we are still not sure if Geraldine is actually a guardian spirit, or if apparent "woes" will be actual "joys," Part I of the poem has subtly prepared us for such an eventuality.

On the whole, Part II of the poem is aesthetically less successful; it was written in 1800, after Coleridge's annus mirabilis. But Coleridge still manages to advance the theme of the poem, first of all by clarifying the meaning of Christabel's union with Geraldine, and, secondly, by showing the effects of that union on Christabel and her father. Bard Bracy's vivid dream is obviously a symbolical representation (with the same sexual overtones) of their union, and its imagery makes the spiritual implications of this union more apparent:

I saw a bright green snake
 Coiled around its wings and neck.
 Green as the herbs on which it couched,
 Close by the dove's its head it crouched;
 And with the dove it heaves and stirs,
 Swelling its neck as she swelled hers!¹¹²

This passage is a culmination of the "plumed serpent" imagery which we have encountered in a less specific form in previous poems, particularly "The Ancient Mariner." Coleridge also uses the same image in a conversation which Crabb Robinson records: "Speaking of the combination of subordinate evils with great good, he said: 'Though the serpent does twine himself round the staff of the God of Healing.'" ¹¹³ And just as Coleridge himself conceived of poetic creation as the taming of serpentine energies, so the poet within this poem understands that music will subdue the snake. ¹¹⁴ But Sir Leoline will not take heed of the insight of his poet.

Christabel is not the only one who has been bitten by the snake; her father is also profoundly affected by the presence of Geraldine. He has been aroused out of his death-like sleep by Geraldine; but immediately he is swept into another excess--this time of feeling. He is first aroused to wrath by Geraldine's story of her abduction and then to even greater wrath by the "inhospitality" of his own daughter:

Within the Baron's heart and brain
If thoughts, like these, had any share,
They only swelled his rage and pain,
And did but work confusion there.
His heart was cleft with pain and rage,
His cheeks they quivered, his eyes were wild ¹¹⁵

Neither is Christabel able as yet to "tame" the serpent; she is also overcome with its energies, and even occasionally assumes ophidian characteristics herself. ¹¹⁶ Although her reaction is fear and Leoline's wrath, both of them are still unable to tame their feelings with thought and thus to achieve balance and wholeness. ¹¹⁷

Coleridge's own verse also lacks this same essential balance

between thought and feeling; he seems to be as overcome by excessive emotion as his own characters. And as a result, his conclusion to Part II degenerates into a rather bewildering attempt to explain the necessity of fear and wrath to growth, this time in terms of the father-child relationship which had only been of secondary importance in the first part of the poem. It seems as if he is after all unable to describe the "subtle and difficult" psychological process by which fear is converted to love, and "Superstition" to "Reason." And because he abandons the attempt at the point at which Dionysiac elements are in ascendancy, his poem seems to be in the tradition of Eros, as dark surrender and excessive emotion, which de Rougemont traces. Although Coleridge was aware of the darker potential of the unconscious mind, his later philosophy (and the implications in the imagery of the completed parts of the poem themselves) indicates that he would not have planned the poem to end with such an excess of feeling over thought. Had he been able to complete the poem, it seems certain that he would have written not only of Christabel's "song of desolation" (the projected subject of Part III), but also, as he did in "The Ancient Mariner," of the ultimate synthesis of the Dionysian and the Apollonian elements of her psyche, and the consequent completion of her initiation into higher levels of existence. However, Coleridge himself was unable to see through to the other side of the abyss of "desolation," and therefore could not write of it. As he says in a letter to Josiah Wedgwood, "I tried & tried, & nothing would come of it. I desisted with a deeper dejection than I am willing to remember."¹¹⁸

CHAPTER IV

"DEJECTION" AND THE "ASRA POEMS"

Coleridge had left Christabel before she was able to fuse feeling with thought, partly because of his own inability to achieve wholeness and therefore to write "ideal" poetry--particularly poetry on the very theme of wholeness. "Dejection: An Ode" is Coleridge's own "song of desolation"; it reveals his own dissociation of sensibility, and the causes for that dreaded divorce of thought and feeling. The published version of "Dejection" is a condensed and less personal version of an earlier verse-epistle to Asra (and, secondarily, to Wordsworth in answer to his "Intimations Ode"). Since the verses which Coleridge decided to eliminate as too personal are also for the most part poor poetry,¹ the second version can be considered a more successful poem. But only more successful, for it does show the effects of revision; Coleridge was unable to synthesize completely the acceptable verses of his earlier "Letter to Asra," and, as a result, the relationship among several of the remaining sections is left in question.² Indeed, "Dejection" has often been examined for its philosophic statements and its personal revelations, but rarely has it been praised for its "organic unity." The lack of organic wholeness also makes philosophical or even psychological interpretation of the poem difficult, for Coleridge's editing has partially obscured the cause and the direction of the movement of his own mind within the poem. Thus, as many critics have discovered, it is necessary to examine both versions of the poem in order to arrive at the

cause of Coleridge's dejection and its effect on his "shaping spirit of imagination." Here, "Dejection" will be considered first, in order to show the difficulties encountered in interpreting it; then the "Letter to Asra" will be examined in order to resolve these difficulties.

"Dejection" opens with familiar Coleridgean symbols of creativity, the wind and the moon, and with the poet's own faint hope that these natural forces will work as they often have done to inspire him and "send [his] soul abroad." At the same time, the poet is aware that the scene before him portends the coming not of creativity but of violent chaos, for the "new moon" is caught in the embrace of the "old moon" and a deadly storm is impending. But he maintains that even violence would be welcomed, if only it could make his static soul "move and live." However, the poet knows that this hope for restoration from nature is unfounded, for the beauties of nature cannot convert his mind from its present "heartless[ness]" to feeling: "I see them all so excellently fair, / I see, not feel, how beautiful they are!"³ It is a "vain endeavor" to look to nature for restoration and wholeness, for man

. . . may not hope from outward forms to win
The passion and the life, whose fountains are within.⁴

This statement is of great importance to an understanding of Coleridge's later theories of the imagination, for it indicates that communion with nature relies upon an "act of the will," an ability to put the "whole soul of man into activity."⁵ And in the next stanzas of this version of the poem, Coleridge emphasizes the necessity of first possessing wholeness or Joy,⁶ for without it, nature remains an object, and as such "essentially fixed and dead":

. . . in our life alone does Nature live:
 Ours is her wedding garment, ours her shroud!

 Joy, Lady! is the spirit and the power,
 Which wedding Nature to us gives in dower
 A new Earth and new Heaven,
 Undreamt of by the sensual and the proud--.⁷

Here, Joy is not the result of union with nature, but its prerequisite; and, as the next verse indicates, it precedes even the "shaping" imagination, for without Joy the activity of the imagination is "suspend[ed]."

But how do we achieve this essential Joy, and, even more significantly, how do we lose it? Here, Coleridge tells us that we can never experience Joy if we are "sensual" or "proud" (the two traits he consistently associates with a contracted consciousness); and we can lose it if hopeless "afflictions" make us afraid to feel and consequently to take refuge in the safe enclosure of thought. But in this version of the poem, Coleridge's own "afflictions" are left unidentified; therefore, it is difficult to determine exactly which influences are conducive to wholeness. All that we know here is that as a result of these "afflictions" he has deliberately neglected the "heart" for the "head":

For not to think of what I needs must feel,
 But to be still and patient, all I can;
 And haply by abstruse research to steal
 From my own nature all the natural man--
 This was my sole resource, my only plan:
 Till that which suits a part infects the whole,
 And now is almost grown the habit of my soul.⁸

Coleridge summarizes his hopeless and joyless situation with the vivid image of the "viper thoughts" which "coil" around his mind. Once again, the image of the snake appears in his poetry, but here it stands not for untamed energy or feeling, but for the opposite excess of thought--both

the "abstruse" thought of the preceding quotation, and, more particularly, the "habit" of non-feeling into which he has retreated. This departure from the usual pattern of imagery can, however, be related to a later comment on snake symbolism which Coleridge made in Aids to Reflection.⁹ Referring to the "temple-language of Egypt," he says that one of the faculties of the mind which the snake could symbolize was

the discursive and logical faculty possessed individually by each individual-- . . . in distinction from the . . . intuitive reason, the source of ideas and absolute truths, and the principle of the necessary and the universal in our affirmations and conclusions.¹⁰

This suggestion certainly applies to "Dejection," for here, Coleridge has restricted himself to the individual or empirical "I" and has neglected the super-individual or absolute "I," which is the Reason and not the understanding; he therefore lacks that essential wholeness which enables the mind to enliven nature by penetrating to its vital inner essence. He is left with "Reality's dark dream."

This version of the poem seems to reach its natural conclusion with this image of the "viper thoughts," for Coleridge has now explained why his sensibilities are deadened and therefore why nature also appears to him to be "fixed and dead"; and he has at least suggested how the mind can achieve wholeness and therefore how the spiritual in nature can be perceived or enlivened. But "Dejection" does not conclude here; it continues on for some one hundred and forty extremely confusing lines. At the beginning of the poem Coleridge had expressed a wish to escape from the prison of thought and to venture into the realm of emotion. But he had realized that nature could not make him feel, for communion with nature itself relies upon the wholeness of the man who approaches

nature. Now it seems as if he does achieve his wish, for nature does come alive; nature does speak to him and "move" him, even though all it can tell of is chaos, cold, pain, and fear. But since nature cannot "give" unless it first "receives,"¹¹ it must be that the poet here is finally able to give to nature, and therefore can receive from it.¹² But this must be in a completely different sense than that suggested in the central passages on Joy. Because Coleridge is not "whole," he cannot penetrate to the vital inscape of nature and share in its joy; therefore, he can only project his own uncontrolled feelings on to the objects of nature. In "The Nightingale" (1798), Coleridge had suggested this very difference between participation and mere projection:

In Nature there is nothing melancholy.
But some night-wandering man whose heart was pierced
With the remembrance of a grievous wrong,
Or slow distemper or neglected love,
(And so, poor wretch! filled all things with himself,
And made all gentle sounds tell back the tale
Of his own sorrow) he, and such as he,
First named these notes a melancholy strain.¹³

This passage clearly reflects the situation in "Dejection"; and the implication in the latter poem is that if a man is whole, he can extend his soul outward and perceive (or recreate) the essential bond between his own soul and the spirit in nature; but if he only thinks, nature will remain "fixed and dead"; and if he only feels, nature will merely reflect his own chaotic feelings. However in this revised version we are still left with the fundamental question of what, since it cannot be the wind, has finally aroused the poet to feeling. But if we do not know the source of his feelings we at least know their nature; they are just as devoid of "genial"¹⁴ creativity as were his thoughts:

Mad Lutanist! who in this month of showers,
 Of dark-brown gardens, and of peeping flowers,
 Mak'st Devils' yule, with worse than wintry song,
 The blossoms, buds, and timorous leaves among.¹⁵

It seems here as if spring will not arrive at all for Coleridge, whereas in earlier years his imagination had been able "o'er Winter's icy plains to fling / Each flower, that binds the breathing Locks of Spring" ¹⁶ Indeed, the poetry of the wind is of unreconciled opposites--of a child separated from her mother, and of man separated from man.¹⁷ Here the prophesy of war in "Kubla Khan" has become an actuality.

Although we know that war can be the prelude to a new synthesis and that fear is part of the growth of the child into wisdom, Coleridge does not give any indication that it will be so for him. As he says in the last verses of this version of the poem, all that he can hope is that for others it will be a sublime "mountain birth," and that they may awaken to Joy. Thus, this last section of the poem is not as non-functional as several critics have suggested, for it provides a dramatic contrast to Coleridge's own storm-ridden soul. But at the same time, such a contrast does not seem to be absolutely necessary to the movement of the poem (the images of the wintry wind blighting the flowers is certainly final enough); and, furthermore, the lines introduce too many new elements (particularly the poet's affection for an unnamed Lady and a friend) for them to be considered an effective conclusion to the poem as it stands.

Many of the problems encountered in "Dejection" are solved by an examination of the first version of the poem. The "Letter to Asra" not only indicates the importance of the concluding reference to the poet's Lady and his friend, but also clarifies the forces behind the poet's sudden movement from thought to feeling, and indicates why he is unable

to combine them and achieve wholeness.¹⁸ Both poems begin with the same moonlit scene and the poet's regretful acknowledgement that nature cannot make him feel. But in this earlier version, immediately after this admission Coleridge indicates that the thought of Sara Hutchinson is able to "feebly stir [his] Heart!"¹⁹ Then, after remembering the many days they had spent together in their special country-haunts, his heart is "revive[d]" and "filled with a living Power":²⁰

I feel my spirit moved.
And wheresoe'er thou be,
O Sister! O Beloved!
Those dear mild Eyes, that see
Even now the Heaven, I see--
There is a Prayer in them! It is for me--
And I, dear Sara, I am blessing thee!²¹

It is obvious in this version that the movement from thought to feeling is gradual and not sudden, and that it is caused not by the stimulus of the wind but by the influence of Asra's love. But the joyful feelings which Asra has awakened in Coleridge are almost immediately replaced by almost overwhelming feelings of grief and despair. It is here that we are presented with the all-important reasons for the "afflictions" which have kept Coleridge from wholeness and creativity and have caused him to retreat into "abstruse research." Although he longs almost desperately to be united with Asra, he realizes that it is impossible, for the sanctity which he places on marriage makes it impossible for him to leave his wife, however painful his relationship with her has become.²² As a result, all he can offer Asra is pain, while if she remains within the Wordsworths' circle she can share their joy:²³

To see thee, hear thee, feel thee--then to part
Oh!--it weighs down the heart!

To visit those, I love, as I love thee,
 Mary, & William, & dear Dorothy,
 It is but a temptation to repine--
 The transientness is Poison in the Wine,
 Eats out the pith of Joy, makes all Joy hollow,
 All Pleasure a dim Dream of Pain to follow!
 My own peculiar Lot, my house-hold Life
 It is, & will remain, Indifference or Strife--
 While Ye are well & happy, 'twould but wrong you
 If I should fondly yearn to be among you--
 Wherefore, O wherefore! should I wish to be
 A wither'd branch upon a blossoming Tree?²⁴

It is now that Coleridge turns to hear the wind, and here it is obvious that the wind echoes the chaos of his own mind and tells of his own pains and fears. This earlier version of the poem indicates more clearly than any of the more philosophic prose statements we have previously examined, that for Coleridge himself a mutual and fulfilled love relationship was an absolute necessity to wholeness and creativity. Indeed, the painfully stilted quality of many of the verses themselves attests to this essential fact. As Coleridge says himself, "Love is the vital air of my Genius."²⁵

Although the "Letter to Asra" is the most significant document of Coleridge's personal need for love, many of his juvenilia also proclaimed it "Better to die, than live and not be lov'd!"²⁶ Throughout his life, Coleridge evinced a great need for love and sympathy. His anxious relationships with various friends--notably his brother George, Lamb, Southey, Poole, Wordsworth, and finally Gillman²⁷--were marked by a great desire to be accepted and to please. As he admitted himself,

the approbation & Sympathy of good & intelligent men is my Sea-breeze, without which I should languish from Morn to evening; a very Trade-wind to me, in which my Bark drives on regularly & lightly.²⁸

But Coleridge needed more than the support and the sympathy of friendship; he needed the self-completion and the inspiration of the love of a woman:

One human being, entirely loving me (this of course, must have been a Woman) would not only have satisfied all my Hopes, but would have rendered me happy and grateful, even tho' I had no Friend on earth, herself excepted²⁹

However, he seemed destined never to fully achieve the entire and mutual love which he spoke of so often in his poetry and prose, and which he was convinced would bring his "whole nature into balance and harmony."³⁰

First of all, there was his adolescent but deeply-felt love for Mary Evans. But Coleridge dared not express this love until it was too late.³¹ As he confesses to Southey,

I never durst even in a whisper avow my passion, though I knew she loved me--Where were my Fortunes? And why should I make her miserable? Almighty God bless her--! her Image is in the sanctuary of my Heart, and never can it be torn away but with the strings that grapple it to Life.³²

Coleridge's love for Mary Evans perhaps provided him with the first example of how much his creativity depended upon love. Mary was his first Abyssinian Muse, and the beginning of his relationship with her was marked by a sudden outburst of creativity. And when he had lost all hope of obtaining her love, he soon found that "When a Man is unhappy, he writes damned bad Poetry"³³

Coleridge's relationship with Sarah Fricker also seemed doomed from the start, for it was begun in the shadow of his love for Mary and seemed only to survive because of Southey's interest in her sister Edith and Coleridge's own interest in the Pantisocracy scheme. Circumstances had drawn Coleridge to Sarah, but now marriage seemed inescapable:

to marry another--O Southey! bear with my weakness. Love makes things pure and heavenly like itself:--but to marry a woman whom I do not love --to degrade her, whom I call my Wife, by making her the Instrument of low Desire--and on the removal of a Desultory Appetite, to be perhaps not displeased with her Absence!--Enough!--These Refinements are the wildering Fires, that lead me into Vice.

Mark you, Southey--I will do my duty.³⁴

Although this certainly is not an auspicious opening for a marriage, it seems as if Coleridge's feelings towards Sarah gradually increased, as the poems written immediately before and after his marriage clearly indicate.³⁵ And the secure and peaceful domestic life which he was able to achieve helped to mature his creative genius, particularly when the birth of his first son, Hartley, deepened the bond between husband and wife. (As he says shortly after Hartley was born, "Wife is a solemn name to me because of it's influence on the more solemn duties of Mother."³⁶) Combined with this domestic tranquility was the settling influence of Poole, who replaced the more critical Southey in Coleridge's affections; indeed, as Coleridge says himself, for a short while he was surrounded by love:

I . . . have six companions--My Sara[h], my Babe, my own shaping and disquisitive Mind, my Books, my beloved Friend, Thomas Poole, & lastly, Nature, looking at me with a thousand looks of Beauty, and speaking to me in a thousand melodies of Love.³⁷

As Yarlott suggests, once the inspiration of Wordsworth was added to that of this group, Coleridge's annus mirabilis was at hand.³⁸ During the period from 1797 to 1798, his "genial spirits" were at their height; he wrote all of his major poems and many of his most satisfactory "minor" poems during this brief period. Again, Coleridge was himself well aware of the effects of love on his wholeness and creativity; once he had left

Stowey for Germany, the "wholeness" of genius left him:

I languish after Home for hours together, in vacancy; my feelings almost wholly unqualified by Thoughts. I have, at times, experienced such an extinction of Light in my mind, I have been so forsaken by all the forms and colourings of Existence, as if the organs of Life had been dried up; as if only simple BEING remained, blind and stagnant!--After I have recovered from this strange state, & reflected upon it . . . I am deeply convinced that if I were to remain a few years among objects for whom I had no affection, I should wholly lose the powers of Intellect--Love is the vital air of my Genius³⁹

But when he returned from Germany, Coleridge discovered that the happiness which he had left was irrecoverable; he became increasingly aware that the differences between Sarah's mind and his own made the "ennobling interchange" of true love impossible. As he says in a letter to Southey, "Never, I suppose, did the stern Match-maker bring together two minds so utterly contrariant in their primary and organical constitution."⁴⁰ He had discovered that his mind and Sarah's were contraries and not opposites, and thus they could never be reconciled. This discovery of his essential incompatibility with his wife was certainly reinforced by the inescapable and unfavourable comparison of Sarah with Sara Hutchinson; after 1799 when he met his "Asra," his marriage dissolved almost completely. And although Coleridge had finally met the kind of love for which he had so desperately longed, this relationship was also doomed, for, as we have seen, Coleridge's views on marriage precluded the full realization of his love for Asra. As he says in another letter to Southey, "Carefully have I thought thro' the subject of marriage & deeply am I convinced of it's indissolubleness."⁴¹ The effect of this impossible situation on Coleridge's psyche and his creativity has already been seen in "Dejection."

Although it is impossible here to trace the course of Coleridge's relationship with his "soul's betrothed wife,"⁴² the effects of it are certainly relevant to this study. Not only were the effects felt by Coleridge long after the relationship itself terminated in 1810, but also, while it continued, Asra was constantly in his mind: "I talk loud or eager, or I read or meditate the abstrusest Researches, or I laugh, jest, tell tales of mirth / & ever as it were, within & behind I think, and image you" ⁴³ We have already seen that Coleridge's love for Asra was at the heart of many of his philosophic statements on love, and that his personal knowledge of "love's prompture deep" provided him with a profound insight into its mysteries.⁴⁴ But more often, because that love was unfulfilled, his feelings for Asra completely overwhelmed his controlling intellect; many of his notebook entries are personal utterances of anguish:

Month after month, year after year, the deepest Feeling of my Heart hid & wrapped up in the depth & darkness--solitary chaos--& solitariness--is it not pang & complaint even in sickness & torture how was this every where uppermost⁴⁵

Particularly painful was the knowledge that he was loved in return:

O Love--inspirer. Love--demander, the lonely Heart aches--even when it loves not, because it loves not--but Hope makes Dream / but him who loves & is not beloved // but O! to him who loves & is beloved, & never must attain.⁴⁶

The intensity of his desire to "attain" that love often led him to indulge in a kind of wish-fulfillment; for example, in one notebook entry he wishes that his wife would die and leave him free to marry Asra,⁴⁷ just as in the "Letter to Asra" he had wished his children never born, for they

had converted "Error to Necessity." In another entry he imagines Asra coming to his bedside "in some lonely Inn where [he] lies deserted";⁴⁸ and in another he dreams of consummating a marriage with her:

With all the merely bodily Feelings subservient to our Reason, coming only at its call, and obeying its Behests with a gladness not without awe, like servants who work under the Eye of their Lord, we have solemnized the long marriage of our Souls by its outward Sign & natural Symbol. It is now registered in both worlds, the world of the Spirit and the world of the Senses. We therefore record our deep Thankfulness to Him, from whose absolute Unity all Union derives its possibility, existence, and meaning⁴⁹

He also imagines and fears the opposite extreme--that Mary has died and Wordsworth has married Sara,⁵⁰ or that Sara has come to love Wordsworth more than she does him.⁵¹ Although these notebook entries certainly provide the opportunity, the purpose here is not to psychoanalyze Coleridge, but merely to emphasize the importance of love to his own life, and finally to show its influence on his own creativity. And the notebooks also offer evidence that Coleridge himself was aware of the effects of this troubled period on his creativity. In an entry of 1803, referring to his inability to finish "Christabel" and other poems such as the "Dark Ladie," he writes:

O *Σαρα Σαρα* why am I not happy! why have I not an unencumbered Heart! these beloved Books still before me, this noble Room, the very centre to which a whole world of beauty converges, the deep reservoir into which all these streams & currents of lovely Forms flow--my own mind so populous, so active, so full of noble schemes, so capable of realizing them / this heart so loving . . . wherefore am I not happy! . . . perditio amatio!

But still have said to the poetic Feeling when it has awak'd in the Heart--Go!⁵²

The fact that Coleridge was unable to escape from his personal problems is definitely reflected in his poetry. Although he managed to

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objectify and universalize his subject in the later version of "Dejection," many of the poems surrounding "Dejection," particularly the "Asra poems," remain purely personal.⁵³ This inability to transcend his personal "afflictions" is particularly significant when we remember that Coleridge himself was opposed to the intrusion of personal elements into a work of art, and felt that one of the prerequisites for "genius" was

the choice of subjects very remote from the private interests and circumstances of the writer himself. At least I have found, that where the subject is taken immediately from the author's personal sensations and experiences, the excellence of a particular poem is but an equivocal mark, and often a fallacious pledge, of genuine poetic power.⁵⁴

However, here Coleridge does admit the possibility of a limited excellence in poetry in the personal idiom; and, although he once apologized for their "querulous egotism,"⁵⁵ he himself achieved that excellence in his earlier "Conversation Poems." These poems, also written during the brief period of domestic harmony, achieve a delicate balance of feeling with thought, personal with universal. As was mentioned in Chapter Two, Coleridge's personal feelings for a loved one are at the centre of each poem; but, in accordance with his theories of love and the imagination, this personal love provides the impetus for the expansion of his soul outward to include and love all creation. Then, from this elevated perception of the "one life within us and abroad," his thoughts return to the loved-one, who is loved even more profoundly since he is seen in the larger context of universal love.⁵⁶ But there is an essential difference between these "Conversation Poems" and the later personal poems which Schulz has quite appropriately labelled the "Confessional Poems."⁵⁷ These poems are not based on the outward expansion of consciousness but, instead, as Schulz suggests, "depict [Coleridge] circling endlessly

around the mysterious but painful drama being enacted in his mind."⁵⁸ Although the "Letter to Asra" is the best example, many of the "Asra poems" also manifest this same contraction inward and the same inability to control emotion with thought. Referring primarily to the love poems on or to Asra, Schulz points out that "the superb synthesizing and symbolizing imagination which produced 'The Ancient Mariner' usually became uncontrollable and aesthetically irresponsible before the immediacy of his longing for love."⁵⁹

One of the first "Asra poems," "The Keepsake,"⁶⁰ is typical, in its personal theme, muted tone and quiet imagery, of the poems written to Sara Hutchinson before "Dejection." Although it was written in the "spring" of their love, it opens with an autumn scene which "Show[s] summer gone, ere come":

And the rose
(In vain the darling of successful love)
Stands, like some boasted beauty of past years,
The thorns remaining, and the flowers all gone.⁶¹

This scene brings to the poet's mind the unfading flowers which his love had embroidered with her auburn hair⁶² on "snow-white silk,"⁶³ and the first kiss which they shared in this same "bower." This is a recreation of a significant moment in Coleridge's own life; and even the authenticity of the kiss is corroborated in his notebooks, where he records the "long Entrancement of a True-love's Kiss."⁶⁴ Another element from the notebooks, and frequently introduced in the early poems,⁶⁵ is the wish with which Coleridge ends the poem:

. . . she promised, that when the spring returned,
She would resign one half of that dear name,
And own thenceforth no other name but mine!⁶⁶

But the image of the rose with only the thorns remaining is much more powerful than these last, glib lines; even within the poem itself, it seems as if spring will not return for Coleridge.

Many of the other early "Asra poems" also celebrate significant moments in his relationship with Sara Hutchinson, some of them the joyful memories which reawaken his feelings in the "Letter to Asra." The "Ode to Tranquility" and the "Ode after Bathing," for instance, are the products of the summer of 1801, which Coleridge spent with the Hutchinsons. In the first poem, amidst apostrophes and artificialities, Coleridge dedicates his soul to Asra: "The feeling heart, the searching soul, / To thee I dedicate the whole!"⁶⁷ The second poem ends with the following lines, which, as Miss Adair also suggests,⁶⁸ anticipate Coleridge's conception of the beloved as a symbol of God: "God is with me, God is in me! / I cannot die, if Life be Love."⁶⁹ (They also recall the concluding line of the earlier poem on his sister's death: "Better to die, than live and not be lov'd!") In this same vein are "Inscription for a Fountain on a Heath" (1801) and "A Day-Dream" (early 1802). The first poem is connected with the famous "Rock of Names" of Dorothy's Journal and Wordsworth's Waggoner."⁷⁰ "A Day-Dream" also opens with the image of the same fountain, but it centers on the peaceful fire-side scene which had helped reawaken Coleridge's feelings in the "Letter to Asra."⁷¹

The shadows dance upon the wall,
By the still dancing fire-flames made;
And now they slumber, moveless all!
And now they melt to one deep shade!
But not from me shall this mild darkness steal thee:
I dream thee with mine eyes, and at my heart I feel thee!⁷¹

Coleridge often returned to this peaceful scene in his notebook entries.⁷³

But such moments of peace were few, and themselves transient, as the imagery of fire and fading summer indicates. Immediately after them follows "Dejection," and poems such as "Separation":

This separation is, alas!
 Too great a punishment to bear;
 O! take my life, or let me pass
 That life, that happy life, with her!⁷⁴

More important to this study is "The Picture," which is usually thought to follow the "Letter to Asra";⁷⁵ it embodies in dramatic form the impossibility of Coleridge's leaving Asra, which he had seen as necessary to both of them in a letter alluded to in the subsequent "Letter to Asra." This poem also reiterates (although perhaps less directly than the prose statements or less personally than the "Letter to Asra") the idea that love is necessary to creation. "The Picture" begins with the poet pushing his way through a "matted underwood" and proclaiming that he is finally "free" from the "master-passion," love:

This is my hour of triumph! I can now
 With my own fancies play the merry fool,
 And laugh away worse folly, being free.
 Here will I seat myself, beside this old,
 Hollow, and weedy oak, which ivy-twine
 Clothes as with net-work: here will I couch my limbs,
 Close by this river, in this silent shade,
 As safe and sacred from the step of man
 As an invisible world⁷⁶

This is definitely a retreat rather than a full release from the influence of love, for the poet has gone into the deepest and wildest part of the forest, hoping that Love will be unable to follow him:

these are no groves
 Where Love dare loiter! If in sullen mood

He should stray hither, the low stumps shall gore
 His dainty feet, the briar and the thorn
 Make his plumes haggard. Like the wounded bird
 Easily caught, ensnare him, O ye Nymphs,
 Ye Oreads chaste, ye dusky Dryades!⁷⁷

This is also obviously an escape from poetry, for he has deliberately chosen to stop by a river which is not a "sacred river of imagination." However, he immediately pictures in his mind such a stream, and a love-lorn poet (as he was once himself) who sits gazing at the water, turning away from a real maiden to contemplate her reflection in the stream.

Such a poet

Worships the watery idol, dreaming hopes
 Delicious to the soul, but fleeting, vain,
 E'en as that phantom-world on which he gazed⁷⁸

But, as always, the real world intrudes; the woman destroys his perfect world by scattering her flowers on the pool:

Then all the charm
 Is broken--all that phantom world so fair
 Vanishes, and a thousand circlets spread,
 And each mis-shape the other.⁷⁹

These lines are, of course, quoted in the introduction to "Kubla Khan," as an indication of the difficult process of recreating in poetry the visionary world of the primary imagination. Like the poet in "Kubla Khan," this youth must also try to re-establish his connection with the ideal world of the phantom Abyssinian maid:

Ill-fated youth!
 Go, day by day, and waste thy manly prime
 In mad love-yearning by the vacant brook,
 Till sickly thoughts bewitch thine eyes, and thou
 Behold'st her shadow still abiding there,
 The Naiad of the mirror!⁸⁰

But neither the idealized poetic world of love nor the equally debilitating world of real love is for the man who has imagined this scene. He passes on, still joyful at his escape from the agonies of love and poetry. Then suddenly he comes upon a sketch done by his own beloved, herself an artist, and his true feelings are dramatically (or melodramatically) revealed:

O Isabel!
Daughter of genius! stateliest of our maids!
More beautiful than Alcaeus wooed,
The Lesbian woman of immortal song!⁸¹

Immediately he begins creating his own idealized image of his own maiden, relating her to the women who have been immortalized in verse. He also engages in devising a way to re-establish his relationship with the real woman. The last lines of "The Picture" capture quite effectively his processes of rationalization, and, as Yarlott suggests, "reveal an unexpected mastery of dramatic monologue":⁸²

She is alone!
The night draws on--such ways are hard to hit--
And fit it is I should restore this sketch,
Dropt unawares, no doubt. Why should I yearn
To keep the relique? 'twill but idly feed
The passion that consumes me. Let me haste!
The picture in my hand which she has left;
She cannot blame me that I followed her:
And I may be her guide the long wood through.⁸³

Once more the poet follows the paths of love.

"To Asra" presents in more personal terms the importance of love to Coleridge, and (certainly by extension) to his creativity. First of all, it must be remembered that in "Dejection: An Ode" Coleridge had said that creativity depends upon Joy, or wholeness, which is "the passion

and the life, whose fountains are within." And in "To Asra" he presents her love as the force which activates that "living fount" within him:

Dear Asra, woman beyond utterance dear!
 This love which ever welling at my heart,
 Now in its living fount doth heave and fall,
 Now overflowing pours thro' every part
 Of all my frame, and fills and changes all,
 Like vernal waters springing up through snow 84

The lines from this sonnet are also close to those in "Religious Musings," where the influence of God himself causes the "day-spring" to "rise glorious" in the poet's soul:

As when the great Sun, when he his influence
 Sheds on the frost-bound waters--The glad stream
 Flows to the ray and warbles as it flows.⁸⁵

Once more we have returned to the conception of the beloved as a symbol of Deity--or at least idealized into the God-like, as in "Love's Sanctuary," where the poet's heart

Enshrines thy [Asra's] form as purely as it may,
 Round which, as to some spirit uttering bliss,
 My thoughts all stand ministrant night and day
 Like saintly Priests⁸⁶

Coleridge expresses this same idea in a more serious form in other "Asra poems," the most significant being "Phantom" (1805).⁸⁷ In this poem, Coleridge seems to penetrate to the very essence of Asra's spirit; by the power of his love for her, the veil of the external world is shed, and he reaches the very Idea of Asra:

All look and likeness caught from earth,
 All accident of kin and birth,
 Had pass'd away

She, she herself, and only she,
Shone through her body visibly.⁸⁸

Coleridge's own comment on this poem is particularly illuminating; he says that it is concerned with the "universal-in-particularness of Form":

This abstract Self is indeed in its nature a Universal personified--as Life, Soul, Spirit & c. Will not this prove it [love] to be a deeper Feeling, & of such intimate affinity with Ideas, so to modify them & become one with them, whereas the appetites and the feelings of Revenge and Anger co-exist with the Ideas, ~~in~~ not combine with them⁸⁹

This tendency to idealize and etherealize the beloved is also present in his more philosophic statements on love and in his more personal notebook entries. As Suther points out, Coleridge often considered Asra to be an angel,⁹⁰ or even the God within him:

My love of [Asra] is not so much in my soul, as my soul in it. It is my whole being wrapt into one desire, all the hopes and fears, joys and sorrows, all the powers, vigor, and faculties of my spirit abridged into one perpetual inclination. . . . I hold it, therefore, neither impiety on the one hand nor superstition on the other that you are the God within me, even as the best and most religious men have called their conscience the God within them.⁹¹

As we have seen in Chapter Two, Coleridge did not consider this love to be "idolatry,"⁹² for the beloved was a symbol of God, and, as such, both contained and led up to the absolute One. Indeed, many of his statements on love indicate that for Coleridge love was a kind of religious experience, directing him towards the absolute unity for which he longed:

For love, passionate in its deepest tranquility, love unutterable, fills my whole spirit--so that every fibre of my heart, nay, of my whole frame, seems to tremble under its perpetual touch and sweet pressure, like the string of a lute--with a sense of vibrating pain, distinct from all other sensations, a pain that seems to shiver and tremble on the threshold of some joy that cannot be entered into while I am embodied--a pain of yearning which all the pleasure on earth could not induce me to

relinquish, even were it in my power . . . --yea, even when the Beloved is present seeming to look thro' her and asking for her very self within or even beyond her apparent form.⁹³

Such statements, and they are many, have led Suther to suggest that Coleridge "was looking for the same thing from love and from poetic experience, namely, a religious, a mystical experience of the absolute" ⁹⁴ To this observation one should add, as does Yarlott, Coleridge's earlier search for a mystical experience in nature. ⁹⁵ But both critics imply that love, poetry, and nature failed to provide that essential experience of oneness. Although, as we have seen, it is true that Coleridge eventually turned from such spiritual symbols to their source, ⁹⁶ it cannot be said that such experiences failed completely for him. For a while, Coleridge was able to achieve "wholeness" and consequently to become one with nature and to imaginatively perceive the spiritual harmony of all creation. For a while, he was able to achieve the reciprocal love which enabled him to be "whole," to achieve a communion with nature, and to embody the intuitions of his primary imagination in poetry. And the memory of those experiences remained with him and formed the basis of his later philosophical statements on love and the imagination. These theories themselves prove that such experiences were not complete failures.

Even the fact that Coleridge turned from these experiences to the contemplation of the transcendent God does not indicate that they were failures, for they had fulfilled their proper role in the Platonic and Plotinian scheme ⁹⁷ by illuminating the divine spark in his soul and leading it to the direct contemplation of "Him, from whose absolute Unity all Union derives its possibility, existence and meaning" ⁹⁸ As

we have seen in the Symposium, to Plato, Uranian love conducts the soul upwards from the love of particular beauty and goodness, to the love of universal beauty.⁹⁹ Plotinus also discusses the ascent of the "heavenly ladder of Love":

there is a progression from the perception of the pleasing aspect of the body (soma) to that of the beauty imparted to it by its ensouling and conforming Psyche, finally to contemplate the exalted transcendent essence of Psyche, the Nous source of all harmonious perfection. Whosoever beholds beauty in any form, takes a step on the way leading to the contemplation of the One.¹⁰⁰

Thus, the movement of Coleridge's own psyche should be seen in the context of the Platonic tradition with which he had so many affinities.

In one of his later poems, itself called "Psyche," Coleridge anticipates this final process of life which, as he says, "begins in a detachment from nature and ends in union with God."¹⁰¹

The butterfly the ancient Grecians made
The soul's fair emblem, and its only name--
But of the soul, escaped the slavish trade
Of mortal life!--For in this earthly frame
Ours is the reptile's lot, much toil, much blame,
Manifold motions making little speed,
And to deform and kill the things whereon we feed.¹⁰²

This image can be seen as a later version of the snake-bird dichotomy,¹⁰³ but here Coleridge implies that all that is possible in this life is the reptilian phase--as he does in "Self-Knowledge," where man is seen as the "Vain sister of the worm."¹⁰⁴ This image of the caterpillar and the butterfly also appears quite frequently in Coleridge's notebook entries. One of these entries is an uncharacteristically bitter comment on the impossibility of achieving in this life a love that does not "deform," but completes:

I addressed a Butterfly . . . thus--Beautiful Psyche, Soul of a Blossom that art visiting & hovering o'er thy former friends whom thou hadst left--. Had I forgot the caterpillar or did I dream like a mad metaphysician the Caterpillars hunger for Plants was Self-love--recollection--feeling, & a lust that in its next state refined itself into Love?¹⁰⁵

More often the entries are concerned not with the imperfections of earthly love but with the death into perfect love:

to see God face to face / which alas! it seems too true that no man can do and live, i.e. a human life. It would become incompatible with his organization, or rather it would transmute it, & the process of that Transmutation to the senses of other men would be called Death--even as ~~the~~ to Caterpillars in all probability the Caterpillar dies--& . . . he does not see the connection between the Caterpillar and the Butterfly--the beautiful Psyche of the Greeks.¹⁰⁶

Coleridge also explores this same idea in a comment on one of Jeremy Taylor's sermons; he says that death is not an evil but a "phenomenal change, incident to a progressive being, . . . as the casting of the caterpillar's skin to make room for the wings of the butterfly. It is the unveiling of the Psyche."¹⁰⁷ And, finally, he also links the imagery of this poem with the movement of his own thought: the "PSYCHE, in its process to full developement, undergoes as many changes as its Greek name-sake, the butterfly."¹⁰⁸

CONCLUSION

This study has examined the processes of love and the imagination in Coleridge's philosophy and poetry, and has attempted to demonstrate their intricate connection in his mind. First of all, by way of summary, for Coleridge both love and imagination are unifying and completing processes: they reconcile opposites--whether these opposites be internal or external. Secondly, both love and imagination ultimately lead man up to the divine which is Unity, or allow man to actualize his own portion of divinity. Through the imagination, man, like God, becomes a creator and "gives birth" to his own "system of symbols." Thirdly, God's own creation is controlled by the principle of love. Love is the cosmic force which unifies the universe, the copula within the Trinity; and man, by an act of love and imagination, can become one with the creation, and finally with the creator.

The processes of love and imagination are also of central importance (although in varying ways) to many of the other Romantics. In order to indicate the possible dimensions of such a study as this, a necessarily short examination of only the central expressions of Shelley's views on love and the imagination will be undertaken here. Shelley is chosen, for he is the poet who has the most affinities with Coleridge; in Shelley at Work, for example, Neville Rogers puts Coleridge second only to Plato as a source of inspiration for Shelley: "Coleridge . . . as far as sheer imagination is concerned, may well have influenced him more subtly and powerfully than could ever be effectively demonstrated in the cold light of critical research."¹ Coleridge himself confirms

their affinities: "I . . . [would] have sympathized with his poetics, [his] metaphysical reveries, . . . and Shelley would have felt that I understood him."² This understanding would have been at least partially based on their similar interests in the Platonic tradition, for Shelley was probably just as familiar with it as was Coleridge. Although there is no certain evidence that Shelley had studied the neo-Platonic philosophers directly, he did read the commentaries and translations of Thomas Taylor, the "English pagan," as Coleridge calls him. And Shelley's close friends, Hogg and Peacock (Peacock was also a friend of Thomas Taylor), were well immersed in Orphic and mystic Platonism; Mary Shelley records the endless conversations the three men had on Platonism. She also records Shelley's progress in his own translations of some of the central Platonic dialogues, which he began in 1817. He translated the Symposium, Phaedrus and the Phaedo; and he began the translation of the Gorgias and Ion, but left them incomplete at his death.³ Thus, the particular dialogues which interested him were those in which Socrates discusses the nature of Eros and eudaemonia (divine inspiration).

The partial similarities in influence and temperament between Coleridge and Shelley naturally led to a similarity in imagery and ideas. Visionary landscapes with images of domes, caves, rivers, fountains, boats, suns, and moons recur throughout the poetry of both men.⁴ But more significant than their common body of imagery is their mutual realization of the cosmic and psychic force of love and its connection with the workings of the imagination. In fact, Floyd Stovall maintains that the principle of love is central to a true understanding of Shelley; it is "the only adequate key to an understanding of his conduct as man and poet; and it appears everywhere, in essays and letters as well as in

poems."⁵ The central extant statements of Shelley's conception of love are the essays On Love (1815) and A Discourse on the Manners of the Ancients Relative to the Subject of Love (1818). Both are profoundly influenced by his translation of the Symposium; in fact, A Discourse was intended as a direct commentary on the Symposium, and specifically as a justification of the homosexual practices of the Greeks. Shelley says that the reason for this prevalent practice was the inferior spiritual condition of Greek women:

They were certainly devoid of that moral and intellectual loveliness with which the acquisition of knowledge and the cultivation of sentiment animates, as with another life of overpowering grace, the lineaments and the gestures of every form which they inhabit.⁶

Shelley thus follows Plato and Coleridge in his equation of love with the recognition of intellectual and moral affinities. And, like Coleridge, he also says that the gratification of the senses through sexual intercourse is only an expression of the higher union of souls: "It soon becomes a very small part of . . . love, which is rather the universal search for a communion not only of the senses, but of our whole nature, intellectual, imaginative and sensitive"⁷ In the same essay, Shelley connects love with the idealizing process of the imagination:

This object or its archetype for ever exists in the mind, which selects among those who resemble it that which most resembles it, and instinctively fills up the interstices of the imperfect image, in the same manner as the imagination moulds and completes the shapes in clouds, or in the fire⁸

These same ideas, expanded and clarified, are present in the little essay On Love; this essay shows that love is a completion of the self and therefore an expansion upwards, as it was for Coleridge:

[Love] is that powerful attraction towards all we conceive, or fear, or hope beyond ourselves, when we find within our own thoughts the chasm of an insufficient void, and seek to awaken in all things that are, a community with what we experience within ourselves.⁹

In his defense of the sexual practices of the Greeks, Shelley was naturally confined to a love between men, but in this essay he significantly expands the context, and, like Coleridge, declares love

. . . the bond and the sanction which connects not only man with man, but with every thing which exists. We are born into the world, and there is something within us which, from the instant that we live, more and more thirsts after its likeness.¹⁰

The language with which Shelley expressed his conception of love carried over into A Defence of Poetry (1821), in which he expresses his conception of poetry. In fact, as Notopoulos also notes, for Shelley poetry functions as Eros did in the Symposium; both Eros and the poet are intermediary daemons who connect man with the divine and draw his soul upwards.¹¹ Poetry is the "interpenetration of a divine nature through our own," which "lifts the veil" from the world and "lays bare the naked and sleeping beauty, which is the spirit of its forms." As will be shown, this conception of the function of poetry is similar to that of love as it is presented in "Epipsychidion." And in one of the central and best known passages in A Defence of Poetry, Shelley himself connects love with the operation of the imagination:

The great secret of morals is love; or a going out of our own nature, and an identification of ourselves with the beautiful which exists in thought, action, or person, not our own. A man, to be greatly good, must imagine intensely and comprehensively; he must put himself in the place of another and of many others; the pains and pleasures of his species must become his own. The great instrument of moral good is the imagination; and poetry administers to the effect by acting upon the cause. Poetry enlarges the circumference of the imagination by replenishing it with thoughts of ever new delight, which have the power of

attracting and assimilating to their own nature all other thoughts, and which form new intervals and interstices whose void for ever craves fresh food.¹²

In this essay, Shelley is close to his earlier statements on love, and in the Platonic tradition of enthusiasmos. The essay shows the influence not only of the Symposium but also of the Ion and the Phaedrus.¹³

Shelley's poetic evolution also may be discussed in terms of love, as it is by R.G. Woodman.¹⁴ First of all, Shelley proclaims love as the cosmic principle of harmony in Queen Mab and, most significantly, in Prometheus Unbound. Secondly, he deals with love in the more personal sense of Eros in "Alastor" and "Epipsychidion," which present the individual soul's search for its "prototype." And, lastly, he presents the final union of the soul with the Ideal in "Adonais." It is, of course, impossible to deal with all of these poems here; therefore, only Prometheus Unbound and "Epipsychidion" will be discussed, as they are probably the central examples of Shelley's conception of the cosmic and the psychic force of love. The former is, of course, the central poem in the Shelley canon; it explores the complex relationship between the motifs of Eros and Agape, as did "The Ancient Mariner."¹⁵

Prometheus Unbound opens with the same scene as Aeschylus' Prometheus Bound; Prometheus is enchained by Jupiter to an icy peak in the Caucasus, suffering for his offences against Jupiter. But here Jupiter is not Aeschylus' supreme and awful god who must be treated with reverence. Instead, as Mrs. Shelley suggests, he is the "Evil Principle" which must be defeated at all costs; he is the embodiment of all tyranny, false religion, and evil custom. As such, he has enslaved man and left him only "fear and self-contempt and barren hope."¹⁶ But, as Prometheus

himself stresses, it is man who has allowed Jupiter to control him. In fact, it is man's mind which has created Jupiter; man himself has deified his own selfish desire for power, the evil principles which existed in his own mind, and must now suffer the inevitable effect of that deification. Jupiter is, then, the thought of man, and Prometheus, who has established Jupiter over his father Saturn, is the mind which originated that thought. As Prometheus says, "I gave all / He has."¹⁷ Prometheus' tortured condition symbolizes the necessarily enslaved and enchained condition of the will of mankind to its evil creation. But Prometheus is more than a symbol of man's enslaved mind; he says in his opening speech that his mind is now free. It no longer contains the hatred, violence and vengeance that is Jupiter. Prometheus thus represents not the mind of man as it is now, but as it could, and, Shelley implies, as it will be. Like Christ,¹⁸ Prometheus has forgiven his oppressor, and by this great act of forgiveness, Jupiter has become not his present thought, but his previous thought.

Prometheus' initial act of forgiveness is the kind of imaginative act which Shelley talks of in A Defence of Poetry; it is what he calls "a going out of our own nature." Prometheus' suffering leads him to "wish no living creature to suffer pain,"¹⁹ and pain leads him to an understanding of the true nature of good and evil. He understands that all evil brings suffering and that Jupiter as supreme evil must suffer supremely. He can only feel sympathy and pity for Jupiter; thus, suffering has led Prometheus to break the circle of hate and to achieve the state of Agape. As Kurtz says,

So long as against the oppressor the oppressed choose to use the destructive instruments of violence and hatred, they themselves are caught painfully in the wide-spread net of destruction. . . . Only in suffering is freedom to be found, for it destroys egotism.²⁰

Indeed, through his suffering and his imaginative understanding of the condition of Jupiter, Prometheus has reached a state such that he can

hate no more,
As then ere misery made me wish. The curse
Once breathed on thee I would recall.²¹

However, the tortuous effects of this previous thought will remain until he actively substitutes a new cause (or thought) for the old, until he enthrones love and good in the place of hate and evil, and thereby "creates anew the universe." And he does turn from the night and winter of hate to the light and spring-like warmth of love. He turns to unite himself with Asia (through the release of the "shadow" of her which exists in his own mind). He institutes a new First Cause, and the result is the inevitable overthrow of Jupiter by Demogorgon (Necessity or Fate).

The second act begins with the reunification of Prometheus and Asia (through Panthea), and the beginning of transformation. Although the three sisters associated with Prometheus--Ione, Panthea, and Asia--have usually been seen as ascending "aspects of love" (by Grabo and others), it is clear that they can be more precisely delineated by their functions in the drama itself. Ione is, as her name indicates, Prometheus' individual sensibility, his sense of himself. Panthea is Prometheus' own emanation or epipsyche, that portion of the Ideal which, as Shelley says in On Life, is contained within each mind. (Her name means literally "Deity in all.") Thus, in her dream, Panthea is reunited sexually with the figure of Prometheus before she can leave Ione and journey to Asia.

The initial "going out of our own nature," the selfless Agape principle manifested in Prometheus' forgiveness of Jupiter, is now completed by the Eros principle, the "identification of ourselves with the beautiful," or the aspiration of man's soul upwards to the Ideal. Asia is, of course, the emanation of Ideal Beauty, Goodness, and Love, the Ideal Essence of the universe, and therefore also the animating Spirit of Nature. She is "more fair" than Panthea, the sun or "Light of Life" to Panthea's moon. Once these sisters are reunited, they begin the journey through the earthly levels of existence, down into the caves of pre-existence where the unknowable "figure" of Demogorgon "sits" enthroned. Asia's quest for a new cause and for the actualization of the Ideal Love which she embodies, releases the power of Demogorgon. This power is for Shelley neutral and formless, and must be directed by man's own will. Here, because the will works in conjunction with the Ideal, the principle of Love is released. Thus, although Prometheus himself does not reappear until the end of Act III, it is his will combined with the principles of the Ideal which guides Demogorgon in his dethroning of Jupiter. Act IV is a great celebration of this restoration of Love; it celebrates the redemption of the harmony of nature, and the joyful liberation of man:

Love, from its awful throne of patient power
 In the wise heart, from the last giddy hour
 Of dead endurance, from the slippery, steep,
 And narrow verge of crag-like agony, springs
 And folds over the world its healing wings.²²

As previously suggested, in poems such as "Alastor" and "Epipsychidion" Shelley deals with love on the more personal level; in "Epipsychidion," his conception of personal love reaches its highest

formulation. In this poem, Shelley presents mortal and eternal love in the one figure of Emilia. Here, the influence of Plato is combined with that of Dante. As Shelley says in A Defence of Poetry,

Dante understood the secret things of love even more than Petrarch. . . . His apotheosis of Beatrice in Paradise, and the gradations of his own love and her loveliness, by which as by steps he feigns himself to have ascended to the throne of the Supreme Cause, is the most glorious imagination of modern poetry.²³

Like Beatrice, Emilia exists in a real and an ideal context; on the literal level she is Emilia Viviani, the Italian poetess who had followed such women as Harriet, Mary, and Clare as Shelley's source of inspiration.²⁴ But on a higher level, Emilia is another manifestation of Shelley's conception of Ideal Beauty, Love, and Goodness, another Asia figure. The first part of the poem (lines one to one hundred and ninety) is devoted to a description of her, and a definition of this form of true love. Here Shelley equates love with the imagination, as he did in A Defence of Poetry:

Love is like understanding, that grows bright,
Gazing on many truths; 'tis like thy light,
Imagination! which from earth and sky,
And from the depths of human fantasy,
As from a thousand prisms and mirrors, fills
The Universe with glorious beams, and kills
Error, the worm, with many a sun-like arrow
Of its reverberated lightning.²⁵

Shelley's description of Emilia employs the same symbols of light that he uses here for the effect of the imagination, and that he had used earlier for Asia:

See where she stands! a mortal shape indued
With love and life and light and deity,

And motion which may change but cannot die;
 An image of some bright Eternity²⁶

The second part of the poem presents Shelley's "idealised history" (lines 191-387), using the quest motif of "Alastor." His history centers on the "many mortal forms" in which he "rashly sought / The shadow of that idol of [his] thought," until he was rescued by the light of the true sun. The third part of the poem is a description of the Ionian island paradise to which the two will escape, and become one:

We shall become the same, we shall be one
 Spirit within two frames, oh! wherefore two?
 One passion in twin-hearts, which grows and grew,
 Till like two meteors of expanding flame,
 Those spheres instinct with it become the same,
 Touch, mingle, are transfigured; ever still
 Burning, yet ever unconsumable:
 In one another's substance finding food,
 Like flames too pure and light and unimbued
 To nourish their bright lives with baser prey,
 Which point to Heaven and cannot pass away.²⁷

(This is of course close to many of Coleridge's notebook entries on the union with the beloved.) The island itself is described in terms of Ideal Beauty unveiled "like a naked bride / Glowing at once with love and loveliness" and containing in its heart "An atom of th' Eternal."²⁸ In A Defence of Poetry, Shelley uses the same image to describe the effect of poetry; it "strips the veil of familiarity from the world, and lays bare the naked and sleeping beauty, which is the spirit of its forms."²⁹ To Shelley, poetry and love recreate the world and make possible the actualization of the kind of Elysian Paradise of "Kubla Khan."

Coleridge himself provides the best summary of the two themes of love and the poetic imagination when he says that poets are "Gods of Love who tame the chaos." (Shelley adds to that definition when he says that "chaos [is] made calm by love, not fear."³⁰) And Hazlitt's description of Coleridge is that of the God of Love: "With mighty wings outspread, his imagination might brood over the void and make it pregnant."³¹

FOOTNOTES

INTRODUCTION

¹Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Collected Letters of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, ed. Earl Leslie Griggs (Oxford, 1956), I, 349.

²Ibid., I, 354.

³Wordsworth, quoted by Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, ed. J. Shawcross (Oxford, 1907), I, 166.

⁴In the Statesman's Manual, Coleridge extends this criticism to eighteenth century prose as well:

The histories and political economy of the present and preceding century partake in the general contagion of its mechanic philosophy, and are the product of an unenlivened generalized understanding.

The Complete Works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, ed. W.G.T. Shedd (New York, 1884), I, 436.

⁵Northrop Frye, A Study of English Romanticism (New York, 1968), 4; and George Whalley, The Poetic Process (London, 1953), 178. Frye defines myths as, "fictions and metaphors that identify aspects of human personality with the environment," and Whalley as, "the most direct and positive assertions of belief" which must "embody the quality of spiritual events." Here, myth is used in Frye's sense.

⁶Coleridge, Coleridge's Miscellaneous Criticism, ed. Thomas Middleton Raysor (London, 1936), 33.

⁷Statesman's Manual, Complete Works, I, 437.

⁸Collected Letters, II, 866:

In the Hebrew Poets each Thing has a Life of it's [sic] own, & yet they are all one life. In God, they move & live, & have their Being--not had, as the cold system of Newtonian Theology represents / but have.

⁹As J.B. Beer states in Coleridge the Visionary (London, 1959), 13-14, "Coleridge did not wish to destroy rationalism. His aim was simply to set the current idea of rationalism in a broader perspective." Also see Walter Jackson Bate's comment on Coleridge's poetics in "Coleridge on the Function of Art," Perspectives in Criticism, ed. Harry Levin (Cambridge, Mass., 1950), 154:

Coleridge occupies a unique position not only in English but in European romantic criticism as a whole: he represents, that is, a suggestive and in some respects challenging attempt to unite the traditional rationalistic values of classicism with the organic vitalism to which the romantic movement aspired, and to substantiate and rest this union upon an ultimate metaphysical basis.

¹⁰Quoted by Beer, Coleridge the Visionary, 26. Beer also includes an equally significant observation by Coleridge's daughter, Sara, which shows that she recognized and shared her father's central trait:

whatever subject I commence I feel discontent unless I could pursue it in every direction to the farthest bounds of thought. . . . This was the reason that my father wrote by snatches. He could not bear to complete incompletely, which everybody else does.

¹¹Biographia Literaria, I, 64.

¹²Coleridge, The Friend, ed. Barbara E. Rooke, The Collected Works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, ed. Kathleen Coburn et. al. (London, 1969), IV, part I, 461.

¹³Biographia Literaria, I, 169.

¹⁴John H. Muirhead, Coleridge as Philosopher (London, 1930), 35.

¹⁵There have been a few excellent studies of the significance of love to Coleridge, notably those of T.M. Raysor, "Coleridge and 'Asra'," SP, XXVI (1929), 305-324, and George Whalley, Coleridge and Sara Hutchinson and the Asra Poems (London, 1955); but they have been restricted almost wholly to the personal rather than the philosophical importance of love to Coleridge.

¹⁶Coleridge, however, translated "Void" as "Chaos," and therefore objected to Hesiod's specific cosmology:

inasmuch as all the problems which it is the peculiar object of philosophy to solve [see above], the Hesiodic theology, or rather theogony, precludes, by resolving the absolute ground and origin of all things into night and chaos.

The Philosophical Lectures of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, ed. Kathleen Coburn (London, 1949), 72.

¹⁷As Thomas Gould says in Platonic Love (London, 1963), 104, for Plato, a

. . . visionary state can be achieved . . . by love and philosophy. . . . In the Symposium he speaks of a way to philosophy through love, in the Republic of a way to love through philosophy. In the Phaedrus he speaks of the philosophic lover

¹⁸Anders Nygren, Agape and Eros (Stockholm, 1930 and 1936), trans. Philip S. Watson (New York, 1969); Denis de Rougemont, Passion and Society (Paris, 1939), trans. Montgomery Beligion (London, 1956); and Martin D'Arcy, The Mind and Heart of Love (New York, 1956). Robett G. Hazo's book, The Idea of Love (New York, 1967) also ought to be mentioned. However, Hazo offers no interpretation of love, but merely repeats the central ideas of all the significant philosophers of love, and classifies these ideas according to selected themes.

¹⁹Nygren, Agape and Eros, 210. This chart is an almost complete summary of the opening 200 pages of Nygren's rather lengthy and often repetitive book. (One wishes that it had made its appearance earlier in the work.)

²⁰Ibid., 181.

²¹By contrasting this death into union with the Christian communion which he associates with Agape, he has almost reversed Nygren's conception of the two motifs.

²²D'Arcy, Mind and Heart of Love, 224ff.

²³Ibid., 157ff.

CHAPTER I

¹Collected Letters, I, 260.

²Coleridge's Tauth is "Thoth," the Egyptian God of wisdom, and Hermes Trismegistus, whose writings were considered to be the source of much of Greek thought. Thomas Taylor was, of course, the most eminent contemporary translator and interpreter of Plato and the neo-Platonics, particularly Plotinus and Proclus. (See below for a more extensive consideration of both figures.)

³Collected Letters, I, 262.

⁴Charles Lamb, quoted in Coleridge the Talker, ed. R.W. Armour and R.F. Howes (Ithaca, 1940), 297.

⁵Biographia Literaria, I, 94ff.

⁶For the most complete list of Coleridge's enormously wide reading see John Livingstone Lowes, The Road to Xanadu (Boston, 1927). Lowes is still the best source-hunter in Coleridge criticism--if nothing else.

⁷Biographia Literaria, I, 98.

⁸Coleridge, The Notebooks of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, ed. Kathleen Coburn (London, 1957), I, 1233 21.246. All notebook entries will appear as they do in Miss Coburn's edition--with Coleridge's own emendations indicated.

⁹See, for example, The Philosophical Lectures, 282: "Extremes are produced by extremes. The tyranny of Aristotle and the Aristotelian philosophy called forth the visionaries and the mystics."

¹⁰Quoted from Notebook 18 by Kathleen Coburn in her introduction to The Philosophical Lectures, 64.

¹¹J.A. Appleyard, Coleridge's Philosophy of Literature (Cambridge, 1965), 62.

¹²The date of this discovery has been much debated, but in another valuable letter to Thelwall, Dec. 1796 (Collected Letters, I, 278), Coleridge maintains that he is not a materialist but a Berkeleian. In a later letter (1801, to Thomas Poole, Collected Letters, II, 709), Coleridge very definitely reveals his aversion to materialism:

Newton was a mere materialist--Mind in his system is always passive--a lazy Looker-on on an external World. If the mind be not passive, if it be indeed made in God's Image . . . there is ground for suspicion, that any system built on the passiveness of the mind must be false, as a system.

¹³In 1803, Collected Letters, II, 961, Coleridge writes:

Believe me, Southey! a metaphysical Solution, that does not instantly tell for something in the Heart, is grievously to be suspected as apocryphal. I almost think, that Ideas never recall Ideas . . . any more than Leaves in a forest create each other's motion--The Breeze . . . that runs thro' them . . . is . . . Feeling.

¹⁴Although it is usually assumed that Associationism remains a central influence on Coleridge until 1800 or 1801, James Volant Baker, in The Sacred River (Baton Rouge, 1957), 17ff., makes a strong case that the extremes of materialism are rejected by Coleridge much earlier than this. (See the first letter referred to in footnote 12, which Baker also uses as evidence.) As Baker says, "[Materialism] was contrary to the native basis of his temperament which was platonic, mystical, and mythologizing." What remained an influence after 1796 was the Hartley of

the last part of the Observations on Man--the Christian Hartley.

¹⁵Baker, Sacred River, 69.

¹⁶Claud Howard, Coleridge's Idealism (Boston, 1924), 29. G.N.G. Orsini, Coleridge and German Idealism (Carbondale, 1969), 148, also notes Coleridge's criticism of the Cambridge Platonists' "want of logic." Howard's aim is to show the close association between the ideas of Coleridge and the Cambridge Platonists, especially those on reason and understanding, and to show that the Cambridge group anticipated Kant. Orsini's purpose is to refute Howard by showing first of all that they did not anticipate Kant, for their ideas were dogmatic rather than truly philosophic; and, secondly, that Coleridge's intellectual affinities are more with Kant and Schelling. Both are one-sided arguments: Howard never really explains how Coleridge was "more critical" than the Cambridge Platonists; Orsini never admits that Howard even makes such qualifications. Nor does Orsini adequately relate to his main thesis the fact that Coleridge makes the ideas of the "practical reason" constitutive rather than regulative.

¹⁷Biographia Literaria, I, 114. See also I, 136.

¹⁸James A. Notopoulos, The Platonism of Shelley (New York, 1969), 155.

¹⁹Edward B. Hungerford, Shores of Darkness (Cleveland, 1941), 3-41.

²⁰As Miss Coburn points out in her introduction to The Philosophical Lectures, 45, Coleridge's comments on the connection between all superstitions and the unconscious mind are frequent. As will be shown, these theories play an important role in his own major poems.

²¹This rather obscure association was made as follows: Thoth was considered by the Greeks to be Hermes, and by the Alexandrian neo-Platonists to be Hermes Trismegistus; in "Il Penseroso," Milton speaks of him as the "thrice-great Hermes."

²²References to this idea are numerous. See Beer, Coleridge the Visionary, 70, for his amalgamation of Coleridge's references to the snake, and Chapter III of the present study for an application of this idea to Coleridge's poetry.

²³Reproduced from M. Oldfield Howey, The Encircled Serpent (London, n.d.), 1.

²⁴See The Philosophical Lectures, 90-91, for example.

²⁵Plutarch, "Isis and Osiris," Plutarch's Moralia, ed. and trans. Frank Cole Babbitt (London, 1936), V, 79. Plutarch, however, prefers to equate Osiris with the principle of moisture, or "the cause of generation," and Typhon with the unrelenting heat which destroys moisture. This is certainly more in keeping with the previous myth, where Typhon is energy or extreme heat, free of moderating light. But at the same time, it confuses an already confused myth, for if the association of the two is to be maintained, the myth should be in terms of heat and light, or productive and destructive waters.

²⁶The Philosophical Lectures, 88.

²⁷Thomas Taylor, "Dissertation on the Eleusinian and Bacchic Mysteries," Thomas Taylor the Platonist: Selected Writings, ed. Kathleen Raine and George Mills Harper (Princeton, New Jersey, 1969), 361.

²⁸This union of God and man, Absolute and Individual, is in direct opposition to the accepted and prevalent worship of the Olympiad. (Zeus, like Shelley's Jupiter or Blake's Urizen, is truly a sky-god--remote, indifferent and all-powerful.) To aspire to the godlike was to be guilty of hubris. However, in the ecstatic and chthonic cults which were regaining influence in Greece before Plato, union of the "many" with the "One" was the primary objective.

²⁹Nygren himself makes this connection (Eros and Agape, 163):

In attempting to trace the Eros motif back to its source in ancient Mystery-piety, our attention is drawn first to the intimate connection between Plato's view and Orphism. Orphism, in fact, contains all the presuppositions of the doctrine of Eros, as can be clearly seen from its central myth, the myth of Zagreus.

He then recounts this central myth in much the same form as above.

³⁰Thomas Taylor, "The Hymns of Orpheus," Thomas Taylor the Platonist, 166. This passage is also quoted by Ross Greig Woodman, The Apocalyptic Vision in the Poetry of Shelley (Toronto, 1964), 11. In "The Hymns of Orpheus," Taylor explores the connections between the Orphics, and Plato and the neo-Platonists in great detail. Coleridge himself tended to emphasize only the connection between Plato and Pythagoras, "the founder of Philosophy," but he does credit Pythagoras with a knowledge of Egyptian and mystical lore. See The Philosophical Lectures, 97ff., and 120.

³¹Plato, Ion, 534a-534b, The Collected Dialogues of Plato, ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (Princeton, New Jersey, 1961), 220. The similarities in imagery and idea to "Kubla Khan" should not be overlooked (see below).

³²In this dialogue, 61a, Collected Dialogues, 43, Socrates says that "philosophy is the greatest of the arts," but just before his death he also practices the art of poetry.

³³As Nygren observes, Agape and Eros, 166ff., Plato's is a religious philosophy. He notes that whereas Logos has previously been stressed, Mythos is now being recognized in Plato. And, as he says, the myth of Eros is the "central Platonic myth."

³⁴Phaedrus, 244a-245b, Collected Dialogues, 491-492.

³⁵The adverse criticism of poetry and poets in the Republic must be seen in the light of such statements as this. Here, it is obvious that the poet cannot merely imitate particulars like a craftsman; he must be a philosopher and a lover of the divine. This distinction is made clear in the Phaedrus itself (248d-248e, Collected Dialogues, 495), where a "follower of the muses" is the first step of the soul from the divine, whereas the "poet or other imitative artist" is the sixth remove from the divine. (See also Erixymachus' speech in the Symposium, discussed below.) Such statements have allowed English critics from Sidney on to defeat Plato's adverse criticism of poets in the Republic with Platonism itself.

³⁶As Joseph Pieper indicates in Love and Inspiration: A Study of Plato's Phaedrus (Munich, 1962), trans. Richard and Clara Winston (London, 1965), 84-85, Plato is aware that man's ascent up the ladder of love is not inevitable. Man can be satisfied with lust, or with merely earthly beauty.

³⁷Phaedrus, 248d, Collected Dialogues, 495.

³⁸Ibid., 252b, Collected Dialogues, 498.

³⁹For example, the Symposium was one of the dialogues which Plotinus commented on rather extensively (Enneads, III, 5) and which Shelley chose to translate.

⁴⁰Plutarch connects the cosmic myth of Hesiod with Isis and Osiris, transferring "the names somewhat and assign[ing] to Isis the name of Earth and to Osiris the name of Love and to Typhon the name of Tartarus." ("Isis and Osiris," Thomas Taylor the Platonist, 137.)

⁴¹Symposium, 178b-178c, Collected Dialogues, 532-533.

⁴²Thomas Love Peacock comments on this speech, and relates it to Egyptian and Orphic mythology:
Primogenial, or Creative Love, in the Orphic mythology, is the first born

of Night and Chaos, the most ancient of the Gods, and the parent of all things. . . . The Egyptians, as Plutarch informs us . . . recognised three distinct powers of Love: the Uranian, or Heavenly; the Pandemian, Vulgar or Earthly; and the Sun . . . and the identity of the Sun and Primogenial Love was recognized by the Greeks; . . . Uranian Love, in the mythological philosophy of Plato, is the deity or genius of pure mental passion for the good and the beautiful; and Pandemian Love, of ordinary sexual attachment.

He then goes on to connect Isis, Osiris, and Typhon with the three types of love. (Quoted by Notopoulos, Platonism of Shelley, 52.)

⁴³Eryximachus continues his analysis of Love's reconciliation of discordant elements into a discussion of the seasons, and indeed manages to include all of the attributes of Apollo, the God of love--music, medicine, reason, and poetry.

⁴⁴This myth is quite similar to Egyptian mythology (see above) as well as to the Caballistic idea of the lost Shechinah (see below).

⁴⁵Symposium, 196e, Collected Dialogues, 549.

⁴⁶Ibid., 202e-203a, Collected Dialogues, 555.

⁴⁷"Shelley's Translations from Plato: A Critical Edition," Notopoulos, Platonism of Shelley, 443. The italics are my own.

⁴⁸Ibid.

⁴⁹D'Arcy, Mind and Heart of Love, 221.

⁵⁰Cratylus, 397e-398a, Collected Dialogues, 435.

⁵¹For Coleridge's rather undecided comment on the "Socratic daemon," see The Philosophical Lectures, 138 and 408. Coleridge rather hesitatingly equates them with the unconscious.

⁵²Symposium, trans. Shelley, Platonism of Shelley, 447.

⁵³The Philosophical Lectures, 158.

⁵⁴Ibid., 165 (see also 177).

⁵⁵Ibid., 166.

⁵⁶Equally neo-Platonic is Coleridge's suggestion (Ibid., 187) that . . . Plato argues that, as there was that power in the mind which thinks and images its thought, analogous to this was the power in nature which thought and imaged or embodied its thoughts, in consequence of which he resolved the ground of all things into the dynamic.

⁵⁷Plotinus, Enneads, III, 5, i, trans. Stephen MacKenna (3rd ed; London, 1962), 191.

⁵⁸William Ralph Inge, Christian Mysticism (6th ed; London, 1925), 121.

⁵⁹Baker, The Sacred River, 120.

⁶⁰Plotinus, Enneads, V, 8, i. Quoted by I.A. Richards, Coleridge on Imagination (2nd ed; London, 1950), 27.

⁶¹Nygren, Agape and Eros, 194ff.

⁶²Plotinus Enneads, I, 3, ii, trans. MacKenna, 37.

⁶³Plotinus is a particularly difficult philosopher to deal with, as there are many seeming contradictions in his philosophy. His is the problem of any monist: he must somehow explain the existence of evil in this world. Although he maintains (in contrast to the Gnostics) that matter is not evil, it is definitely the furthest emanation of the divine Sun and therefore bordering on darkness. When Plotinus attempts to explain evil, emanation is considered as a kind of "falling away." As A.H. Armstrong suggests in The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy, ed. A.H. Armstrong (Cambridge, 1967), 231:

This view of the material universe as last and lowest in the order of goodness, unity, and reality, but the image and reflection of what is higher, leaves room for a good deal of variation of attitude.

⁶⁴Nygren, Agape and Eros, 569-570.

⁶⁵It should be also noted that Proclus was equally important to another aspect of Coleridge's thought; he also supported Coleridge's conviction that the mind was essentially active and not merely passive, as in Hartleian psychology:

The most beautiful and orderly development of the philosophy which endeavors to explain all things by an analysis of consciousness, and builds up a world in the mind out of materials furnished by the mind itself, is to be found in the Platonic Theology, of Proclus.

Quoted by E.R. Dodds in the introduction to his edition of Proclus' The

Elements of Theology (Oxford, 1963), xxxiii. As Shawcross suggests in his edition of Biographia Literaria, I, 243, it was "Proclus who prepared Coleridge for Boehme, as Boehme prepared him for Schelling."

⁶⁶As Nygren indicates, Agape and Eros, 667-669, Ficino's purpose was to purify Eros of its medieval association with Agape. This synthesis had reached its highest point in the Augustinian doctrine of caritas. But in the Renaissance, this synthesis broke down; the Renaissance stressed Eros, and the Reformation, purified Agape.

⁶⁷Evelyn Underhill, in Mysticism (12th ed.; New York, 1955), 160, summarizes the most important doctrines of the Caballa (and associated occult and magical systems), as follows:

1. That a supersensible and real "cosmic medium" exists, which interpenetrates, influences, and supports the tangible and apparent world
2. That there is an established analogy and equilibrium between the real and unseen world, and the illusory manifestations which we call the world of sense.
3. That this analogy may be discerned, and this equilibrium controlled, by the disciplined will of man, which thus becomes master of itself and of fate.

For Coleridge's own comments on the Caballa, see The Philosophical Lectures, 299. Because this comment is late, it tends to be derogatory, dismissing the doctrines as "pantheistic."

⁶⁸Beer, Coleridge the Visionary, 59.

⁶⁹*Ibid.*, 52.

⁷⁰Nygren, Agape and Eros, 574.

⁷¹Baker, The Sacred River, 72.

⁷²Quoted by Beer, Coleridge the Visionary, 62-63.

⁷³This use of the metaphor of earthly love for the union of man with God is a common one. In her definitive work on mysticism, Underhill says that it is one of the three central metaphors for mystic union. However, this metaphor of marriage is usually one of Agape rather than Eros: Christ is the bridegroom and the soul is the bride waiting passively to be filled with divine love. It is not difficult to see why Coleridge preferred Boehme's dynamic inversion of the traditional roles.

⁷⁴Coleridge, "On the Principles of Genial Criticism," included in Biographia Literaria, ed. Shawcross, II, 235.

⁷⁵Quoted by Baker, The Sacred River, 120.

⁷⁶See *ibid.*, 133, and Inge, Christian Mysticism, 279, for a discussion of Boehme's use of the dialectical principles of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis.

⁷⁷Jacob Boehme, Personal Christianity, ed. and trans. Franz Hartmann (New York, n.d.), 80-81.

⁷⁸Biographia Literaria, I, 103.

⁷⁹The Philosophical Lectures, 323.

⁸⁰Quoted from The Friend by Baker, The Sacred River, 133.

⁸¹Nygren, Agape and Eros, 221.

⁸²Hartley's system also accords an important place to love; his "theopathy" will be discussed in Chapter III of this study, where his influence on "Religious Musings" will be discussed.

CHAPTER II

¹Collected Letters, II, 672. Coleridge also explains what he means by "thoughts" and "things" to Thomas Clarkson, Collected Letters, II, 1194-1195, and suggests that God's Thoughts are Ideas or "Things."

²Appleyard, Coleridge's Philosophy of Literature, 94.

³Collected Letters, II, 1034. (Also quoted by Appleyard, 96.)

⁴This is Walter Pater's "formula" for Coleridge. Compare it with Diotima's description of the daemon Eros, above.

⁵Biographia Literaria, I, 14.

⁶J.R. de J. Jackson, Method and Imagination in Coleridge's Criticism (London, 1969), 73.

⁷Henry Nelson Coleridge, quoted in Coleridge the Talker, 142.

⁸Sara Coleridge, *ibid.*, 29. Appleyard, Coleridge's Philosophy of Literature, 10-11, makes a somewhat similar observation:

it seems possible now to say that the confused eclecticism with which Coleridge is often charged can best be explained, in part at least, as the instinctive inclination to see all sides of a problem, and to move, by opposing true but partial solutions, towards more inclusive and complicated explanations.

⁹Biographia Literaria, I, 174.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, I, 175. As Jackson notes, Coleridge here refrains from being completely sceptical of the possibility of achieving satisfactory results from this method.

¹¹*Ibid.*

¹²*Ibid.*

¹³*Ibid.*

¹⁴*Ibid.*, I, 180.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, I, 183.

¹⁶*Ibid.*

¹⁷*Ibid.*, I, 186.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, I, 202.

¹⁹Richards, Coleridge on Imagination, 58.

²⁰Arthur O. Lovejoy, The Reason, the Understanding, and Time (Baltimore, 1961), 55.

²¹Biographia Literaria, I, 202.

²²Richards, Coleridge on Imagination, 59-60.

²³Biographia Literaria, I, 202.

²⁴Collected Letters, I, 349.

²⁵ Shawcross, introduction to Biographia Literaria, I, lviii.

²⁶ Schelling, Transcendental Idealism, I, iii. Quoted by Shawcross, lxi-lxii.

²⁷ Shawcross, lxx.

²⁸ Biographia Literaria, I, 164-166.

²⁹ Ibid., I, 168.

³⁰ In Biographia Literaria, I, 167, Coleridge also expresses the need to be aware of this potential, in a quite striking, and, as we shall see in Chapter IV, significant image:

They and they only can acquire the philosophic imagination who within themselves can interpret and understand the symbol, that the wings of the air-sylph are forming within the skin of the caterpillar. . . . They know and feel, the potential works in them, even as the actual works on them!

³¹ Ibid., I, 173.

³² Ibid., I, 168.

³³ Ibid., I, 167 and 173, respectively.

³⁴ Ibid., I, 168.

³⁵ As Lovejoy suggests in The Reason, the Understanding and Time, 1, Characteristic of nearly all the more typical and influential of the philosophic systems which introduced a new temper into German and . . . European thought between 1795 and 1830 was a fashion of distinguishing two radically different modes of knowing, a "lower" and a "higher," of which the former was said to constitute the method of science, the latter that of philosophy.

³⁶ Bate, "Coleridge on the Function of Art," 146.

³⁷ Coleridge, quoted by Muirhead, Coleridge as Philosopher, 99.

³⁸ Ibid., 195.

³⁹ Biographia Literaria, II, 12.

⁴⁰ Coleridge was himself aware that his philosophic justification was more of an encumbrance than an elucidation: as he says in Table Talk, Complete Works, ed. Shedd, VI, 520,

The metaphysical disquisition at the end of the first volume of the "Biographia Literaria" is unformed and immature; it contains the fragments of the truth, but it is not fully thought out.

⁴¹ Coleridge, The Watchman, ed. Lewis Patton, The Collected Works, ed. Coburn, II, 132. (See also The Friend, Part I, 520ff., for the same distinction.)

⁴² Certainly his own experiences as a poet and, after his annus mirabilis, his fear that he perhaps, after all, lacked the essential quality of the imagination, added to his formulation of this distinction. See Collected Letters, I, 470.

⁴³ Although he does not as yet use the terms, "fancy" and "imagination," it is certain that the following early observations are an attempt to verbalize that essential difference: "The Heart should have fed upon the truth, as Insects on a Leaf--till it be tinged with the colour, and shew it's food in every the minutest fibre." and ". . . Estlin hath not the catenating Faculty--he wants the silk thread that ought to run through the Pearl-chain of Ratiocination." (October, 1794, Collected Letters, I, 115; and March, 1796, ibid., I, 193.)

⁴⁴ Collected Letters, II, 864-866. This same differentiation is repeated in essentially the same form in 1809 in The Friend, Collected Works, ed. Coburn, I, 456; and in 1812, in Omniana, Literary Remains, ed. Henry Nelson Coleridge (London, 1836), I, 326.

⁴⁵ Collected Letters, II, 1034.

⁴⁶ "On the Principles of Genial Criticism," included in Biographia Literaria, II, 235.

⁴⁷ "On Poesy or Art," included in Biographia Literaria, II, 262. (See also Miscellaneous Criticism, 207 and 208.)

⁴⁸ Ibid., II, 258.

⁴⁹ Ibid., II, 259.

⁵⁰ Ibid., II, 257.

⁵¹ Statesman's Manual, Complete Works, I, 436-437.

⁵²All of these distinctions are employed in Coleridge's lectures of 1808, 1811, 1813, and 1818, and applied to the practical criticism of past and present poets. Particularly illuminating is his crediting of Shakespeare with all of the positive aspects of his many two-fold divisions, and therefore considering him to possess "genius" rather than only "talent"--the distinction between these being another of Coleridge's favorite divisions.

⁵³Coleridge, Coleridge on the Seventeenth Century, ed. Roberta Florence Brinkley (New York, 1968), 694. Understanding appears twice on the chart, separated by a black line, in order to show that there are two types of knowledge, and that Understanding is the highest power in the lower type of knowledge and the lowest power in the highest type of knowledge. Jackson also discusses this chart in Method and Imagination, 115; but in order to support his contention that the primary imagination is the "unconscious repository of divided knowledge," he equates the Primary Imagination with "Reason," and the "Imagination" of Coleridge's chart with the secondary imagination. However, this would mean that the secondary imagination is not purely aesthetic, as it clearly is in Coleridge's other statements. Nor does it explain how the secondary imagination incorporates "the reason in the images of the sense," or mediates between the lowest and the highest on the chart.

⁵⁴See the Statesman's Manual, Complete Works, I, 456, where Coleridge defines both reason and religion (and understanding).

⁵⁵Collected Notebooks, 3152 12.67.

⁵⁶As Coleridge comments in a marginal note to the System des Transcendentalen Idealismus, quoted by James D. Boulger, Coleridge as Religious Thinker (New Haven, 1961), 110: "I itself even in its absolute Synthesis supposes an already perfected Intelligence, as the ground of its existing as it does exist."

⁵⁷Walter Jackson Bate, Coleridge (London, 1968), 191ff.

⁵⁸Indeed, like the Cambridge Platonists, Coleridge maintains that religion cannot be separated from philosophy.

⁵⁹Derek Stanford, "Coleridge as Poet and Philosopher of Love," English, XIII (1960), 3-7. However, Stanford restricts himself primarily to Coleridge's more personal utterances on love.

⁶⁰Quoted by Muirhead, Coleridge as Philosopher, 159. (The other mysteries are: Will, Conscience, Carnate Evil, Identity, Growth, and Progression.)

⁶¹Collected Notebooks, 2130 21.443.

⁶²Collected Letters, III, 304. Coleridge repeats this distinction in a more personal context in Notebook entry 3194 19.64: "My love is built up far from accident."

⁶³Collected Notebooks, 3083 19.44

⁶⁴Collected Letters, III, 305. (See also Collected Notebooks, 1822 16.205, where Coleridge also maintains that lust must be subordinated to love which "assimilates or transplants the eternal into the Personal" and internal. Here, he equates lust with the external organs of the senses, and love with the internal organs of breathing and digestion, which transform what they receive.)

⁶⁵Ibid.

⁶⁶Coleridge, Coleridge's Shakespearean Criticism, ed. Thomas Middleton Raysor (London, 1930), II, 143.

⁶⁷Ibid., I, 86.

⁶⁸Ibid., I, 110.

⁶⁹Henry Crabb Robinson, quoted in Coleridge the Talker, 53.

⁷⁰Shakespearean Criticism, II, 141-142.

⁷¹Coleridge on the Seventeenth Century, 444.

⁷²Aids to Reflection, Complete Works, ed. Shedd, I, 268-269. Coleridge repeats this thought in Table Talk, ibid., I, 415: "The truth is, a great mind must be androgynous." In both statements, Coleridge is close to D'Arcy's theories, outlined in the Introduction to this study.

⁷³See Coleridge's poem, "The Second Birth."

⁷⁴Collected Notebooks, 189 G.185. In notebook entry 1679 21.407, Coleridge emphasizes his own need for a reciprocal relationship: "My nature requires another Nature for its support." The importance of this statement will be seen in Chapter IV.

⁷⁵Shakespearean Criticism, II, 144.

⁷⁶Collected Letters, I, 397-398.

⁷⁷Biographia Literaria, II, 32.

⁷⁸For example, in "The Eolian Harp," the focal point is Sarah; in "This Lime Tree Bower My Prison," Charles Lamb; and in "Frost at Midnight," Coleridge's son, Hartley.

⁷⁹Table Talk, Collected Works, VI, 348. See also Shakespearean Criticism, II, 155-156; and Collected Notebooks, 1679 21.407.

⁸⁰Coleridge, Anima Poetae, ed. Ernest Hartley Coleridge (Boston and New York, 1895), 198.

⁸¹See Geoffrey Yarlott, Coleridge and the Abyssinian Maid (London, 1967), 280-306.

⁸²Biographia Literaria, II, 12.

⁸³Quoted in Coleridge the Talker, 213-214.

⁸⁴Biographia Literaria, I, 59. See also Coleridge's comments on Shakespeare, *ibid.*, II, 16, as well as his comment on Wordsworth, page 31 of this thesis.

⁸⁵This emphasis upon feeling is partially a result of Coleridge's growing disenchantment with Hartley's passive system. (See footnote 13, Chapter I.)

⁸⁶Collected Notebooks, 3231 24.21. Thus, the chart which Coleridge provides could also read:

REASON		HEART
IMAGINATION	or	LOVE
UNDERSTANDING		INTELLECT

Coleridge also stresses the fact that love is an act of the will, Shakespearean Criticism, II, 207.

⁸⁷Collected Notebooks, 3092 19.43. Coleridge also links love and poetry as both manifesting "passionate order," in the following statements:

In poetry it is the blending of passion with order that constitutes perfection: this is still more the case in morals, and more than all in the exclusive attachment of the sexes.

and

Love is the spirit of Life, and Music the Life of the Spirit.--

What is music?--Poetry in its grand sense.

Answer.

Passion and order aton'd!

(Shakespearean Criticism, II, 142; and Collected Notebooks, 3231 24.21.)
See also 1229 2.25, and "Ad Vilmun Axiologum."

⁸⁸Collected Letters, III, 305. The date of this letter may account partially for the derogatory nature of the remarks: it was written in 1811, soon after Coleridge's disagreement with Wordsworth over some remarks made to Montagu.

⁸⁹Biographia Literaria, II, 101. See also Table Talk, Complete Works, VI, 404, where he calls Wordsworth a "spectator ab extra."

⁹⁰Notebook 21, 118. Quoted by Beer, Coleridge the Visionary, 293.

⁹¹Collected Notebooks, 2355 21.539.

⁹²Bate, Coleridge, 153.

⁹³Quoted by Muirhead, Coleridge the Philosopher, 195.

⁹⁴"On the Principles of Genial Criticism," included in Biographia Literaria, II, 236:

That which has become, or which has been made agreeable to us, from causes not contained in its own nature, or in its original conformity to the human organs and faculties; that which is not pleasing for its own sake, but by connection or association with some other thing separate or separable from it, is . . . [not] beautiful.

⁹⁵Ibid., II, 243. (This idea was suggested throughout the Symposium.)

⁹⁶Ibid., II, 236.

⁹⁷Quoted by Raysor, "Unpublished Fragments on Aesthetics By S.T. Coleridge," SP, XXII (1925), 531-532. Raysor's collection is from the Egerton MS 2800, pages 66-77. (See Collected Notebooks, 1680 21.408, for an early attempt to relate Beauty, Good, and Love.)

⁹⁸"Fragment of an Essay on Beauty," included in Biographia Literaria, II, 251.

⁹⁹"On the Principles of Genial Criticism," ibid., II, 227.

¹⁰⁰"Mr Coleridge's Lectures," Morning Chronicle, December 13, 1811. Included in Shakespearean Criticism, II, 206.

¹⁰¹Collected Letters, II, 305 (quoted above in regard to the difference between love and lust); Coleridge on the Seventeenth Century, 193; and an uncollected notebook entry quoted by Raysor, "Coleridge and 'Asra'," 319.

¹⁰²Collected Notebooks, 2540 17.98.

¹⁰³Ibid., 2530 17.88.

¹⁰⁴Table Talk, Complete Works, VI, 349.

¹⁰⁵Aids to Reflection, ibid., I, 138. The importance of marriage to Coleridge is also indicated by the many times that he lists the prerequisites of a happy marriage. See, for instance, Omniana, Literary Remains, I, 361, and Collected Letters, III, 91-93. Coleridge's own marriage had none of the qualities which he lists. He certainly would have been happier if he had not conceived of marriage as a sacred bond, for then he would have been free to love Asra, his "soul's betrothed wife."

¹⁰⁶Omniana, Literary Remains, I, 390.

¹⁰⁷Collected Notebooks, 2600 17.21.

¹⁰⁸Coleridge, Inquiring Spirit, ed. Kathleen Coburn (London, 1951), 69.

¹⁰⁹Collected Notebooks, 2540 17.98.

¹¹⁰The Philosophical Lectures, 175-176. (See Chapter I of the present study for a more complete account of Coleridge's rather unusual theories on Plato's "unwritten dogmata.") Collected Notebooks, 2445 17.19 is an earlier (1805) attempt to delineate the relationship between the Platonic "God, His Word, His Wisdom," and the Christian "Father, Son, and Holy Spirit."

¹¹¹Table Talk, Complete Works, VI, 314.

¹¹²See Bate, Coleridge, 216ff.

¹¹³Table Talk, Complete Works, VI, 290.

¹¹⁴"Formula Fidei de Sanctissima Trinitate," Literary Remains, III, 1.

¹¹⁵Ibid., III, 1-2.

¹¹⁶Ibid., III, 2.

¹¹⁷Ibid., III, 2-3 and 127.

¹¹⁸Coleridge on the Seventeenth Century, 201-202. Also see Collected Letters, II, 1196.

¹¹⁹Statesman's Manual, Complete Works, I, 471-472. In The Philosophical Lectures, 223, Coleridge also stresses that man's Eros for the ideal is not enough. Man needs God's Agape.

¹²⁰Anima Poetae, 68.

¹²¹"Essay on Faith," Literary Remains, IV, 430.

¹²²Ibid.

¹²³Statesman's Manual, Complete Works, I, 462.

¹²⁴"Essay on Faith," 431.

¹²⁵Statesman's Manual, 458.

¹²⁶"Essay on Faith," 431.

¹²⁷Ibid., 433.

¹²⁸Statesman's Manual, 458.

¹²⁹Omniana, Literary Remains, I, 351-353.

¹³⁰Ibid., 354. Boehme expresses the same idea (Personal Christianity, 83): "No one truly knows his own self until he finds his true self in the Unity of All."

¹³¹Aids to Reflection, Complete Works, I, 271 and 274.

¹³²Anima Poetae, 259.

¹³³Notebook 31, f 33. Quoted by Boulger, Coleridge as Religious Thinker, 153-154. (See also Collected Notebooks 2531 17.89.)

¹³⁴Biographia Literaria, I, 165-166.

¹³⁵See Book I of The Prelude, particularly lines 301-302:
Fair seed-time had my soul, and I grew up
Fostered alike by beauty and by fear.

¹³⁶Collected Letters, I, 267.

¹³⁷Collected Notebooks, 2441 17.15.

¹³⁸Collected Letters, III, 153.

CHAPTER III

¹Collected Notebooks, 1064 21.190.

²"Religious Musings," 105-115, The Complete Poetical Works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, ed. Ernest Hartley Coleridge (Oxford, 1912), I, 113.

³Poetical Works, I, 110.

⁴"Religious Musings," 369-370, Poetical Works, I, 123.

⁵Coleridge, Lectures 1795 on Politics and Religion, ed. Lewis Patton and Peter Mann, Collected Works, ed. Coburn, I, 114.

⁶Dorothy Waples, "David Hartley in The Ancient Mariner," JEGP, XXXV (1936), 339-341.

⁷"Religious Musings," 42-45, Poetical Works, I, 110-111. Also see lines 198 and following, for Coleridge's most explicit use of Hartley's system of "theopathy."

⁸"The Destiny of Nations," 80-88, Poetical Works, I, 134. It is also interesting to note that Coleridge still uses the terms "fancy" and "imagination" interchangeably; in a somewhat similar passage in "Religious Musings," the imagination is the power which "unsensualizes" the mind.

⁹Hartley, Observations on Man, II, 329-330, discussed by Appleyard, Coleridge's Philosophy of Literature, 40.

¹⁰"The Destiny of Nations," 127, Poetical Works, I, 136.

¹¹Ibid., 36-59, Poetical Works, I, 133.

¹²Ibid., 459-462, Poetical Works, I, 146-147.

¹³Poetical Works, I, 147.

¹⁴As Baker has established in The Sacred River, 19, and as we have discussed above, the transition of thought came soon after the completion of "The Destiny of Nations." He quotes the following note added by Coleridge to a manuscript of the poem:

N.B.--Within twelve months after the writing of this Poem, my bold Optimism, and Necessitarianism . . . gave way to the daybreak of a more genial and less shallow system.

¹⁵Appleyard, Coleridge's Philosophy of Literature, 45.

¹⁶"Religious Musings," 152-155, Poetical Works, I, 115.

¹⁷"The Destiny of Nations," 18-20, Poetical Works, I, 132.

¹⁸H.W. Piper, Nature and the Supernatural in "The Ancient Mariner" (Sydney, 1955), 10.

¹⁹"Religious Musings," 9-10, Poetical Works, 109.

²⁰See Coleridge's own criticism of his early poetry in Biographia Literaria, I, 3, 16.

²¹Collected Letters, I, 137.

²²"Religious Musings," 414-419, Poetical Works, I, 124-125.

²³"The Destiny of Nations," 283-288, Poetical Works, I, 140. This rather significant image is also present in Coleridge's sonnet to Bowles:

shadowy PLEASURE with mysterious wings,
Brooded the wavy and tumultuous mind,
Like that great Spirit, who with plastic sweep
Mov'd on the darkness of the formless Deep!

Both should, of course, be related to Paradise Lost, I, 19-22 (and to Genesis).

²⁴Statesman's Manual, Complete Works, I, 436.

²⁵R.L. Brett, Reason and Imagination: A Study of Form and Meaning in Four Poems (London, 1960), 80.

²⁶Biographia Literaria, II, 12.

²⁷"On the Principles of Genial Criticism," included in Biographia Literaria, II, 235. I have italicized "flashes" myself. The same term, "flash," is also employed, in a specifically sexual context, in "Lines at Shurton Bars," 91-96, Poetical Works, I, 99-100.

²⁸For other poetic landscapes, often quite close in imagery to "Kubla Khan," see "To The Author of Poems [Joseph Cottle]," and "The Garden of Boccacio."

²⁹Shakespearean Criticism, I, 222.

³⁰Ibid. For the same contrast in terms of "Gothic" and "classic" see Coleridge's Miscellaneous Criticism, 6-8.

³¹Biographia Literaria, II, 258.

³²"Kubla Khan," 14-16, Poetical Works, I, 297.

³³See Lowes, Road to Xanadu, 71, and Baker, The Sacred River, 173.

³⁴Shakespearean Criticism, I, 224.

³⁵As early as "Religious Musings" the fountain had been used by Coleridge as a symbol of creativity--"immeasurable fount / Ebullient with creative Deity!" (403-404, Poetical Works, I, 124.) As Beer points out in Coleridge the Visionary, 61, Boehme also equates the "fountain" with the "heart" and the "princely" with the "head."

³⁶"Kubla Khan," 17-24, Poetical Works, I, 297. It is interesting to note that in this fountain are the "seeds" of Kubla's kingdom--grain and rocks.

³⁷In his essay on Aeschylus' Prometheus, Coleridge defines war as a "schism, or division, that is, a polarization into thesis and antithesis," (Literary Remains, II, 343. See also Biographia Literaria, II, 19, for the same image.)

³⁸"On Poesy and Art," included in Biographia Literaria, II, 256. This idea always fascinated Coleridge; it occurs for instance, in "An Effusion at Evening" (which also links the imagination and love). And in notebook entry 1725 16.376, when Coleridge decides to make a list of "the instances of the Proverb, Extremes Meet," his example is an instance of "heat in ice" from Paradise Lost.

³⁹The pre-Platonic idea of the reconciliation of opposites as a harmony occurs throughout Coleridge's works. As he says in "On Poesy and Art," *ibid.*, II, 261, "that man is designed for a higher state of existence . . . is deeply implied in music, in which there is always something more and beyond the immediate expression." He also often associates love with music; "Ad Vilmum Axiologum" is perhaps the best example.

⁴⁰As Coleridge says in Shakespearean Criticism, II, 69, "pleasure is the magic circle out of which the poet must not dare to tread." In this regard see also Collected Notebooks, 2832 15.219.

⁴¹As Werner W. Beyer indicates in The Enchanted Forest (Oxford, 1963), 120, the main sources are Purchas, Bartram, Maurice, Bruce, Burnet, Milton, Pausanias, and Herodotus.

⁴²Lowes, Road to Xanadu, 370ff., documents Coleridge's familiarity with Bruce's Travels to Discover the Source of the Nile, and indicates possible echoes of it in "Kubla Khan."

⁴³Coleridge also equates Isis with the earth in his lectures on Prometheus, Literary Remains, II, 326.

⁴⁴Bartram's Travels, quoted by Lowes, Road to Xanadu, 365.

⁴⁵See Plutarch, "Isis and Osiris," 101ff., as well as Maurice I, 102, quoted by Lowes, Road to Xanadu, 381. Maurice describes Isis or the moon's "immediate utility in swelling the waters of that sacred river, whose annual inundations were the perpetual and abundant source of plenty."

⁴⁶See Beer, Coleridge the Visionary, 183.

⁴⁷Shakespearean Criticism, I, 184-185. As Miss Adair points out in The Waking Dream, 125-126, Ficcion and Pico della Mirandola make the same distinction. Nietzsche was certainly anticipated in his formulation of the dichotomy between Dionysus and Apollo.

⁴⁸Shakespearean Criticism, II, 263.

⁴⁹This interpretation seems to be supported by Coleridge's comment on the title of Origen's work on the Emperor Gallienus. The title was usually translated, "that only a poet is king," but Coleridge disagreed:

Qy. Is it not possible that Origen's Title might be rendered, That the only Poet is the 'Emperor And is it not probable that the theme of a work done in praise of the Emperor Galienus, was to prove that true poesy, = making, was that of giving objectivity, form and life to the Ideas of legislative Reason, the reducing the rude materials of a multitude to measure and harmony & c. . . . (Quoted by Kathleen Coburn in her notes to Notebook entry 1057 21.181.)

⁵⁰Marshall Suther, Visions of Xanadu (New York, 1965), 54, makes the same suggestion in his examination of the similarities between the imagery of "Kubla Khan" and that of "The Eolian Harp." The harp, itself a symbol of the poet, is a "coy maid" who is seduced by the breeze of poetic inspiration. Suther maintains that in the "Eolian Harp" the poet is the maiden, and (more definitely in an early version of the poem) that "the relation between the two--between lute and wind, maid and lover, poet and influx of nature--is graphically described in terms of sexual union (a case of becoming the other)."

⁵¹Dorothy F. Mercer, "The Symbolism of 'Kubla Khan'," JAAC, XII, i (1953), 51ff.

⁵²Beer, Coleridge the Visionary, 252-253. The first letter invented was, of course, Alpha, and thus Beer makes another connection between the name of the "sacred river" and the Abyssinian maid. It is also interesting to note that in Hebrew lore Aleph was the male element and Beth (cave) was the female, and the formation of the alphabet was the result of their sexual union. Coleridge also connects Kubla with the formation of letters, Collected Notebooks, 1281 8.30: "Kublaikhan ordered letters to be invented for his people."

⁵³Beer tells us, Coleridge the Visionary, 67, that Coleridge spoke "of the possibility of law handed down to the patriarchs having been preserved in the Temple of Isis--which he would presumably have located in Abyssinia." See also pages 254-255, where he finds a further identification of Coleridge's maid with Isis through Heliodorus' Aethiopian History.

⁵⁴Quoted by Beer, Coleridge the Visionary, 63. (Also quoted above.)

⁵⁵There are actually three circles, which several critics have seen as representing the Trinity. See Adair, The Waking Dream, 142, for example.

⁵⁶Collected Notebooks, 609 4.25, and Collected Letters, IV, 545. It is also interesting to note that Coleridge also associated snakes with honey in Notebook entry 2882 11.14, which, as Miss Coburn suggests in her Notes, may be an attempt to continue "Kubla Khan." (This suggestion is, of course, based on the theory that "Kubla Khan" is only a "fragment," but as we have seen, the poem definitely forms a coherent whole as it is.)

⁵⁷Before the examples are given, it must be noted that Coleridge's images are not allegories to be comprehended by the understanding alone. Natural forces must not be rigidly equated with abstract concepts, as does Warren when he maintains that the sun is the understanding (which, as we shall see, is not only an allegorical but an erroneous reading). Miss Adair includes the same cautionary note in reference to the much-debated role of the sun and moon in the poem: "Both the sun and moon change with the geography of the voyage and also with the Mariner's spiritual state; they cannot be rigidly limited in meaning." (The Waking Dream, 61.) It is, of course, extremely difficult to retain in a work of criticism, Coleridge's subtle balance, but the attempt to do so must at least be made.

⁵⁸"The Rime of the Ancient Mariner," 614-618, Poetical Works, I, 209. It is also parallel to Blake's statement that "Everything that lives is holy," and to Wordsworth's verse,

He who feels contempt
For any living thing hath faculties
Which he hath never used.

⁵⁹Shelley, A Defence of Poetry, Selected Poetry, Prose and Letters, ed. A.S.B. Glover (London, 1951), 1032.

⁶⁰G. Wilson Knight, The Starlit Dome (2nd ed., New York, 1960), 88.

⁶¹The crew is provided with a motive, but one which is based purely upon self-concern and expediency. James D. Boulger, Twentieth Century Interpretations of the Ancient Mariner (New Jersey, 1969), 9, presents the best explanation of the actions of the sailors:

The sailors use syllogistic logic and cause and effect in the ordinary way to calculate the morality of shooting the albatross, and, of course, the calculations fail, because the poem deals with effects whose causes are spiritual but unknown.

⁶²Lowes, Road to Xanadu, 235.

⁶³There is some support for this interpretation of the polar daemon as a serpent of the deep. In The Botanic Garden, Erasmus Darwin notes that, "winds generated about the poles are pushed forward towards

the tropical line by the pressure from behind. The south-west winds, as the atmosphere is suddenly diminished in the polar regions, are drawn, as it were, into an incipient vacancy." He then makes the amazing suggestion that this may be the work of an unknown dragon. Quoted by Piper, The Active Universe, 98. Darwin was, of course, one of Coleridge's sources.

⁶⁴See G.R.S. Mead, Thrice-Greatest Hermes (London, 1964), especially I, 334-335, for the most comprehensive account of the connection between the "logos-mind" and the "good daemon."

⁶⁵In Coleridge's later terms, Ipseity and Alterity are no longer joined by Community.

⁶⁶Of course, the Mariner's lack of (primary) imagination or intuition did not cause the "fall"; the fall was caused by it. The Mariner "failed to make proper use of his senses" (as Coleridge says of Cain) in killing the albatross in the first place.

⁶⁷See especially Collected Notebooks, 272 G.269, and 273 G.270, where Coleridge talks about Boehme's "wrath-fires" and "love-fires."

⁶⁸Beer, Coleridge the Visionary, 155.

⁶⁹Quoted by Mead, Thrice-Greatest Hermes, I, 305.

⁷⁰This fascinating figure is definitely a figure of lust which, as we have seen in Chapter II, is associated with the "contracted" self, the purely empirical I, and the resulting spiritual isolation.

⁷¹Collected Notebooks, 273 G.270.

⁷²This egocentrism can be equated with Nygren's negative conception of Eros: for Nygren, Eros is based on a recognition of "value in its object," and since the Mariner is unable to grasp intuitively the real value of the albatross, he unthinkingly destroys it. Eros is also "dependent on want and need" and "motivated"; it is in this sense that the Ancient Mariner first pleads for a "saint" to "take pity."

⁷³Robert Penn Warren, "A Poem of Pure Imagination," Selected Essays (2nd. ed; New York, 1958), 254.

⁷⁴"The Rime of the Ancient Mariner," 267-271, Poetical Works, I, 197.

⁷⁵Ibid., 272-281, Poetical Works, I, 198.

⁷⁶Once again, these opposites are seen unified in the element of water as they were in "Kubla Khan."

⁷⁷See Nygren's chart reproduced in the introduction to this study.

⁷⁸"The Rime of the Ancient Mariner," 354-362, Poetical Works, I, 200.

⁷⁹The Philosophical Lectures, 226.

⁸⁰Howey, The Encircled Serpent, 83-84 and 380, outlines the association between the Hebrew seraph and the Egyptian plumed serpent, for the Hebrew word could refer to either serpent or seraph. He refers to Genesis 3:14, Numbers 21:68, and II Corinthians 11:14 as evidence. Beer, Coleridge the Visionary, 127, indicates that the mythographers of Coleridge's own day were fascinated by this connection of serpents with seraphs. His example is Maurice's History of Hindustan, I, 338, which, as we have seen, Coleridge had read with great interest.

⁸¹As in "Kubla Khan" (and The Theory of Life), synthesis gives way to thesis and antithesis, which forms another synthesis and so on.

⁸²Martin Gardner, The Annotated Ancient Mariner (Cleveland, 1965), 219, makes another observation on myth which it is important to remember here: "in a symbolic narrative . . . only certain objects and incidents give to the story, in an overall way, a universal meaning." (See footnote 57 above.)

⁸³The same need to love not only a woman but to expand the mind outward to include all else is put forward in a more personal context in "Reflections on Having Left a Place of Retirement."

⁸⁴Coleridge on the Seventeenth Century, 613.

⁸⁵As Katharine Garvin explains it in "Snakes in the Grass," REL, II, ii, (April 1961), 20, Lilith is both Adam's first wife and a common Hebrew noun, equivalent to the Greek lamia or Arabian ghul. And Nethercot indicates that this connection was described by Purchas.

⁸⁶Howey, The Encircled Serpent, 386. Proclus also maintains that benevolent daemons can take the shape of snakes.

⁸⁷Arthur H. Nethercot, The Road to Tryermaine (New York, 1962), 135-138.

⁸⁸See particularly 60-126, Poetical Works, I, 133-136.

⁸⁹Biographia Literaria, I, 6.

⁹⁰This combination of pleasure and pain fascinated the seventeenth century as it did the later nineteenth century. Crashaw's verses on Teresa are among the best examples.

⁹¹Underhill, Mysticism, 40.

⁹²Quoted by Thomas R. Preston, "Christabel and the Mystical Tradition," Essays and Studies in Language and Literature (Duquesne Studies, Philological Series, 5, 1964), 148-149.

⁹³Ibid., 152.

⁹⁴Derwent Coleridge supports this interpretation of Geraldine: "[she is] no witch or goblin, or malignant being of any kind, but a spirit, executing her appointed task with the best of good-will." (Quoted by Beer, Coleridge the Visionary, 277; it is interesting to note that although he quotes this passage, Beer still sees Geraldine as an evil force.)

⁹⁵Of course, Coleridge's Gothic is always psychological, and he was very critical of pure and external horror. As Poe said, "The terror is not of Germany [external], but of the soul."

⁹⁶Table Talk, Collected Works, VI, 471.

⁹⁷"Christabel," 333-337, Poetical Works, I, 227.

⁹⁸Hawthorne, "Young Goodman Brown" and The Scarlet Letter, and Shelley, "Alastor" and Prometheus Unbound, for example. Coleridge also associates untamed nature with the unconscious mind in his comparison of the chthonic or Dionysian with the "heavenly" or Apollonian aspects of the mind.

⁹⁹Spiritually, of course, for the person whom she literally reaches is Geraldine. But the "scandalous" rumour, supposedly started by Hazlitt, that Geraldine was really a man in disguise may not be so far-fetched after all. If the connection with St. Theresa is considered, Geraldine could be Christ (and Christabel, Christ's chosen woman) appearing first as evil and later manifesting himself as he really is. But there is not enough evidence within the poem itself to support this interpretation.

¹⁰⁰Biographia Literaria, II, 120.

¹⁰¹Harold Bloom, The Visionary Company (New York, 1961), 207.

¹⁰²"Christabel," 16-19, Poetical Works, I, 216.

¹⁰³Beer, Coleridge the Visionary, 183.

¹⁰⁴At night, liliths can assume the form of snakes or owls. (As we have established, lamiae are themselves ambiguous figures, so there is a double ambiguity here.)

¹⁰⁵"Christabel," 58-65, Poetical Works, I, 217.

¹⁰⁶D'Arcy, Mind and Heart of Love, 163-164.

¹⁰⁷(Just as the fire, the opposite of light, had leapt into flame in her presence.) Coleridge makes good use of many of the common superstitions.

¹⁰⁸"Christabel," 202-206 and 211-213, Poetical Works, I, 222-223.

¹⁰⁹*Ibid.*, 227-232, Poetical Works, 223.

¹¹⁰This is, as many critics have pointed out, an observation which Coleridge made of his own son Hartley and included in "The Nightingale":

And he beheld the moon, and, hushed at once,
Suspends his sobs, and laughs most silently,
While his fair eyes, that swam with undropped tears,
Did glitter in the yellow moon-beam!

The similar image in "Christabel" can, although only by implication, be seen as the "unveiling" of the moon. Even as it stands, the "sudden light" is an important inclusion, for it can be seen as a portent of the transition from fire to light.

¹¹¹"Christabel," 326-331, Poetical Works, I, 226.

¹¹²*Ibid.*, 549-554, Poetical Works, I, 232.

¹¹³Quoted in Coleridge the Talker, 330.

¹¹⁴See Collected Notebooks, 1079 21.204.

¹¹⁵"Christabel," 636-641, Poetical Works, I, 234.

¹¹⁶Here the effect is reciprocal, for Geraldine has been at least partially restored by her encounter and even declares a "gentle thankfulness" to Christabel.

¹¹⁷According to Coleridge, The Philosophical Lectures, 314-316, neither was St. Teresa herself able to achieve the vital synthesis of conscious and unconscious, thought and feeling.

¹¹⁸Collected Letters, I, 643.

CHAPTER IV

¹The following lines from the "Letter to Asra" will effectively serve as an example:

Dear Mary! on her Lap my Head she lay'd--
Her Hand was on my Brow,
Even as my own is now;
And on my Cheek I felt the eye-lash play.
Such joy I had, that I may truly say,
My Spirit was awe-stricken with the Excess
And trance-like depth of it's brief Happiness.

Besides the double-epithets and the completely unnecessary "I may truly say," there is the extreme difficulty in ascertaining the spatial (let alone the spiritual) relationship between Mary and Coleridge.

²Although it is usually suggested that the last section is irrelevant to the poem, Charles S. Bouslog suggests that Coleridge could have ended at line 75. ("Structure and Theme in Coleridge's 'Dejection: An Ode'" MLQ, XXIV (1963), 50.)

³"Dejection: An Ode," 37-38, Poetical Works, I, 364.

⁴Ibid., 45-46, Poetical Works, I, 365.

⁵Biographia Literaria, II, 12. In "On the Principles of Genial Criticism," included in Biographia Literaria, II, 240, Coleridge quotes this central section of "Dejection," and says that it is a reflection of the following lines from Plotinus (Enneads, VI, 3, i):

discerning in certain objects the Ideal-Form which has bound and controlled shapeless matter . . . it [the perceptive faculty] gathers into unity what still remains fragmentary, catches it up and carries it within, . . . and presents it to the Ideal-Principles as something concordant and congenial

⁶E.H. Coleridge explains what Coleridge meant by Joy:

He called it joy, meaning thereby not mirth or high spirits, or even happiness, but a consciousness of entire and therefore well being, when the emotional and intellectual faculties are in equipoise.

Quoted by Richards, Coleridge on Imagination, 150.

⁷"Dejection: An Ode," 48-49 and 67-70, Poetical Works, I, 365-366. The next lines in the poem definitely indicate that Richards' conception of the primary imagination is in error, for Coleridge compares this kind of elevated perception with that of the "loveless ever-anxious crowd."

⁸Ibid., 87-93, Poetical Works, I, 367.

⁹He is, in a sense, reverting to a more traditional pattern of imagery.

¹⁰Aids to Reflection, Complete Works, I, 268. (Coleridge relates this suggestion to the fall of man as it is presented in Genesis.)

¹¹"Dejection: An Ode," 47, Poetical Works, I, 365.

¹²The relationship between man and nature is even more difficult to establish, for in a poem proclaiming the essential activity of the mind, the image of the wind harp is used. In the "Eolian Harp," it had been a symbol of the passive mind.

¹³"The Nightingale," 15-22, Poetical Works, I, 264-265. However, this poem does not stress the necessary wholeness of the mind before communication with nature can be possible, but suggests that wholeness can be achieved from nature.

¹⁴The pun on "genial" seems to be intentional. I am indebted to Dr. J.W. Bilsland for this suggestion.

¹⁵"Dejection: An Ode," 104-107, Poetical Works, I, 367.

¹⁶"An Effusion at Evening," 9-10, Poetical Works, I, 49.

¹⁷Both images are of pain and fear, and clearly indicate the divorce of thought from feeling.

¹⁸For the best critical comparison of the two versions, see Yarlott, Coleridge and the Abyssinian Maid, 244-279, especially 247, where he presents a chart of the different arrangement of the verses and the omissions in the second version.

¹⁹"Letter to Asra," included in Whalley, Coleridge and Sara Hutchinson and the Asra Poems, 156. It is interesting to note that in the next verse Coleridge indicates that even as a youth he had linked the love of a maiden with a moonlit scene. Such poems as "A Lover's Complaint to His Mistress" corroborate this suggestion.

²⁰Ibid., 111-112, Coleridge and Sara, 158.

²¹Ibid., 92-98, Coleridge and Sara, 157-158.

²²See lines 244-248 for Coleridge's reference to his discordant relationship with his wife, which even occasionally makes him wish his children had never been born, for they have converted his "Error to Necessity."

²³As Yarlott indicates, Coleridge and the Abyssinian Maid, 256, this suggestion seems to be the result of an earlier exchange of letters between Coleridge and Asra. Coleridge had written a letter to Asra probably indicating the pain which his necessary separation from her caused him, and also perhaps complaining of his domestic troubles. She had replied, placing the blame on herself, and indicating her own pain. Coleridge seems to suggest here that perhaps it would be better if they parted and tried to forget each other.

²⁴"Letter to Asra," 155-168, Coleridge and Sara, 159.

²⁵Collected Letters, I, 471.

²⁶"On Receiving an Account That His Only Sister's Death was Inevitable," 14, Poetical Works, I, 20.

²⁷As Yarlott suggests, Coleridge and the Abyssinian Maid, 32, all of Coleridge's "sheet anchors" had "the strength of character," the "self-sufficiency," and the "capacity for regulating his emotional life evenly" that Coleridge lacked.

²⁸Collected Letters, II, 1054-1055. See also "Constancy to an Ideal Object," where, without love, man is but a "becalméd bark, / Whose Helmsman on an ocean waste and wide / Sits mute and pale his mouldering helm beside." (Here there are echoes of "The Rime of the Ancient Mariner.")

²⁹Quoted by Whalley, Coleridge and Sara, 86.

³⁰Quoted by Raysor, "Coleridge and 'Asra'," 312.

³¹See "On a Discovery made Too Late," originally sent in a letter to Southey. See also Coleridge's letters to Mary proclaiming his love, Collected Letters, I, 131 and 140.

³²Collected Letters, I, 88.

³³Ibid., I, 116.

³⁴Ibid., I, 145.

³⁵See, for example, "To the Nightingale," "Lines Written at Shurton Bars," "The Eolian Harp," and "Reflections on Having Left a Place of Retirement."

³⁶Collected Letters, I, 306. (Also see "Sonnet to a Friend who Asked, How I Felt when the Nurse First Presented My Infant to Me.")

³⁷Ibid., I, 271.

³⁸Yarlott, Coleridge and the Abyssinian Maid, 104.

³⁹Collected Letters, I, 470-471. See also 493 where he admits to Poole, "my poor Muse is quite gone--perhaps, she may return & meet me at Stowey." It is also interesting to note that it was during the period between Germany and "Dejection" when Coleridge was without a fulfilled love that he began to wonder whether he possessed genius at all. (See Collected Letters, I, 656, and II, 714.)

⁴⁰Collected Letters, II, 832. In this letter Coleridge criticizes Sarah's coldness of mind: her mind is "warm in anger, cold in sympathy --and in all disputes uniformly projects itself forth to recriminate, instead of turning itself inward with a silent Self-questioning." (See also Collected Notebooks, 979 21.131.)

⁴¹Collected Letters, II, 767.

⁴²The most thorough accounts of this relationship are given by Raysor, "Coleridge and 'Asra'," and Whalley, Coleridge and Sara Hutchinson and the Asra Poems.

⁴³Collected Notebooks, 2036 15.15. Coleridge admits this fact several times in his personal notebooks; see, for example, 2000 9.106, and 2019 9.125.

⁴⁴In Notebook entry 1623 21.380, Coleridge defends such metaphysical investigations, and says that his purpose is "to make the Reason spread Light over our Feelings, to make our Feelings diffuse vital Warmth thro' our Reason--these are my objects--& these my Subjects." But at the same time he does admit, as he did in "Dejection" and in Biographia Literaria, I, 10, that he occasionally retreated into thought in order to avoid his own feelings. But at those times, his own "cowardice of all deep Feeling" affected even his metaphysics (1737 16.123).

⁴⁵Collected Notebooks, 1670 16.72.

⁴⁶Ibid., 2132 21.455.

⁴⁷Ibid., 1421 4.108.

⁴⁸Ibid., 1601 21.361.

⁴⁹Ibid., 2600 17.211. Coleridge, the "subtle-souled psychologist," as Shelley called him, attempts to interpret this "waking dream" in an equally significant comment which follows it.

⁵⁰Ibid., 2001 9.107.

⁵¹Ibid., 3148 12.63. This entry also indicates Coleridge's sense of inferiority to Wordsworth, for he imagines that if Wordsworth did love his Sara even a portion as much as he does himself, she should "inevitably love him."

⁵²Ibid., 1577 21.297. See also 2035 15.14.

⁵³For a complete list of the "Asra Poems" see Whalley, Coleridge and Sara, 151-180.

⁵⁴Biographia Literaria, II, 14.

⁵⁵Quoted by George Watson, Coleridge the Poet (London, 1966), 49.

⁵⁶The circular structure of Coleridge's "Conversation Poems" was first explored by Max F. Schulz in The Poetic Voices of Coleridge (Detroit, 1963), 73-99, and the present suggestion follows his argument. The pattern is, of course, only a general one, the best example of it being "This Lime-tree Bower my Prison."

⁵⁷Ibid., 131.

⁵⁸Schulz, Poetic Voices of Coleridge, 132. Schulz's example is "To William Wordsworth"; although Whalley includes this poem among the "Asra poems" it will not be discussed here, as it is not a central "Asra" poem. Schulz's summary of the poem will suffice:

Many characteristics of the confession poem appear in "To William Wordsworth": (1) the swift alternation of emotions, of "life's joy rekindling" only to arouse a "throng of pains"; (2) the cry of unrequited love and the lament for "past youth and manhood come in vain. / And genius given and knowledge won in vain"; (3) the hopeless feeling that the future lies dead in the unfulfilled promise of the past; and (4) the sense of isolation that results from being pitied rather than loved.

⁵⁹Schulz, "The Wry Vision of Coleridge's Love Poetry," Personalist, XLV (1964), 214. However, the primary purpose in the following examination of Coleridge's "Asra poems" is not to indicate his poetic failings, but to examine his treatment of love (and often to indicate more successful lines in these poems).

⁶⁰According to Miss Adair, The Waking Dream, 185, the date of this poem is late 1799, soon after Coleridge and Asra met. The following discussion of the most important "Asra poems" will in most cases follow Miss Adair's dating. She herself is following Raysor's suggestion in "Coleridge and 'Asra'," 323, that Coleridge's notebooks are the key to his poetry written between 1802 and 1810; and she often finds evidence which contradicts Whalley's suggested dates. The fact that the poems are so closely related to the notebook entries also reinforces the fact that at this period even in verse Coleridge could not escape from his personal life. The poems themselves justify biographical criticism, although the application of such a method to the major mythical poems is completely unwarranted. (For Coleridge's own dislike of personal criticism see Biographia Literaria, II, 86-87.)

⁶¹"The Keepsake," 6-9, Poetical Works, I, 345.

⁶²Sara Hutchinson's famous auburn hair, mentioned by Dorothy Wordsworth and Coleridge's children, is one of the few details that we have of her appearance. (See Whalley, Coleridge and Sara, 38.)

⁶³This image is close to the one in "An Effusion at Evening" where the poet spreads "flowers" over "icy plains."

⁶⁴See Collected Notebooks, 578 5.73 and 1575 21.296, both dated November 25th, 1799.

⁶⁵For instance, in "Love," the first "Asra poem," after the knight has endured "ten long years" of suffering, his disdainful lady finally consents to be his wife. See also "The Day-Dream" and "The Happy Husband."

⁶⁶"The Keepsake," 37-39, Poetical Works, I, 346.

⁶⁷"Ode to Tranquility," 25-26, Poetical Works, I, 361.

⁶⁸Adair, The Waking Dream, 188.

⁶⁹"Ode after Bathing," 23-24, Poetical Works, I, 360.

⁷⁰See Whalley, Coleridge and Sara, 120, and Collected Notebooks, 980 21.132. Coleridge frequently repeats the initials of Dorothy, Mary, Sara Hutchinson, and Wordsworth in his notebook, often arranging them in groups.

⁷¹Lines 31-36 are quite close to lines 99-110 in the "Letter to Asra." (Here the "eyelash" line is clarified.)

⁷²"A Day Dream," 25-30, Poetical Works, I, 385.

⁷³See Collected Notebooks, 1829 16.212, for instance.

⁷⁴"Separation," 17-20, Poetical Works, I, 398. That this uneasy tranquility did not last long is also obvious from the similar conclusions of "The Pains of Sleep," 1803 ("To be beloved is all I need, / And whom I love, I love indeed."), and "The Blossoming of the Solitary Date Tree," 1805 ("Why was I made for Love and Love denied to me?").

⁷⁵Miss Adair, The Waking Dream, 192, disagrees with Whalley, and suggests it was written immediately before "Dejection." However, her reasons are not conclusive.

⁷⁶"The Picture," 46-54, Poetical Works, I, 370.

⁷⁷*Ibid.*, 27-33, Poetical Works, I, 370.

⁷⁸*Ibid.*, 83-85, Poetical Works, I, 371.

⁷⁹*Ibid.*, 91-94, Poetical Works, I, 371.

⁸⁰*Ibid.*, 106-111, Poetical Works, I, 372.

⁸¹*Ibid.*, 169-172, Poetical Works, I, 374.

⁸²Yarlott, The Abyssinian Maid, 39.

⁸³"The Picture," 178-186, Poetical Works, I, 374.

⁸⁴"To Asra," 4-9, Poetical Works, I, 361. This fountain image should also be related to the poetic fountain in "Kubla Khan," although the love which activated it, so to speak, was a sexual one. This love, as the concluding lines indicate, is definitely spiritual. This same image of the fountain within, associated with Joy and with Asra, is repeated in a notebook entry of 1804 (Collected Notebooks, 2279 21.473) when such a joy is past:

Oh Sara! I am never happy, never deeply gladdened--I know not, I have forgotten what the Joy is of ~~that~~ which the Heart is full as of a deep & quiet fountain overflowing insensibly, or the gladness of Joy, when the fountain overflows ebullient.

⁸⁵"Religious Musings," 417-419, Poetical Works, I, 125.

⁸⁶"Love's Sanctuary," 2-5, Poetical Works, I, 362.

⁸⁷See also "An Angel Visitant," "Recollections of Love," and "Phantom or Fact."

⁸⁸"Phantom," 1-3 and 7-8, Poetical Works, I, 393.

⁸⁹Collected Notebooks, 2441 17.15. See also 2055 15.28, 2061 15.33, 2078 15.45, and Adair, The Waking Vision, 208-210.

⁹⁰Marshall Suther, The Dark Night of Samuel Taylor Coleridge (New York, 1960), 55. One of his examples is as follows: "I have loved so as I should feel no shame to describe to an Angel, and as my experience makes me suspect--to an Angel alone would be intelligible."

⁹¹Quoted by Raysor, "Coleridge and 'Asra'," 319.

⁹²See page 59 of this thesis.

⁹³Quoted by Raysor, "Coleridge and 'Asra'," 318.

⁹⁴Suther, The Dark Night, 44.

⁹⁵Yarlott, The Abyssinian Maid, 290.

⁹⁶Coleridge's renunciation of the possibility of love came long after his rejection of the possibility of achieving communion with nature (for communion with nature depended on the Joy of love). His continuing hope that love would restore him is shown in such poems as "The Visionary

Hope," and the final lack of hope in "Love's Apparition and Evanishment":

And then came Love, a sylph in bridal trim,
And stood beside my seat;
She bent, and kiss'd her sister's lips,
As she was wont to do;--
Alas! 'twas but a chilling breath
Woke just enough of life in death
To make Hope die anew.

⁹⁷ Indeed, if his love had been completely fulfilled, Coleridge, like Plotinus' lover and poet, might have lingered longer over the earthly manifestations of the spiritual.

⁹⁸ Collected Notebooks, 2600 17.21.

⁹⁹ Symposium, 211c, Collected Dialogues, 562-563.

¹⁰⁰ Quoted by De Marquette, Introduction to Comparative Mysticism, 125. Miss Underhill, Mysticism, 41, discusses this same process:

there are really two distinct acts of "divine union," two distinct kinds of illumination involved in the Mystic Way. . . . First, there is the union with Life, with the World of Becoming Secondly, there is the union with Being, with the One: and that final, ineffable illumination of pure love which is called the "knowledge of God."

¹⁰¹ Also see Literary Remains, I, 230.

¹⁰² "Psyche," Poetical Works, 412. This poem also illustrates the emblematic quality of Coleridge's later poetry. As Whalley indicates, "'Late Autumn Amaranth': Coleridge's Later Poems," PTRSC, II (1964), 170, the later poems are either personal, "Asra poems," or emblematical and metaphysical poems. Coleridge was against allegory and metaphysical "wit," but once his interest in the immanence of God had passed, his poems were more often allegorical than symbolical.

¹⁰³ The poem also brings to mind Dante's Purgatorio, X, 124-126: "Perceive ye not that we are mere worms / Born to form the angelic butterfly?"

¹⁰⁴ "Self-Knowledge," 9, Poetical Works, I, 487. "Limbo" and "Life-in-Death" express an equally dark view of earthly existence.

¹⁰⁵ Collected Notebooks, 2317 21.501.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., 2556 17.114. Also see The Philosophical Lectures, 249.

¹⁰⁷Literary Remains, III, 309.

¹⁰⁸Biographia Literaria, I, 57.

CONCLUSION

¹Neville Rogers, Shelley at Work (Oxford, 1956), 110. Also see A.C. Bradley, "Coleridge-Echoes in Shelley's Poems," A Miscellany (New York, 1929), 171-176.

²Quoted by Beer, Coleridge the Visionary, 291.

³See Notopoulos, The Platonism of Shelley, 376-515 for these translations.

⁴See Knight, The Starlit Dome, for an examination of such parallels.

⁵Floyd Stovall, "Shelley's Doctrine of Love," PMLA, XLV (1930), 283.

⁶Shelley, Discourse on the Manners of the Ancients, Selected Poetry, Prose and Letters, ed. Glover, 1021-1022.

⁷Ibid., 1022.

⁸Ibid.

⁹Shelley, On Love, Glover, 974-975.

¹⁰Ibid., 975.

¹¹Notopoulos, Platonism of Shelley, 347.

¹²Shelley, A Defence of Poetry, Glover, 1032.

¹³Although Shelley is like Coleridge in proclaiming the imagination a synthetic power which releases us from "the accident of surrounding impressions," he is unlike Coleridge in proclaiming that poetry "is not subject to the active powers of the mind, and that its birth and recurrence has no necessary connection with the consciousness or will." The image of the Eolian lyre which he uses in the Defence of Poetry seems to be fitted to this conception; however, when he uses it he does qualify it somewhat by saying that there is a principle within the mind

of man which acts other than the passive lyre and "produces not melody alone, but harmony, by an internal adjustment of the sounds and motions thus excited to the impressions which excite them."

¹⁴Woodman, The Apocalyptic Vision, 40-61.

¹⁵Of course, its scope is larger than this; it explores all of the questions central to Shelley--the nature of man, the relationship between man and his gods and man and the Ideal, and the nature of Good and Evil. However, the examination here will be restricted to the nature of the imagination and its connection with Eros and Agape.

¹⁶Shelley, Prometheus Unbound, I, 8, A Variorum Edition, ed. John Zillman (Seattle, 1959), 131.

¹⁷Ibid., I, 381-382, Zillman, 155.

¹⁸Shelley's conception of Prometheus is much like his idea of Christ. Christ was not divine because he was the son of God; in fact, this was impossible, for a God full of hate and revenge could never beget a son so full of love and forgiveness. As Shelley says in his Essay on Christianity (probably 1816), Christ was divine in the fullest sense. He was a perfect man. Not only did he teach and live by the doctrines of love, gentleness, and forgiveness towards those who cursed him, but he also maintained those values through great suffering. As Shelley says in Hellas,

A power from the unknown God,
A Promethean conqueror, came:
Like a triumphal path he trod
The thorns of death and shame.

Although certainly less directly, Shelley also makes a connection between Christ and Prometheus on this poem. As he says in the "Preface" to the poem Prometheus is also the Satanic rebel but, like Christ, he is "exempt from [Satan's] taints of ambition, envy, revenge. . . ."

¹⁹This act of going out of oneself and identifying with another is essentially the same act that partially releases the Ancient Mariner. (Shelley greatly admired Coleridge's "Ancient Mariner.")

²⁰Quoted in Zillman's edition of Prometheus Unbound, 387.

²¹Prometheus Unbound, I, 57-59, Zillman, 134.

²²Ibid., IV, 557-561, Zillman, 299.

²³A Defence of Poetry, Glover, 1043.

²⁴As many critics have observed, Mary and Clare are also in the poem, as the moon and the comet.

²⁵"Epipsychidion," 162-169, Poetical Works, ed. Thomas Hutchinson et al. (2nd ed; Oxford, 1970), 415.

²⁶Ibid., 112-115, Hutchinson, 414.

²⁷Ibid., 573-583, Hutchinson, 423-424.

²⁸Ibid., 479, Hutchinson, 422.

²⁹A Defence of Poetry, Glover, 1052.

³⁰Quoted by Northrop Frye, A Study of English Romanticism, 105.

³¹Quoted by Beer, Coleridge the Visionary, 35.

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